customary international law

At the Washington Examiner, I discuss the implications for the attorney-client relationship of a law firm’s decision to dump a client after signing a contract to represent it in the litigation over the Defense of Marriage Act. I also discuss the ideological double standards at work in the legal profession, and the potential implications of the decision for civil defendants in lawsuits. The Washington Post criticizes the firm’s about-face here. Law professor Jonathan Adler comments here.

At the Examiner, I also recently discussed the role of nebulous, fabricated , ideologically-driven norms of “customary international law” in undermining countries’ criminal-justice systems and sovereignty, and the courts’ seeming lack of empathy for victims of violent crime in places like Illinois.

On Monday, the Supreme Court, citing “international opinion,” outlawed life imprisonment without parole for juveniles who commit rape, torture, and other non-homicide crimes.

Earlier, New Zealand was pressured to end life without parole for adults who commit “the worst” murders, based on a supposed rule of “customary international law” against life imprisonment without parole.

Citing Spanish law and supposed international human-rights norms, Spain now refuses to extradite terrorists who plot mass murder to the United States unless the U.S. agrees not to seek life imprisonment without parole.

Victims of torture, sexual mutilation, and attempted murder cannot have peace of mind unless their attacker is kept in jail for life without parole.  A scary example is “Milagro Cunningham, a 17-year-old who beat and raped an 8-year-old girl before leaving her to die under 197 pounds of rock.”  This evil, violent thug will apparently be eligible to seek release under the Supreme Court’s decision Monday in Graham v. Florida.  Why should that little girl, scarred for life, have to face the terrifying possibility of one day being attacked again by her would-be murderer?

The Supreme Court’s ruling sets a terrible precedent for civil liberties as well, since foreign legal systems and international lawyers are often hostile to free speech, religious freedom, and the right of homeowners to defend themselves against burglars and other intruders who may commit violence by wielding a knife or gun in self-defense.  The U.N. Human Rights Council says there is no human right to self-defense, and that, quite the contrary, international human rights norms require “very severe gun control.”

Accordingly, CEI and the Cato Institute joined an amicus brief filed with the Supreme Court asking it not to rely on international norms in deciding the Graham case.

If America got rid of the death penalty tomorrow, the army of lawyers who today relentlessly delay and block executions would simply turn around and fight life without parole for violent criminals (liberal judges like Ninth Circuit Judge Harry Pregerson have argued that life without parole is unconstitutional even for serious adult crimes).  Opposing strict penalties for criminals sets liberal lawyers and judges apart from ordinary people who believe in “vengeance,” and thus helps them feel morally superior and holier-than-thou.  It makes them feel sophisticated and refined to argue that society should forgive violent criminals who have supposedly “rehabilitated” themselves by claiming to be sorry for their victims (even though many “model inmates” have gone on to commit horrible crimes after being released on parole–seldom against wealthy lawyers).   Many of those lawyers were trained at my alma mater, Harvard Law School, where moral vanity can be found in abundance.

These sanctimonious lawyers and judges have forgotten the wisdom of the great Athenian lawgiver Solon, who observed that true justice will not be achieved until those who have not been victimized by crime are just as indignant as those who were victimized.  As Midrash sagely notes, “He who is kind to the cruel is cruel to the kind.”

(Unlike what you may have gleaned from watching “L.A. Law,” when a death sentence is overturned by the courts, it is very seldom because of the convict’s alleged innocence; the reason is usually something like a failure to consider some obscure supposedly mitigating factor, or the fact that the defendant was sentenced to death by a judge rather than a jury.  Most innocent people in jail are there for drug, sex-crime, or regulatory offenses, not capital crimes that carry the death penalty.)

The Obama administration is busy packing the courts with people who will block the death penalty and strict sentences for violent crime at every turn, like the radical law professor Goodwin Liu, and a judge who tried to block the execution of the Roadside Strangler based on the unbelievable ground that his “sexual sadism” was a mitigating factor–even though the Roadside Strangler admitted his execution was appropriate.  Whether or not the death penalty is good public policy (admittedly, death is different because it is irrevocable), it is obviously not unconstitutional, and should not be judicially nullified, since it is expressly contemplated in the Constitution, such as in the language of the Fifth Amendment.

The Supreme Court is back in session. Today, it is hearing a challenge to a federal law banning depictions of cruelty to animals brought by a defendant convicted of selling pit-bull dogfight videos. A federal appeals court struck down the 1999 law as a violation of the First Amendment. The government is asking the Supreme Court to reinstate the law, and rule that animal cruelty depictions are not protected speech, the way some other kinds of speech, like obscenity, are considered unprotected by the Supreme Court.  (While the Supreme Court has ruled that obscenity is not protected speech, it has required that obscenity be defined narrowly so as not to reach sexually-oriented speech that either has artistic, literary, or political value, or is not patently offensive.)  At oral argument today, the Justices suggested that the law is overbroad and vague.

The Supreme Court also recently agreed to hear a challenge to Chicago laws banning handguns, in a case called McDonald v. City of Chicago. I explained earlier why the lower court ruling upholding the ban was based on flawed reasoning about how Second Amendment rights apply to state and local governments.

The court will also hear a challenge to the imposition of life sentences without parole on teenage offenders who have repeatedly committed violent crimes (like rape and sexual battery) against victim after victim, but not yet succeeded in killing someone. If the challenge is successful, it may be harder for states to deter violent crimes by minors against children and adults alike. (The death penalty and life sentences are significant deterrents to those who commit violent crimes, reducing the murder rate.  For example, a recent Emory University study says that each execution deters approximately 18 murders.)

The Heritage Foundation explains why life sentences without parole are appropriate, and why it would be a bad idea for judges to make up limits on such sentences.

A gaggle of left-wing lawyers and religious groups are asking the Supreme Court to rule that the Eighth Amendment’s ban on cruel and unusual punishment restricts the imposition of life without parole on juveniles, even when they have repeatedly committed violent crimes. Their long-run goal is to make it as difficult to impose life sentences as it currently is to impose the death penalty, which cannot be carried out without years of endless and expensive appeals, most of which focus on aggravating or mitigating factors, rather than the defendant’s guilt or innocence (even admittedly-guilty death row inmates often succeed in delaying for years, or even overturning, their death sentences).  (Most murderers never even get the death penalty, even when they outrageously torture the dying victim.)

The left-wing lawyers and religious groups are also unjustifiably seeking to use fuzzy notions of “customary international law” to override U.S. law, as the Cato Institute and others have pointed out in their court brief.

“Customary international law” threatens America’s security and civil liberties.  Piracy flourished in the crucial shipping lanes off the coast of Somalia partly due to a treaty that the U.S. has not ratified yet — but which is often described as “customary international law” binding on all nations. Partly as a result of the LOST Treaty, billions of dollars worth of cargo, and human lives, have been lost due to piracy. Harold Koh, appointed by Obama to be the State Department’s chief lawyer, argues that “customary international law” like LOST is binding on the U.S., even when it is reflected in treaties that the U.S. has refused to sign.  (European human-rights conventions and an indecisive White House also have delayed action against the pirates.)  That’s just one reason U.S. policymakers should think twice before following vague “international norms.”

Since customary international law is vague, liberal lawyers invariably use that ambiguity to claim that it dictates a host of controversial requirements that few countries would voluntarily adopt on their own, like banning Mother’s Day as sexist, and mandating quota-based affirmative action. For example, the CEDAW equal-rights treaty has been construed by an international committee as requiring “redistribution of wealth,” “affirmative action,” “gender studies” in academia, government-sponsored “access to rapid and easy abortion,” “comparable worth,” and “the application of quotas and numerical goals and measurable targets aimed at increasing women’s political participation.”

One of the arguments in the animal-cruelty video case — that the government can prohibit an entire category of speech to promote a “compelling interest” — is quite dangerous, because courts now routinely find even trivial government goals to be “compelling interests.” It is almost considered bad manners for a judge to candidly say that a law passed by a legislature is not supported by a compelling interest, which is why judges usually strain to find that the other Supreme Court requirement for upholding a ban on speech (“narrow tailoring”) is missing instead. (In my 2007 law review article, I listed some of the not-very-crucial interests widely recognized by the courts as “compelling,” like “preventing splintered political parties and establishing professional standards.”  Courts sometimes find interests to be “compelling” even when they logically contradict each other — for example, courts have found “compelling” interests justifying both governmental discrimination against gay people, and governmental bans on discrimination against them (even purely private discrimination by religious groups or clubs).  Some court rulings finding “compelling interests” are just wrong.)

The Supreme Court cases challenging life without parole are Graham v. Florida and Sullivan v. Florida. The animal cruelty video case is U.S. v. Stevens.