christopher horner

PG&E, Exelon, Duke — progressive companies or energy-rationing profiteers?

by Marlo Lewis on September 29, 2009

in Global Warming

Divide et Impera — divide and conquer — is perhaps the oldest strategic maxim of war, politics, and diplomacy. Businesses succumb to it time and time again. Why?

It is in the general interest of business to preserve an open and competitive marketplace, and to limit tax and regulatory burdens. However, it is often in the special interest of particular firms to expand the size and scope of government in order to collect political “rents” – windfall profits created by market-rigging subsidies, preferences, or mandates. 

When only a few firms engage in rent-seeking, the rent seeker’s concentrated benefits will far outweigh his portion of the diffuse costs imposed on the economy as a whole. But each rent seeker’s success encourages others to get in the game. In time, the costs of government adversely affect millions of bottom lines. Worse, interventionist policies (for example, subsidized lending via Freddie Mac and Fannie May) can create systemic risk and crash entire economies.

V.I. Lenin basically viewed all capitalists as rent seekers. Capitalists are so fixated on short-term gain, he mused, that they will “sell the rope” by which their enemies will hang them. This much is clear — there is no honor among thieves. The more businesses depend on political predation, the easier it is for anti-market interventionists to divide and conquer.

This brings us to the topic of cap-and-trade, a form of energy rationing. There’s money to be made in energy rationing — OPEC proves it! The emission permits in a cap-and-trade program are like the oil production quota in OPEC, the only difference being that they’re tradable. The cap makes the permits a valuable commodity, and Waxman-Markey in the early years would distribute about 85% of all permits free of charge to various industries and interest groups.

So it should come as no surprise that some corporations love Waxman-Markey. Indeed, the corporate coalition known as the United States Climate Action Partnership (US CAP) outlined the main features of the Waxman-Markey bill months before it was introduced in a January 2009 report titled A Blueprint for Legislative Action. US CAP members don’t worry that Waxman-Markey might destroy millions of jobs and trillions of dollars in cumulative GDP. They expect to get a bigger piece of a smaller pie.

US CAP member PG&E pulled out of the U.S. Chamber of Commerce last week citing “irreconcilable differences” over climate change policy. Today’s Bloomberg.Com reports that US CAP member Exelon has announced it will not renew its membership in the Chamber, and that US CAP member Duke Energy will not renew its membership in the National Association of Manufacturers (NAM). 

PG&E, Exelon, and Duke preen themselves as progressive companies who put principle (planetary rescue) ahead of profit. In reality, they seek political rents at the expense of the public interest in limited government, economic growth, and affordable energy. Waxman-Markey sets aside the biggest chunk of free emission permits — 35% — for electric utilities. And their industry representative, the Edison Electric Institute (EEI), is lobbying the Senate to increase the booty to 40%.

How much boodle can a rent seeker make these days? A recently leaked non-public report reveals that Exelon expects Waxman-Markey to generate hundreds of millions of dollars annually for the company.

On June 9, 2009, four days after Waxman-Markey was marked up in the House Energy and Commerce Committee, Hugh Wynne, a senior analyst with BernsteinResearch, led a group of investors to meet with Exelon’s senior management at the company’s headquarters in Chicago. Wynne summarized Exelon’s thinking in a non-public report prepared for Bernstein’s clients:

If passed, [Exelon Chairman] John Rowe calculates the Waxman-Markey bill will add $700 to $750 million to Exelon’s annual revenues for every $10 per metric ton (Mt) increase in the price of CO2 allowances. Such a revenue increase would contribute $0.67-0.72 to earnings per share. Exelon estimates that the price of CO2 allowances, when the law takes effect in 2012, will range from $15 to $18/Mt, implying a positive earnings impact of $1.00 to $1.30 per share.

The Chamber and NAM oppose Waxman-Markey because they promote the general interest of business in a free and healthy economy. Green groups are putting pressure on other companies to leave Chamber and NAM, my colleague Christopher Horner notes. Divide and conquer is, alas, a pathetically easy game to play in an era of big government and climate hysteria. 

The real story is that so many Chamber and NAM members are standing firm, and that most observers do not expect the Senate to pass a cap-and-trade bill this year.

Firing Blanks on FOIA Part II

by Iain Murray on September 17, 2009

in Economy, Energy, Environment, Global Warming, International, Regulation

In his update to his post, Declan McCullagh notes an objection by the Center for American Progress:

The fourth objection is the most compelling. The Center for American Progress writes: “The potential benefits of clean energy legislation far outweigh the modest costs.” That’s a reasonable cost vs. benefit calculation, and it includes the claim that even with the extra taxes, cap and trade is so vital to America, it’s still worth it.

That’s the right approach to take: it would be a very good thing if all federal regulation were subject to a cost vs. benefit analysis. For example, if rising temperatures are significantly harming the planet, and cap and trade would reduce greenhouse gases enough to slow the rise, that would be a real benefit. But the Center for American Progress never actually makes that argument, and as CEI senior fellow Christopher Horner says: “Nobody has ever said this will change the temperature. It won’t.”

Well, we’ve already covered that one.  Even taking the most favorable analysis to WaxKey, the costs to Americans massively outweigh the benefits to them.  Here’s my post from a week ago:

There’s a new cost:benefit study from New York University Law School’s Institute for Public Integrity that, its authors claim, shows that, “From almost any perspective and under almost any assumption, H.R. 2454 [Waxman-Markey] is a good investment for the United States to make in our own economic future and in the future of the planet.”  A good investment for the US? Really?

The authors recognize that the benefits they find are global, while the costs are located in the US.  So let’s see what benefits accrue to US citizens and at what cost. (I am working with the authors’ figures here, which derive from the EPA, and are significantly different from the figures provided by such groups as the Heritage Foundation or the American Council for Capital Formation, which find much, much higher costs.)

Highest possible benefit = $5.2 trillion / 6 billion people = benefits of $866 per person

Cost to US citizen = $660 billion / 300 million people = cost of $2200 per citizen

That means a best possible benefit to cost ratio for a US citizen of 0.4:1.

The report talks about thinking of the Waxman-Markey costs as a “highly effective, highly leveraged form of foreign aid.”  One has to doubt that, given that the benefits that accrue to the developing world do so mostly in the far future, while the developing world is in desperate need of greater wealth – and better access to energy – today.  Even if it were true, however, one wonders whether the American public will accept a de facto tax increase of around $1300 per person, or $400 billion total, to pay for such climate aid.

Yet that’s assuming that the “high end” benefits scenario is what occurs.  The global low end benefits are actually far outweighed by the American costs, leading to a benefit:cost ratio to America of something in the order of 0.05:1 (or a cost:benefit ratio of 20:1).

And, of course, there’s no guarantee that a reduction in American emissions will amount to a reduction in global emissions.  We have seen the response to European cap-and-trade schemes being the relocation of facilities to other jurisdictions.  If so, the effective foreign aid program of Waxman-Markey might actually be a loss of American jobs to be replaced by developing world jobs, with no emissions reduction at all.  That would be very generous of us, but not quite what the authors of this study have in mind.

To summarize, the authors of the study have conclusively demonstrated that the Waxman-Markey bill is actually a very bad deal for the United States, and their attempts to claim otherwise are just spin.