American Enterprise Institute

Government Promoted the Risky Non-Traditional Mortgages that Triggered the Financial Crisis

by Hans Bader on July 26, 2011 · 1 comment

in Bailout Watch, Economy, Politics as Usual, Regulation, Zeitgeist

Ed Pinto, who was an executive at Fannie Mae long before it went into the toilet and nearly took the financial system down with it, notes that “the financial crisis resulted from an unprecedented accumulation of weak and risky Non-Traditional Mortgages (NTMs)” promoted by both the government and the government-sponsored mortgage giant Fannie Mae. “Each type of NTM featured increased borrower leverage and risk.”

In Government Housing Policy: The Sine Qua Non of the Financial Crisis, he describes in detail how government housing policy explicitly promoted massive increases in leverage and moral hazard by both borrowers and investors and chronicles the central role played by Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac as the clearly-acknowledged kings of moral hazard and leverage. As he points out, government involvement included the facts that (1) Congress, at the behest of community advocacy groups, forced Fannie and Freddie to replace conservative underwriting with flexible underwriting knowing that banks would follow suit; (2) Fannie vowed to transform the housing finance system using flexible underwriting, in an effort to protect its charter privileges bestowed by Congress; and (3) HUD, after a decade of effort, proudly took credit for a revolution in affordable lending. This revolution then led directly to the 2008 financial crisis, which precipitated a $160 billion bailout of Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac, the nation’s two government-sponsored mortgage giants.

(Unlike the private banks, which repaid their bailouts with interest, Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac are not expected to repay taxpayers, and their bailout tab may rise to $1 trillion, according to Bloomberg News. The Obama administration earlier lifted the $400 billion limit on bailouts for Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac, so that they could continue to buy up junky mortgages at taxpayer expense, and showered their executives with $42 million in compensation. In May 2010, the administration and its congressional allies blocked efforts to reform Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac.)

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Spinning the Defeat of Cap-and-Trade

by Marlo Lewis on August 11, 2010 · 1 comment

in Global Warming

Barring the trickery of a lame duck conference committee, cap-and-trade is dead in the 111th Congress. Some blame Obama for not taking a more hands-on role. Others blame environmental groups for waging a $100 million lobbying campaign without winning a single GOP convert to the Kerry-Lieberman cap-and-trade bill. Others blame the allegedly “well-funded denial machine,” even though proponents, who include major corporations like British Petroleum, must have outspent CEI and its free-market brethren by more than 100 to 1.

Today’s Climatewire (subscription required) features interviews with Exelon Corp. VP Betsy Moler and Phil Sharp, President of Resources for the Future, who lament that Republican lawmakers, the “inventors” of “market-based” environmental policy, have turned against their own “invention.” If I catch their drift, Moler and Sharp are trying to spin GOP opposition to cap-and-trade as self-contradictory, hence as unstable, hence as reversible. As Climatewire reports, Moler is not ready to “throw in the towel” and Sharp entertains the hope that a “new kind of coalition” will emerge in the next Congress.

Now, let’s look at this notion, peddled by Moler and Sharp, that Republicans betrayed themselves and besmirched their own legacy by blocking cap-and-trade. Here’s how it’s discussed in Climatewire:

In an interview, Moler said that her deep disappointment was the rejection by Republican leaders in Congress of a market-based strategy for raising the price of carbon emissions, to speed transitions by power plants, industry and consumers to cleaner energy.

The Democrats called it “cap and trade.” Republicans labeled it “cap and tax,” and the change in one word proved lethal.

“The thing that just amazes me, confounds me, surprises me is how successfully the Republican leadership and a lot of the people who would be potentially negatively impacted have been in vilifying what have historically been market-based solutions,” Moler said.

Inventors Turn on Invention

“Cap and trade is really a Republican instrument that grew out of a lot of the Republican thought leaders as a market-sensitive, market-friendly, anti-command-and-control mechanism” to reduce sulfur- and nitrogen-based air pollution in the 1990 Clean Air Act amendments. “Now, some of the same people who invented it have turned on it as an energy tax,” she said. “It’s a huge missed opportunity. I don’t know where you go next.”

Moler’sregret is seconded by Philip Sharp, president of Resources for the Future, who, as a Democratic House member from Indiana, stood with Moler in the 1990s in the energy deregulation campaign. Sharp was a pivotal factor in Congress’ adoption of the 1990 Clean Air Act amendments and the 1992 Energy Policy Act, which opened the way for FERC’s electricity market orders four years later.

“I’m not here to say cap and trade is the only way to do this,” Sharp said in an interview. “It worked magnificently with SO2 and a couple of other instances.” Scaling it up massively to deal with economywide carbon emissions is another question. “We don’t know we can manage it as effectively,” he said.

“But what is really unfortunate in the public debate is that the current Republican leadership has overthrown one of the great Republican successes in this country [under President George H.W. Bush], to capitalize on the flexibility of the marketplace” in achieving regulatory change, Sharp said.

“I don’t think people appreciate the extraordinary challenge that represented and the difficulty of getting it done” in the 1990s, he said. Now, with the demise of that approach, Congress has invited U.S. EPA to step in on the climate front “and regulate the living [daylights] out of everything and see how well a modern economy works doing that.”

Moler and Sharp miss several key points.

First, the Title IV acid rain cap-and-trade program enacted under President George H.W. Bush is not the “magnificent” success they suppose it is. As Kenneth Green, Steven Hayward, and Kevin Hasset of the American Enterprise Institute note, prices of tradable sulfur dioxide (SO2) emission permits have been highly volatile: “SO2 trading prices have varied from a low of $70 per ton in 1996 to $1500 per ton in late 2005. SO2 allowances have a monthly volatility of 10 percent and an annual volatility of 43 percent over the last decade.”

Second, utilities participating in the SO2 emissions trading program could meet all or part of their obligations by purchasing low-sulfur coal and/or installing scrubbers, a commercially-proven emission control technology. In contrast, there is no low-carbon coal, and no commercially-proven technology to “scrub” carbon dioxide (CO2) emissions out of power plant exhaust streams.

Third, unlike sulfur, which is an impurity or contaminant in coal and oil, carbon is intrinsic to the chemistry of fossil fuels. Consequently, whereas emission control requirements for SO2 do not logically entail an unlimited agenda aiming at total abolition of the fuel, emission control requirements for CO2 do imply abolition as the ultimate objective. Such extremism is reflected in the apocalyptic rhetoric of the global warming movement, in petitions demanding that EPA establish national ambient air quality standards (NAAQS) for CO2 at 350 parts per million and for other greenhouse gases at pre-industrial levels (not even a global depression lasting several decades would be sufficient to lower CO2 concentrations to 350 ppm), and in Al Gore’s campaign to “repower America“ with “zero-carbon energy” within “ten years.” More pertinently, pull-out-the-stops, sky-is-the-limit regulation lurks in the Waxman-Markey and Kerry-Lieberman bills’ escalator clauses, which all but ensure that the explicit emission reduction target (83% below 2005 levels by 2050) would be superseded by more aggressive requirements.

Fourth, just because a “market-based” approach is more efficient, in principle, than command-and-control regulation does not in any way obligate Republicans to support Waxman-Markey or Kerry-Lieberman if those same Republicans oppose all regulatory climate policies.

Fifth, every Republican in the Senate voted for the Murkowski resolution to block EPA regulation of greenhouse gases via the Clean Air Act. So it’s silly to say that Republicans “invited U.S. EPA to step in on the climate front ‘and regulate the living [daylights] out of everything. . .’” President Obama threatened to veto both the Murkowski resolution and the much weaker Rockefeller bill, which would merely postpone EPA regulation of stationary sources of greenhouse gases for two years. It’s the Democratic leadership, not the GOP, that has “invited” EPA to make climate policy through the regulatory back door.

Finally, Republicans betray themselves (ask President George “Read My Lips; No New Taxes” Bush) when they vote for rather than against higher taxes. Because carbon is intrinsic to the chemistry of fossil fuels, a carbon cap-and-trade scheme is a virtual broad-based energy tax. The same cannot be said of the SO2 program, which was merely a virtual pollution tax. Moler and Sharp would like GOP lawmakers to believe they can win elections by becoming the Party of Energy Taxes. Fortunately, most Republicans don’t need much coaching to realize that is complete bunk.

Peekaboo! PCAOB More Powerful and Less Accountable than Government Claims

by Jonathan Moore on December 4, 2009 · 7 comments

in Legal

On December 7, the U.S. Supreme Court will hear Free Enterprise Fund v. Public Company Accounting Oversight Board. The case, brought by CEI and Jones Day attorneys on behalf of the Free Enterprise Fund, challenges the constitutionality of the way Public Company Accounting Oversight Board (also known as PCAOB, or not so affectionately as Peekaboo) members are appointed. The PCAOB, which was established by the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, is an independent governmental agency (according to Sarbanes-Oxley it is a private institution, but even supporters of the Board’s structure admit that it is a governmental body) whose members are selected by the SEC commissioners collectively. The lawyers arguing the case argue that this selection process violates the appointments clause of the Constitution.

The Constitution, in Article 2 sec. 2, establishes that the President “Shall have Power, by and with the Advice and Consent of the Senate to… nominate, and by and with the Advice and Consent of the Senate, shall appoint Ambassadors, other public Ministers and Consuls, Judges of the supreme Court, and all other Officers of the United States, whose Appointments are not herein otherwise provided for, and which shall be established by Law: but the Congress may by Law vest the Appointment of such inferior Officers, as they think proper, in the President alone, in the Courts of Law, or in the Heads of Departments.”

According to the Constitution, the President is responsible for appointing what has later been defined as “principal officers.” Further, if the officers are deemed to be “inferior officers,” Congress may give appointment power to the President, a judge, or the head of a department. Lawyers for the Free Enterprise Fund charge that regardless of whether the PCAOB members are principal or inferior, the Constitution has been violated. The President does not appoint the board members, and as such, if they are principal officers, the Constitution has been violated. If the board members, however, are inferior officers, they have not been appointed by a head of a department, rather, they have been appointed by the SEC commissioners.

Lawyers defending the constitutionality of the PCAOB have charged that the board members are inferior officers, and that the SEC commissioners collectively are the head of the SEC. Further, they claim that the SEC has complete control over the PCAOB through several powers, including the power to review all PCAOB rules, and approving the PCAOB’s budget. As such, they argue, this direct supervisory authority makes the PCAOB clear inferior officers, and since the President has control over the SEC commissioners, who have control over the PCAOB, the President has “fully effective control” over the PCAOB.

Yesterday, however, at an American Enterprise Institute event titled “Public Company Accounting Oversight Board: A Preview”, former SEC Commissioner (2002-2008) Paul Atkins provided an alternative story of the SEC’s control over the PCAOB, as well as refuting the claim that the SEC commissioners are collectively the head of the SEC.

Atkins noted several areas in which the PCAOB managed to evade SEC controls and operate very independently of the SEC. First, he stated that the PCAOB’s budget was not nearly as under control by the SEC as has been claimed. Atkins stated that the “staff at Peekaboo were not telling the truth” to the SEC about the PCAOB’s budget. His experience at the SEC led him to the conclusion that the SEC “didn’t really have the authority it supposedly did” over the PCAOB’s budget.

At one point, the SEC asked the PCAOB for a business plan regarding their operations. The PCAOB chairman informed the SEC that Sarbanes-Oxley “was his business plan” and for five years the PCAOB evaded the SEC’s demand for a business plan.

After the PCAOB produced their “Audit Standard 2”, “all five” SEC commissioners were in favor of “radical” changes to it, and yet it took the SEC years to even make “some” changes to the auditing standards due in part to PCAOB recalcitrance.

He stated that the PCAOB used “informal rulemaking” to adopt “staff-driven” rules which evaded the need to obtain SEC approval for all rules. As an example, he says that the PCAOB’s rule making regarding stock options was “not subject to any rule at all” despite functioning as a rule.

Atkins directly refuted the claim that the SEC has plenary power over the PCAOB, stating bluntly that the SEC’s “power is not plenary” regarding the PCAOB. He even said that a good analogy for SEC oversight of the PCAOB was that of “pushing on a string”.

Atkins also implied that considering the SEC commissioners as a collective head for the SEC was ignoring the realities of the day-to-day operation of the SEC. He stated that the chairman has considerably more power than the other commissioners. He noted that the 1950 Reorganization Plan 10 gave “authority over the budget” and “HR decisions” to the SEC’s chairman. He did say that consensus among the commissioners is generally important, but said that “in reality, he can still appoint whoever he wants” to critical appointment posts. And yet, this does not apply to the PCAOB, who are appointed collectively by the SEC. Further, Atkins even questioned whether or not the President had direct power over the SEC, a lynchpin of the defenders of the SEC’s argument. He stated that the SEC’s history “illustrates how difficult it is for the President to assert authority” over the SEC, much less the PCAOB.

Atkins’ telling of the SEC and PCAOB’s relationship calls much of the PCAOB’s legal defense into question. If the SEC lacks reliable control over the PCAOB, how can the President have “fully effective control” over the PCAOB? If, one wonders, the SEC chairman is treated as the appointer for other positions within the SEC, which implies that he is the head of the department, why is it that he does not have the power to appoint the PCAOB members? And why is the SEC chairman sufficiently powerful to act as the head in all other appointment cases, but when it comes to the PCAOB he must act as an equal to his fellow commissioners? And further, if the President lacks even control over the SEC, how can he truly have control over the PCAOB members, who are an additional step further down the chain of command?

These are some questions the justices should be asking on December 7.