Last week, I described how the Dodd-Frank financial “reform” law passed last summer violates constitutional separation-of-powers safeguards by giving unaccountable bureaucrats the power to seize companies and legislate through administrative fiat. But that is not the only way Dodd-Frank violates the Constitution. It also violates property rights and equal-protection guarantees.
For example, it contains racial preferences that were criticized by members of the U.S. Commission on Civil Rights. It “imposes race and gender employment quotas on the financial industry,” noted economist Diana Furchtgott-Roth in the Washington Examiner. Its ”Section 342 states that race and gender employment ratios must be observed by all government agencies that regulate the financial sector, as well as private financial institutions that do business with the government.”
This unconstitutional requirement is the brainchild of Los Angeles Congresswoman Maxine Waters, the Castro-loving, left-wing ideologue who earlier praised the Los Angeles race riots that destroyed scores of Korean-owned businesses as an “uprising” against injustice. Waters once told a CEO in a public Congressional hearing, “This liberal will be all about socializing . . . .uh, uh . . . would be about, basically, taking over and the government running all of your companies.”
Law Professor Richard Epstein notes that Dodd-Frank is also an unconstitutional “taking” of private property, since it deliberately forces certain banks to process debit card transactions at a loss. (That provision is being challenged in a lawsuit called TCF Bank v. Bernanke. Debit cards did not contribute to the financial crisis in any way, but Dodd-Frank regulates them at the behest of large businesses that objected to being charged any fee by banks for processing debit card payments. Thanks to Dodd-Frank, some customers will now be charged annual fees for their debit cards.)
Dodd-Frank itself contains little “reform,” reinforcing the very features of the status quo that spawned the financial crisis. Congressional Democrats blocked a GOP amendment that would have reformed the government-sponsored mortgage giants, Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac, and the Obama administration lifted a $400 billion limit on bailing them out and showered their executives with $42 million in pay — even though Treasury Secretary Geithner has admitted that “Fannie and Freddie were a core part of what went wrong” in the financial crisis.
Fannie and Freddie helped spawn the mortgage crisis by buying up risky mortgages and repackaging them as prime mortgages, thus creating an artificial market for junk: “From the time Fannie and Freddie began buying risky loans as early as 1993, they routinely misrepresented the mortgages they were acquiring, reporting them as prime when they had characteristics that made them clearly subprime.”
At the direction of the Obama administration, Freddie Mac ran up more than $30 billion in losses to bail out mortgage borrowers, some of whom had high incomes. Federal regulators sought to make Freddie Mac hide the resulting losses from the SEC and the public.
Dodd-Frank is not unique in containing racial preferences. Many bills backed by Obama are riddled with racial set-asides, including the health care law passed last year. Obamacare has attracted criticism from the U.S. Commission on Civil Rights for containing both racial preferences and lower standards for treatment in predominantly-minority institutions, potentially harming both white applicants and minority patients. This racial discrimination appears to violate court rulings like the Supreme Court’s Adarand decision, and the Rothe and Western States Paving decisions issued by the federal appeals courts.
by Hans Bader on July 23, 2010
in Bailout Watch, Economy, Employment, Legal, Nanny State, Odds & Ends, Personal Liberty, Politics as Usual, Regulation, Sanctimony, Zeitgeist
“Decisions on which car dealerships to close as part of the auto industry bailout — closures the Obama administration forced on General Motors and Chrysler — were based in part on race and gender, according to a report by Troubled Asset Relief Program Special Inspector General Neal M. Barofsky: ‘Dealerships were retained because they were recently appointed, were key wholesale parts dealers, or were minority- or woman-owned dealerships.’ Thus, to meet numbers forced on them by the Obama administration, General Motors and Chrysler were forced to shutter other, potentially more viable, dealerships. The livelihood of potentially tens of thousands of families was thus eliminated simply because their dealerships were not minority- or woman-owned.”
It’s likely that these race-based closures of auto dealerships violated Supreme Court rulings like Adarand Constructors v. Pena (1995), which say that the federal government can’t use race except to remedy the present effects of its own past discrimination, as I explain below. What this means is that terminated dealers could bring a billion-dollar class-action lawsuit challenging the use of race under 42 USC 1981 and the Constitution, based on cases like Gratz v. Bollinger (2003) (that Supreme Court decision let white college applicants bring a reverse-discrimination class action over a university’s use of race as a factor in admissions, even though it’s seldom clear in such cases exactly which white applicants would have gotten admitted if race hadn’t been used to admit some minorities).
This is just the latest harm the Administration has inflicted on automakers and dealers. Its incredibly wasteful Cash-for-Clunkers program cost taxpayers and used-car and car-parts businesses billions, and drove up the cost of car-parts and used cars for dealers and consumers alike.
It doesn’t look like the automakers and the government have a valid defense to any lawsuit over the race-based car-dealership closures. There doesn’t seem to be any pattern or practice of discrimination against minorities in the auto industry that could conceivably have justified the use of race as a remedy under the Supreme Court’s Adarand decision (indeed, the automakers have long had affirmative action programs that provide a leg up to minority businesses), and in any event, the Obama administration doesn’t seem to have had any such remedial rationale in mind for using race. If it didn’t have a remedial rationale in mind for the closures, it can’t rely on one later, according to the Supreme Court’s ruling in Shaw v. Hunt (1996). And it can’t rely on a “diversity” rationale for using race (except in universities), according to federal appellate court rulings like Lutheran Church–Missouri Synod v. FCC, 141 F.3d 344 (D.C. Cir. 1998) and Messer v. Meno, 130 F.3d 130 (5th Cir. 1997). The government may be able to invoke sovereign immunity to limit any such liability to the terminated dealers, but the automakers won’t.
(Ironically, Cash-for-Clunkers, which was designed as welfare for the automakers, actually did virtually nothing for the U.S. automakers it was supposed to help, since it simply shifted auto purchases earlier, encouraging Americans to buy cars earlier (during the program) rather than later (after the program ended). Indeed, it may actually have harmed GM and Ford, since their market share was lower during Cash-for-Clunkers than later on, when car buyers were turned off by Toyota’s safety recalls and bought more GM and Ford vehicles than before. People who participated in Cash-for-Clunkers bought lots of Toyota vehicles as replacements, which did nothing for the U.S. automakers.)
Virginia legislators recently killed bills to extend child support to adult college students. The bills would have required a non-custodial parent to make payments to the other parent while their adult child is attending college. A number of states have such laws, but legislators in Virginia voted the bills down after receiving an avalanche of angry e-mails and phone calls from their constituents opposing the bill.
The bill was killed by the House of Delegates Courts of Justice Committee in an voice vote on January 22 to strike the bill from the docket. It was killed this legislative session by the Senate Courts of Justice Committee, which voted 13-to-1 to shelve the bill indefinitely on February 1. Only Senator Roscoe Reynolds (D-Martinsville) voted to keep the bill alive.
The U.S. Supreme Court has never decided whether it is constitutional to make divorced parents pay child support for adult children, even though married parents have no such obligation. The Pennsylvania Supreme Court struck down such a requirement in Curtis v. Kline, 666 A.2d 265 (1995), rightly reasoning that it was irrational discrimination that violated the Constitution’s Equal Protection Clause. But the Oregon Court of Appeals upheld such a requirement. In many states that have such mandates, lawyers have simply failed to challenge them, which is mystifying given lawyers’ duty to zealously represent the interests of their clients.
I and legal commentator Walter Olson earlier noted that such laws have unforeseen bad consequences, such as (1) forcing parents to support children who are disrespectful and abusive toward them, and whom they have no parental control over, or (2) forcing parents to make payments to their ex-spouse who was once the custodial parent, rather than directly to their child or the child’s college, thus actually reducing the child’s ability to attend college.
The Virginia bills drew negative attention from journalists and commentators, like the Richmond Times-Dispatch‘s award-winning columnist A. Barton Hinkle, syndicated columnist Amy Alkon, and criminal-justice expert Radley Balko.
We wrote earlier about the bizarre aspects of divorce law and child support in Maryland and Virginia.
It’s not a good thing for a lawyer when you argue in the Supreme Court and the Justices are confused about your position. But that happened on December 2 in the case of Fitzgerald v. Barnstable School Committee, where Justices and court reporters alike were confused about what a school system’s lawyer was arguing in her oral argument. That’s too bad, because the lawyer’s argument on behalf of the school board was basically correct.
Fitzgerald is a sexual harassment case alleging “peer harassment” by a student against another student. The peer-harassment angle is important, because students aren’t state actors, so the standard of liability under the Constitution (which requires “state action”) is logically different than under Title IX (which doesn’t require any “state action”). (Making the Constitutional standard as broad as Title IX would produce all sorts of bizarre consequences by gutting the Constitution’s “state-action” doctrine)
Under Title IX, school boards are liable for “deliberate indifference” by school officials (or the school board itself) that allows harassment by one student against another to continue. (The plaintiff in Fitzgerald lost on her Title IX claim because she failed to show deliberate indifference, according to a federal appeals court).
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There’s an interesting case pending in the Supreme Court, Fitzgerald v. Barnstable School Committee, that could make Title IX irrelevant in many cases, by creating a vast new constitutional tort of sexual harassment, if the plaintiffs have their way. And amazingly enough, the Massachusetts school board that’s the defendant seems inclined to let the plaintiffs have their way. (Massachusetts’ bizarre state laws provide a possible explanation for this mystery). [UPDATE: THE SCHOOL BOARD LATER CONTESTED SUCH AN EXPANSION OF LIABILITY AT ORAL ARGUMENT on December 2].
Under Title IX, a federal law passed by Congress to expand women’s rights against sex discrimination, schools are liable if they’re “deliberately indifferent” to sex discrimination by third parties, like sexual harassment by students. But the federal Constitution is a different story. Not every case where Harry pesters Sally is a constitutional case, even if it violates Title IX.
Conduct isn’t unlawful “discrimination” for federal constitutional purposes when it’s done by a private party, even if it’s a private entity that possesses a valuable state liquor license (Moose Lodge v. Irvis) or is housed in state property like a dormitory (United States v. Morrison (2000)).
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