
Usually, you can advertise and discuss a product, even if not everyone is allowed to buy it. Thanks to the First Amendment, you can advertise a prescription drug even though most people don’t have a prescription for it, as the Supreme Court ruled in 1976. You can advertise liquor and guns, even if minors can’t buy them, and gambling. The First Amendment has been held by the courts to protect advertising of all these things. But Massachusetts securities regulators think you shouldn’t be allowed to advertise your hedge fund on a website, if it is accessible to Massachusetts residents, even though hedge funds are perfectly legal.
Massachusetts fined Bulldog Investors, an out-of-state hedge fund, $25,000 because it had a website promoting the hedge fund, and emailed information about the hedge fund to a Massachusetts resident, even though neither he nor the hedge fund intended to enter into a securities transaction, and Massachusetts admits the hedge fund was not trying to sell him anything. Massachusetts argues in essence that the hedge fund needs to shut up to avoid “conditioning the market” for its product, an investment that only “sophisticated” investors with lots of money are legally allowed to buy. Massachusetts’ ban is based on the paternalistic desire to keep people in the dark about hedge funds for their own good. (The practical effect of such bans is that even journalists like Deirdre Brennan of FINalternatives have had difficulty reporting on hedge funds and accessing basic information about them, since hedge fund managers are scared to even talk to journalists.)
Keeping people in the dark for their own supposed good obviously doesn’t measure up under the Supreme Court’s First Amendment commercial-speech jurisprudence, so Massachusetts disingenuously justified the ban in court as a roundabout way of forcing hedge funds to register with government agencies and provide specified disclosures in the course of doing so (a rather ineffectual way of promoting such disclosures, judging from the fact that Bulldog blocked public access to its website, rather than registering, after Massachusetts fined it; Massachusetts relied on the conclusory assertions of a hired expert, Professor Franco, who admitted he had no empirical evidence, and could not even quantify how effective the ban is in forcing hedge funds to register). Amazingly, the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court bought this argument hook, line, and sinker, upholding a trial court ruling in which the judge herself admitted that “Professor Franco does not purport to quantify the effectiveness of the regulatory scheme, and the Court is not in a position to do so.” Apparently, speech restrictions do not need to achieve anything useful to pass muster in Massachusetts. They just need to be based on a dubious rationale that is invented in response to a First Amendment challenge.
As CEI explained in an amicus brief I submitted on behalf of journalists, academics, and think tanks, that pretextual rationale, invented after-the-fact in litigation, cannot survive the “intermediate scrutiny” that applies to commercial advertising restrictions, which forbids “hypothesized justifications” and post hoc rationales for a regulation that did not actually motivate the challenged regulation. See, e.g., Thompson v. Western States Medical Ctr., 535 U.S. 357, 373 (2002); United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515, 533, 535-36 (1996).
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