Comparative effectiveness

The American health care system is in crisis.  And the Obama administration and Democratic congressional leaders appear determined to make it worse.  How else to explain the backroom deals, midnight votes, and procedural legerdemain which senior Democrats have undertaken in order to enact  a health care bill that no one—not even its most ardent supporters—seems to like very much, and which large swaths of the American public viscerally oppose?

Nevertheless, in just a few hours, the House of Representatives will vote on the $940 billion Senate health care bill, followed by a reconciliation package of “fixes” that were needed to attract the support of enough congressional Democrats.

Set aside, for a moment, the procedural shenanigans and cost-shifting gimmicks involved in gaming the bill’s CBO score.  These sorry episodes will soon be forgotten by the American public even as today’s new low in American governance seems destined to become tomorrow’s standard operating procedure—there to be abused by both parties.  This is to be lamented.  But, today, our far bigger concern is for the future of American medical care.

Much has been written about this bill’s “takeover” of American health care.  But, the sad truth of the matter is that, for the past few decades, the federal and state governments have been in control of close to half of all health care resources, with Medicare, Medicaid, SCHIP, and other government health programs accounting for some 48 percent of all health care dollars spent in 2007.  In addition, private health insurance is already heavily regulated by state and federal laws governing who must be covered and how.  In a very meaningful sense, government took over health care long ago.

Still, despite copious amounts of government control, what kept American health care alive was the residue of market processes that enabled some semblance of choice, price signals, adaptability, and—perhaps most important—physician responsiveness to patients’ needs.  The great tragedy of today’s health care legislation is not simply that it seeks to exert more control over the provision of health insurance and medical services per se, but that by doing so, it takes us farther and farther into a future in which the relationship between physician and patient will be irreparably severed.

Most of the problems in America’s health care system—high and rising prices, lack of consistent and reliable access for millions, rampant cost shifting, and an inability to distinguish between effective and ineffective services or between high and low quality, to name just a few—stem not from some supposed market failure, but primarily from existing government interventions in the market for health care and health insurance.

Some people have had difficulty affording health care. But, because the public opposed the huge cost of directly subsidizing health care purchases, government regulations were implemented that hid most of the costs of those subsidies within the system—what my former colleague Tom Miller described as trying to have socialism’s benefits without socialism’s (overt) costs.  But each new round of regulatory fixes forced costs higher, leading to yet another round of regulations.  Thus, there’s nothing particularly new in today’s legislation.  And, as with all previous government interventions, this new regulatory regime will make the major problems in America’s health care system still worse.

Why?  Because the vast majority of Americans—those enrolled in government health programs and those who receive health insurance as an employment benefit—see no clear relationship between the services they receive and the cost of that care.  Therefore,  they have no incentive to make rational, cost-conscious decisions about what health services they consume, driving up expenses and straining budgets.  This new legislation will further shield patients from the true cost of their health care choices.

Over time, the need to restrain costs has made the third party in the doctor-patient-payer relationship increasingly more important than the second.  The present health care legislation seeks to cut hundreds of billions of dollars out of Medicare, while spending those “savings” and hundreds of billions more in new tax revenue to subsidize private sector health insurance coverage.  The inevitable end result will be less and less decision-making power in the hands of American health care consumers. 

There is no sustainable way for government to subsidize more and more of our health care spending without also controlling how much is spent or where that spending goes.  Government will shift ever more of our health care dollars away from those services we as consumers value to those government bureaucrats value.  As in Canada, the United Kingdom, and countless other countries with health care central planning, high minded panels and commissions and bureaus will be established to determine which services are worth paying for and which are not.  Health decision making will no longer lie with the patient and his doctor, but in a committee of bureaucrats in Washington.

Ultimately, central planning in health care is no more effective than central planning in any other economic activity.  Markets need a critical mass of individuals spending their own dollars in order to allocate resources efficiently.  That’s because only free individuals making their own spending decisions can reveal the aggregate value they place on various goods and services.  When government decides what to buy and at what price, the absence of aggregated individual price signals means that the central planner cannot know what consumers—or in the case of health care, patients—value most. 

The fatal conceit of health care central planners is their belief that they can use cost-benefit or comparative effectiveness analysis to determine, with precision, which patients ought to receive which treatments.  Is $50,000 too much to pay for a cancer drug that may cure just a small fraction of the patients who take it, or which, on average, will extend patients’ lives by less than a year?  There is no one “right” answer for every patient.  But, as in any kind of economic transaction, someone needs to determine what’s worth paying for.  When government picks up most of the tab, giving every patient every treatment that might possibly provide some benefit is a surefire way to bankrupt the public fisc. 

The Obama administration and its allies in Congress seem to know this, but their method of addressing this problem is so clumsy it would be laughable if the consequences weren’t so serious.  To keep costs low, today’s health care legislation will create a Patient-Centered Outcomes Research Institute and a Medicare Committee founded on the untenable premise that every patient is exactly average.  The clinical research on which these bodies will make their payment decisions is conducted on groups of patients who are as much alike as possible.  Such an approach is absurd on its face.  In the real world, patients respond differently to different treatments, so basing payment decisions on what’s best for the average patient would be a recipe for disaster. 

In the near term this means that, in order to cut costs, countless patients are likely to receive inappropriate treatments.  In the long run, this will put a drag on medical innovation, as R&D expenditures will shift to respond to the price signals sent by government.  We won’t have the treatment innovations that patients want and need, but those that government bureaucrats find most appropriate for the median voter.  Everybody else will be out of luck.

With Democratic support coalescing around Sen. Max Baucus’s (D-Mt.) health care reform proposal, passage of a comprehensive overhaul now appears more likely than ever.  Opponents had their summer of protests.  But, Democrats have shown a renewed sense of energy since discrediting Sarah Palin’s “death panels” and Sen. Charles Grassley’s claim that ObamaCare would “pull the plug on grandma.” Still, while those charges may have been a little overwrought, there is plenty to be concerned about with the Democratic health reform effort.

As I explain in a new Competitive Enterprise Institute paper out today, “A Cure Worse than the Disease: Obama Care Won’t Cut Costs, But May Cut Quality,” most of the alleged cost-cutting measures in the Baucus bill merely shift costs from the federal government onto the states or private payers, without affecting long-term health care inflation.  The only measures that could reduce the annual rate of growth in health care costs would erect government barriers between patients and their doctors, while jeopardizing long-term medical innovation.

Skeptics have made hay arguing that the so-called Sustainable Growth Rate can’t be counted on to cut $245-billion in Medicare spending. But Senate Finance Committee negotiators have designed a Medicare Commission—what the White House previously called an Independent Medicare Advisory Commission—to make similar cuts in physician and hospital payment rates in a more opaque way.

In an April New York Times interview, President Obama suggested that such a group, working outside of “normal political channels,” should guide decisions regarding that “huge driver of cost…the chronically ill and those toward the end of their lives.”  That’s not exactly a death panel roving the country to pull the plug on innocent grandmas who’ve survived past their sell-by dates, but the effects could be equally pernicious.

What the Medicare Commission is likely to do is work with the Patient-Centered Outcomes Research Institute also established by the Baucus bill to incorporate comparative clinical effectiveness recommendations into Medicare and Medicaid payment policies.

In theory, there’s nothing wrong with comparative effectiveness research, or what used to be called evidence-based medicine.  Good research comparing the clinical effectiveness, risks, and benefits of two or more medical treatments can help doctors better understand the likely benefits of the treatments they prescribe and improve the quality of care they deliver.  But patients vary substantially in their individual physiology, their response rates to drugs and surgical procedures, and their willingness to tolerate side effects.  Doctors know this, and they realize that one size definitely does not fit all. That’s why, in practice, evidence-based medicine in the U.S. and abroad has produced incrementally useful information, but has failed to systematically change the practice of medicine.

Generally, we should encourage efforts to eliminate waste and reduce the use of ineffective treatments, especially when we’re talking about public programs and taxpayer money.  But the only way these programs would result in significant savings is if legislation or subsequent implementation tries to force the square peg of comparative effectiveness research results into the round hole of clinical practice by requiring physicians to always pick the treatment deemed best for the average patient.

That’s not just bad for patients in the near term, it would also wreak havoc on long term medical innovation.  If every new medicine were required, immediately upon gaining regulatory approval, to be effective and cheap enough to get the support of bureaucratic bean counters, research on the next generation of treatments for cancer, heart disease, and countless other serious conditions would slow to a snail’s pace.

Get used to the innovative medical treatments that we already have today.  If these programs become part of our health care system, we’ll be seeing a lot fewer treatment innovations tomorrow.

There was a good front page article in yesterday’s Washington Post on the history of advances in medical science and technology.  The conclusion:  Although the costs of treating many serious medical conditions has risen dramatically over the course of the last few decades, most of these cost increases have come hand-in-hand with significant improvements in health outcomes.  Take the article’s discussion of the evolving treatment of heart attacks:

“When I was in medical school, about all we had to offer was oxygen, morphine and prayers,” said Eric Topol, director of the Scripps Translational Science Institute in La Jolla, Calif.  Topol, who turned 55 last month, graduated from medical school in 1979. For 15 years he was head of cardiology at the Cleveland Clinic, where he helped run some of the clinical trials that have changed treatment so dramatically.  Today, someone having a heart attack who gets to a hospital in time is likely to get cardiac catheterization, angioplasty, the placement of a medicated stent, therapy with four anticoagulant drugs and, on discharge, a handful of lifetime prescriptions.  “There’s been a complete transformation in how it’s handled just since I’ve been in medicine,” Topol said.  That transformation has saved the lives of millions of Americans.

Of course, not every costly intervention works as well as the others.  Drug-eluting stents cost from $600 to $1,000 more than bare metal ones, but only provide a very small advantage.  The question is:  Who gets to decide whether the expense is worth it?  With millions of additional Americans about to be brought into taxpayer-subsidized or paid health care systems, we naturally want government to make wise spending choices.  But health care reformers who want to give government bodies greater power to deny health care choices over-simplify the ability to make these decisions.

President Obama, for example, has been characterizing the comparative-effectiveness concept as simply as choosing between two drugs, one of which works better than the other and costs half as much (You can watch the President on YouTube here).  But, like the drug-eluting stent example, most (thought admittedly not all) health care choices boil down to more costly interventions working very much better for some patients and providing little or no benefit for others. “It is safe to say that almost everybody who has a heart attack wants the best treatment available. Nobody wants to turn back the clock,” the Post article acknowleges.  But, for the Administration, there are no hard choices:

“No part of health reform is talking about rationing who gets this care and improvement in treatment,” said [David] Cutler, the Harvard economist, who is one of President Obama’s principal advisers on health care.

To the Post‘s credit, the aritlce offers us this bit of reality:

Experience, however, suggests that treating heart attacks is very unlikely to get cheaper in the future — either for individual patients or for the country as a whole.  “The low-hanging fruit has been largely consumed,” said C. Michael Gibson, a cardiologist and chief of clinical research at Beth Israel Deaconess Medical Center in Boston. “We are now facing the battle of a half- to one percent improvements in mortality that will come at very high cost.”