corporations

In The Atlantic, former ACLU board member Wendy Kaminer discusses the New York Times’ refusal to correct repeated falsehoods in its editorials about the Supreme Court’s Citizens United decision, and its decision to repeat those false claims even after their falsity was pointed out by attorneys and a constitutional law professor. The Times has repeatedly insinuated that the Supreme Court overturned a 1907 federal law banning corporate contributions to political campaigns when it actually did no such thing.

The Citizens United ruling allowed corporations and unions to pay for their own political ads attacking politicians, but it did not allow them to make campaign donations to congressmen, or strike down the Tillman Act, a 1907 law barring such donations. The Times also falsely implied that the Supreme Court had struck down “disclosure requirements“ for campaign donations.

Earlier, law professors wrote at The Volokh Conspiracy about the New York Times’ refusal to print a letter to the editor pointing out a mistake in a recent Times editorial about federal appeals court rulings dealing with business and arbitration of legal disputes. The law professors also argued that the Times persistently misstated whether it is permissible to detain enemy combatants.

I have previously written about the New York Times’ failure to correct repeated falsehoods it printed in its “news” coverage of the Supreme Court’s 2007 Ledbetter v. Goodyear decision, which you can find at this linkTimes reporters such as Linda Greenhouse made it sound like the plaintiff in that case, Lilly Ledbetter, had been arbitrarily prevented by the Supreme Court from suing despite only recently learning of the pay discrimination around the time she retired. Actually, as lawyers have repeatedly pointed out, Ledbetter knew by 1992, if not earlier, that she was being paid less than the male employees she claimed should have been paid the same as her. No wonder the Supreme Court’s 2007 ruling in Ledbetter v. Goodyear dismissed her lawsuit as untimely.

As the National Journal’s Stuart Taylor noted, Ledbetter brought her discrimination claim only after the supervisor she accused of discrimination had died, and shortly before she retired, and she knew of the pay disparity she later complained about for at least five years before filing an EEOC complaint. Thus, she was unable to qualify for an extension of the 180-day deadline for suing based on lack of awareness of the pay disparity.

The New York Times editorials repeatedly makes false claims about court rulings to try to depict the Supreme Court as “pro-business.” But it is not in fact pro-business, as I previously explained here.

Indeed, the Supreme Court is more hostile to business than most of the lower federal courts, and is generally hostile to employers in discrimination cases.

Last week, I had the pleasure of discussing net neutrality with James Boyle, a Duke Law Professor and the co-founder of the Center for the Study of the Public Domain, and Paul Jones, the director of ibiblio, on WUNC’s The State of Things radio program. Our hour-long discussion touched on a number of important tech policy topics, and I highly recommend giving the show a listen (download the MP3 here) if you’re interested in hearing the insights of two very thoughtful scholars and critics of cyber-libertarianism.

I’m a big admirer of Boyle and Jones, who’ve both done a lot of excellent work studying copyright and public domain in the information age. While I don’t share their views on the merits of net neutrality regulation — or, perhaps, of government regulation in general — there’s much common ground between us on many issues, including intellectual property, free speech, and government surveillance.

For folks who don’t want to spend an hour listening to our discussion, I’ve typed up a brief summary of the questions we attempted to tackle in our discussion and the various arguments we raised. My apologies if I’ve mischaracterized any arguments or statements — if you want to know what was actually said, go listen to the whole interview!

  • What role should government play in regulating the Internet? I argue its proper role is to enforce voluntary arrangements (Terms of Service) and, when appropriate, enforce civil judgments against firms that have broken their promises. Boyle, on the other hand, argues that government should enforce not only contracts but also net neutrality rules because last-mile Internet service is a natural monopoly and consumers often don’t understand what they’re getting, which means that socially desirable contracts aren’t likely to emerge. I respond by citing Thomas DiLorenzo’s critique of the natural monopoly hypothesis and pointing out that government has obstructed ISP competition by allocating spectrum inefficiently and imposing excessive costs on wireline ISPs through burdensome rights-of-way and franchising rules.
  • Why did Google retreat on its commitment to net neutrality in joining with Verizon to exempt wireless services from neutrality? Boyle argues it’s because Google realized the future of communications is mobile and believed it needed to compromise with Verizon (America’s biggest wireless carrier). Jones points out that the Google-Verizon proposal isn’t a business agreement, but a compromise designed to address the conflicting interests of various stakeholders. I argue that Google recognized that government discrimination among competing business models and platforms is a greater danger to consumers than provider discrimination, and that innovation truly occurs when ‘walled gardens’ such as the iPhone co-evolve with open platforms like Android — the “Yin and Yang” of innovation, as Bret Swanson puts it). Boyle argues that proprietary platforms and exclusionary deals between content and service providers preclude disruptive innovation and digital generativity. He cites the financial crisis as an example of inadequate regulation resulting in poor outcomes that might have not have occurred had there been greater oversight.
  • Does collusion among large, powerful Internet corporations help or harm consumers and innovation? Jones cites Adam Smith’s The Wealth of Nations in arguing that, without government regulation, mega-corporations will collude and carve up the marketplace, hindering innovation and progress. I argue that leaving companies free to try to “carve up markets” actually spurs beneficial competitive responses and promotes destructive market entry, even if the process isn’t always pretty. I argue that the forces arrayed against today’s major companies–competitors, consumers, suppliers, downstream partners–make it impossible for any entity or group of entities to engage in any truly abusive practices without suffering harsh punishment.
  • Will entrepreneurs and innovators even be able to get off the ground if corporations have unlimited control over Internet applications and content? I argue that government policies, such as the DMCA’s anti-circumvention provisions, are a major part of the problem because they distort natural market outcomes and prop up bad business models. Boyle agrees that these provisions are seriously problematic, calling DMCA a “lawyers’ full employment act.” He points out that many of the most important innovations of the last couple of decades — Google, Facebook, Twitter, and so forth — came about precisely because of the Internet’s openness and dynamism. I argue that the openness that characterizes the Internet is indeed desirable in many ways, but that voluntary institutions can offer open platforms without being forced to do so by government. I point out that network operators who hinder the value of the content that traverses their pipes do so at their own peril, and that infrastructure and content companies actually have a symbiotic relationship, rather than an adversarial one. Jones argues that because many ISPs are also content companies, they have an incentive to privilege their own content at the expense of competing offerings. I point out that consumer demand for Internet video outlets (i.e. YouTube and Hulu) deters providers from slowing down Internet-delivered content. Boyle argues that the continued existence of the open Internet is crucial in ensuring that the ‘walls’ that enclose walled gardens don’t grow too tall.
  • Shouldn’t we treat the Internet like a public utility — a road on which all can travel? I argue that treating the Internet like a public utility, like we already treat roads, raises the dilemma of the tragedy of the commons. I point out that many private roads already exist today without the ‘tollbooths’ that neutrality advocates fear. Jones points out that the real tragedy is one of unregulated commons which lack adequate rules. Boyle argues that the economics of physical property (scarce goods) cannot readily be mapped to networks and calls the Internet a “comedy of the commons” (borrowing from Carol Rose). I argue that government-run commons have a poor track record, from highways to the wi-fi band, and that the success of network industries requires smart investment and innovation that government isn’t well-equipped to deliver. Boyle argues that not all resources must be owned if they’re to be efficiently utilized, citing the emergence of free trade with India and China in the 1700s and the subsequent collapse of state-chartered trading monopolies. Boyle argues that tomorrow’s “next great thing” may never emerge if the openness of today’s Internet isn’t enshrined in regulation.

In the Citizens United case, the Supreme Court recently struck down restrictions on corporations’ and unions’ ability to criticize politicians.

Do corporations have free speech rights? I explained why I think they should have free speech rights in this letter in the New York Times. Many civil liberties guarantees, like free speech, have long applied to corporations in the U.S. and Europe, as I noted earlier at the Examiner.

Anthony Dick rebuts common misconceptions about the Supreme Court’s decision here.

Earlier, I wrote about Justice Alito’s reaction to the President’s attack on the Supreme Court’s ruling in the Citizens United case. Here, Justice Thomas explains why he skips the State of the Union Address.

At the president’s recent State of the Union address, he misleadingly attacked the Supreme Court for supposedly “reversing a century of law“ restricting corporate spending on political campaigns in its ruling this month in Citizens United v. FEC.

In response, an annoyed Supreme Court Justice Samuel Alito, who was attending the speech as an invited guest, apparently mouthed the words “not true,” although his words were not audible and did not interrupt the president’s speech.  (Obama was criticizing a Supreme Court ruling that struck down a recent federal restriction on corporations’ ability to criticize politicians.  The ruling, which was based on the First Amendment, said it was not invalidating a century-old 1907 law that bans corporations from making donations to politicians, who have long leaned on corporations to give money to their pet causes.  The ruling also did not lift restrictions on foreign corporations.  I earlier explained in the New York Times why corporations logically do have free speech rights.)

Maybe Justice Alito’s annoyance was cumulative, and based as much on the president’s past lies about an earlier Supreme Court ruling authored by Alito, as on his misleading criticism of the Supreme Court’s recent ruling.   Past lies make later falsehoods seem less like innocent mistakes.

In his 2008 campaign, and again in 2009, Obama criticized Justice Alito’s decision in Ledbetter v. Goodyear, which did not, contrary to the president’s claims, create a rigid 180 day deadline for bringing pay discrimination claims after an employee’s pay is set, regardless of whether the worker couldn’t have discovered the discrimination until years later.  (The deadline was 180 days, with various common-sense exceptions for hoodwinked employees, under one federal law, called Title VII.  But it is generally three years under another federal law, the Equal Pay Act, that also has more generous accrual rules.  Most employees could evade the short deadline of Title VII simply by having the sense to sue under the Equal Pay Act as well.  Alito’s ruling left workers with ample time to sue over discrimination, contrary to what Obama claimed.  Lilly Ledbetter lost her discrimination case because she waited until 1998 to file a complaint, despite admitting in her deposition that she knew her pay was low by 1992.)
I documented this in my commentary about the Supreme Court last yearNational Journal’s Stuart Taylor (a critic of the Supreme Court’s recent ruling in favor of corporations), and lawyers Paul Mirengoff and Ed Whelan, also described how Obama repeatedly distorted what the Supreme Court said in the Ledbetter case.

Over at the Detroit News, Hans Bader and I explain why corporations have human rights despite not being human. The reason why? Transaction costs.

This has implications for everything from Intel’s EU antitrust battle to newspapers’ free speech rights.