Big Three

Workers may get violent if their wages are cut. The United Auto Workers union (UAW) has a monopoly and was an anchor on the Big Three U.S. automakers. These two ideas were professed by two labor leaders at the recent Federalist Society Convention in Washington, D.C.

There may be violence, says Damon A. Silvers, Associate General Counsel for the AFL-CIO and Deputy Chair of the Congressional Oversight Panel for TARP. Silvers spoke on last Friday’s panel “Labor: Wall Street, Labor Unions, and the Obama Administration: A New Paradigm for Capitol and Labor?” Speaking to the panel, he claimed economic downturns which cause people to have their wages cut, can have devastating results.

Silvers pointed to wage cuts in Brazil and spoke of the violence which ensued. He argued that when people are starving they may get violent, that the have nots will take from the haves. Quickly cautioning that this could not happen in the United States, he smirked and added, “but it may.” Not so subtly, Silvers implied that if you cut union wages there may be violence.

Another gem from the convention came from Thursday’s lead discussion “Redistribution of Wealth.” One presenter, when asked what happened to the auto industry in regards to unions, stated, “Unions missed the most basic fundamental economic role they have to play, which is to take wages out of competition. What happened was when they had a monopoly or took wages out of competition for the Big Three people competed more inefficiently…When the transplants came…the union didn’t do its job, it was an anchor to the competitive field as opposed to a help.”

Which right leaning free-market intellectuals stated this fact? None other than any Andrew Stern, the president of the SEIU! That is correct, Andy Stern blamed the collapse of the Big Three in part to the union monopoly of the UAW and called it an anchor to competition.

More characteristically, Stern also spoke of redistribution of wealth saying, “I do no support, I condemn, the redistribution of wealth — that is to say, the redistribution of wealth upwards.”

Advocating the redistribution of wealth? Cautioning of violence if wages are cut? Is this really the message top officials in the two largest labor unions want to be sending? Both Stern and Silvers knew their audience did not agree with them – Stern was sweating during his presentation – but did make an effort to speak to the constitutionally minded lawyers association.

Unfortunately, while tempered, their message was a clear endorsement of class warfare. Espousing unions as the only way for workers to get ahead in America, they chastised the Reagan era and directly blamed the demise of unions for what they claimed were lower worker wages. They ignored facts of other presenters showing that most workers’ standard of living has actually gone up in the last 30 years.

Stern should be given credit for acknowledging that the UAW monopoly helped almost destroy the American auto industry. He must acknowledge that hard work, innovation, and ingenuity are the real engine of the American economy, not collective bargaining. The monopolistic nature of unions in many industries is a liability to both workers and unions. As Stern pointed out in the context of the failure of the U.S. auto industry, unions’ inflexibility can drag down companies and work as a hindrance, not a help.

The United Auto Workers’ (UAW) loud complaining that they’re being asked to bear a disproportionate share of the costs of restructuring the Big Three begs the question: How much is their fair share to bear? As Holman Jenkins notes, in his Wall Street Journal column, the UAW may not like the answer.

The two parties that turned the Big Three into a perennially limping freak of unwritten industrial policy now will take formal ownership of their handiwork. The United Auto Workers (UAW) would own 39% of GM. The federal government would own 50%. The creditors will be shafted with just 10%. (In the Chrysler plan being discussed, labor would own 55%, making it effectively a subsidiary of the UAW.)

The day after any such settlement is finalized, the clock will start ticking down to the next collective-bargaining session between a monopoly UAW and what remains of the Big Three — though now the UAW would be sitting on both sides of the table.

Nearly 25 years ago, a Los Angeles Times reporter innocently and accurately invoked the “M” word in describing the domestic auto sector, noting that the arrival of Japanese auto plants was “threatening the UAW’s traditional monopoly on labor in the domestic auto industry.”

The erosion of the Big Three’s market share since then has really been the erosion of the market for monopoly labor-produced cars. The UAW standard tactic, “pattern bargaining,” which it pursues without embarrassment, would have gotten Bill Gates thrown in jail under the antitrust laws.

In practice, monopoly bargaining generally leads to an adversarial relationship between a company’ s management and the union that represents its employees, so it will be interesting to see how the UAW “sitting on both sides of the table” affects this dynamic. On the one hand, its members would still expect the UAW to gain the highest pay and benefits possible. On the other, as a major partial owner, it would have very strong incentives to keep costs down to help increase profits.

In the public sector, two parties sharing the same goal is common, since government agency administrators and the unionized employees they supervise both want to justify getting more money from taxpayers, who can’t go elsewhere. Car buyers, however, can go take their business elsewhere.

Last night, the Detroit Big Three bailout package crashed and burned for the best of reasons. To their credit, Senate Republicans refused to abide the United Auto Workers’ cavalier attitude toward further, drastic concessions. Reports The New York Times:

Late Thursday, the Senate did not take up an assistance measure passed by the House, after hours of negotiations between Senate Republicans with the auto companies and the U.A.W. The sticking point apparently was the union’s refusal to agree to lower wage and benefit rates as soon as next year.

Representatives for the union, which had already accepted a series of cuts in its current contract, sought instead to push any more concessions back to 2011, when the U.A.W.’s contract with Detroit auto companies expires.

And the UAW’s stated reason for wanting to take so long? The union put out a statement:

“Unfortunately, Senate Republicans insisted that this had to be accomplished by an arbitrary deadline. This arbitrary requirement was not imposed on any other stakeholder groups. Thus, the U.A.W. believed this was a blatant attempt to make workers shoulder the lion’s share of the costs of any restructuring plan,” the statement said.

Isn’t it inconvenient how an emergency can impose an “arbitrary deadline”? The UAW’s argument of “Make them do more!” cannot obscure the fact that the union itself still needs to make further concessions, no matter what.

If the Detroit auto makers’ situation were truly as dire as they and the union claim, they’d be renegotiating contracts now.

 

Apple's 1984  "Big Brother" commercial.

Apple's 1984 "Big Brother" ad

An article over at Ad Age brings up an angle on the whole auto industry bailout probably not considered much before.  The fact that a yet-to-be-appointed “car czar” will have control over a multibillion dollar advertising budget for the big three.  Under the guise of “oversight,” this would effectively “Create World’s Most Powerful Marketing Exec[utive].”  

The draft rescue plan for Detroit sent to the White House by Congress yesterday calls for the appointment of a “car czar” who will oversee the Big Three automakers’ expenses over $25 million — which, by extension, would include media buys. Based on Advertising Age’s estimates of spending by General Motors Corp., Chrysler and Ford Motor Co., that would give the as-yet-unnamed car czar control over some $7.3 billion in marketing spending in the U.S. alone.

The most disturbing thoughts about this (particularly to those concerned with liberty) are provoked here: 

The car czar would wield a budget more than double those of AT&T, Verizon, Unilever and Johnson & Johnson, which round out the nation’s top five marketing spenders, and give the car czar more clout with media and agencies than such famed names in marketing as Walmart Chief Marketing Officer Stephen Quinn and Anheuser-Busch VP-Marketing Dave Peacock.

…If the bailout goes through, agencies that work for the Big Three will essentially be toiling on a government account, with all the associated red tape and strictures that involves.

So there you have it.  We should all be concerned about this for many reasons.  As mentioned, the large ad budget that comes with a czar-controlled U.S. auto industry will allow a government bureaucrat to wield unbalanced and unchecked influence over not only who gets ad contracts, but what media outlets get ad money. The czar can simply refuse to give business to an advertising agency who works for a foreign competitor of the big three (or a “non-compliant” corporation), or refuse to pay money to show ads on outlets that they deem “unfriendly” to the administration or its mission.   This will be an unequivocal disaster.  We have already seen the lengths to which administrations (and pre-administrations) have gone to influence and/or silence media they do not like.  What kind of power plays do you think are possible when the administration’s appointee controls a major source of media outlets’ ad revenue? Whatever it ends up being, it won’t be pretty.

Eli, in answer to the blog post you phrased as a question, the argument from the individual you heard, echoed by other Big 3 execs, is not a valid point in support of a bailout.

Their claim that consumers won’t buy from an automaker in bankruptcy is a specious argument. Yes, some won’t, but many consumers also are not going to buy cars from companies perceived to be so weak that they have to beg for a bailout from the government. A company’s clutching to a government lifeline to keep from going bankrupt wouldn’t be that much different for many car buyers than an actual bankruptcy.

This is particularly true if the government forces the companies, as a condition of the bailout, to make “environmentally correct” cars that no one really wants. A company emerging from a Chapter 11 bankruptcy, by contrast, has a chance to win consumers back by making products that they want.

I also addressed your argument that “If the manufacturer no longer exists, then the car parts might not” in a previous Open Market entry (that was cited in a brilliant Washington Times editorial on Thursday). That entry noted the thriving reproduction parts industries for DeLoreans and Studebakers, both made by automakers long defunct (DeLorean went bankrupt in the ’80s and Studebaker folded up shop in the ’60s). The fact of these industries’ existence cuts in favor of consumers in a Big 3 bankruptcy. Given that there would be millions more Big 3 cars on the road than DeLoreans and Studebakers, entrepreneurial firms would rush to acquire the intellectual property rights that a bankruptcy court could easily award so that new parts could be made for consumers. Warranty claims could also be given priority by the bankruptcy court, as the Times editorial noted, and those are usually backed up by the insurance company of the warranty issuer, anyway.

It looks like to tide the companies over, Congress is going to vote this week to let them use money already appropriated for “green cars” for general operating purposes. From a free-market perspective, this action is neutral and may even be a net positive, as it reduces the promotion of a state-directed “green agenda.”

But when Congress comes back next year, bankruptcy must be on the table for both big automakers and big banks, as it is for small businesses every day. Otherwise, the economy may never get out of “Reverse.”

While lawmakers consider whether or not to bail out an industry they holed beneath the waterline, perhaps they could learn from the history on another once-thriving auto industry, that of Great Britain. It’s a salutary tale.
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As the Senate prepares to debate the proposed $25 billion bailout bill for the Big Three Detroit automakers, it’s worth pointing out — as many times as possible — just what this money might be going to pay for. First, as Larry Kudlow, points out, there are uncompetitive salaries.

Here’s a stat from my friend, blogger Mark Perry: Total compensation per hour for the big-three carmakers is $73.20. That’s a 52 percent differential from Toyota’s (Detroit South) $48 compensation (wages + health and retirement benefits). In fact, the oversized UAW-driven pay package for Detroit is 132 percent higher than that of the entire manufacturing sector of the U.S., which comes in at $31.59.

Yet that’s not all. As The Wall Street Journal‘s Paul Ingrassia notes, Detroit doesn’t need more money, but radical change, including getting rid of union contracts, which, as he noted on NPR this week, include burdensome work rules. Here’s one example he cites in his Journal op ed:

A few years ago the UAW even waged a spirited fight to protect the “right” of workers to smoke on the assembly line, something that simply isn’t allowed at, say, Honda’s U.S. factories. Aside from the obvious health risk, what about cigarette ashes falling onto those fine leather seats being bolted into the cars? Why was this even an issue?

In what other industry would this even be tolerated?

Yet even that is not all — then there is the UAW “Jobs Bank,” which keeps allegedly laid-off auto workers on at full salary and not working. This is beyond Soviet. In the former Communist bloc, people had a saying: “We pretend to work and they pretend to pay us.” Not even pretending to work and getting paid for real beats that every time.

If Detroit deserves anything, it’s a Lada plant.

In his CBSNews.com column today, CNet’s Declan McCullagh makes a good case against bailing out the Detroit Big Three. As he rightly points out, decades of extremely generous union contracts have yielded huge liabilities in what have become known as “legacy costs,” which include such things as pensions and retiree health insurance.

In recent years, these legacy costs have become an enormous burden on GM, Ford and Chrysler, who face increased competition from foreign automakers, most of whom have lower labor costs thanks to much lower levels of unionization. One particularly lavish benefit is the United Auto Workers’ employer-funded “Jobs Bank,” which pays laid-off auto workers get paid their full salary for not working. McCullagh writes:

A beneficiary of that program was someone named Jerry Mellon, who worked for GM until his division merged with another in 2000 and he was no longer needed. Except for a brief period in 2001, Mellon received his full salary for not working, which reached $64,500 a year by 2006. Include benefits, and the annual cost to GM exceeds $100,000.

Nice work — or lack thereof — if you can get it! McCullagh goes on:

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