financial meltdown

Arnold Kling hits the creation of the secondary market for mortgage loans as the major factor — 50 percent — causing the current financial crisis. As Kling wrote:

In hindsight, I think that the crisis was caused by
a) creation of the secondary mortgage market (50 percent)
b) low down payment mortgages (30 percent)
c) the “suits vs. geeks” divide (15 percent)
d) other (5 percent)

The more I think about the secondary mortgage market, the less I like it. Any widespread benefits, such as lower mortgage interest rates, are microscopic. On the other hand, several times (not just recently), the market has been used to create or enhance regulatory loopholes that undermined the safety of the financial system as a whole.

I am surprised that Kling so lightly dismisses the benefits as “microscopic” of one of the most positive innovations in the mortgage market.  Just think about it.  Financial institutions — primarily savings and loans — prior to the creation of the secondary market, took in short-term deposits and made long-term, fixed-rate loans (30 years).  Until the early 1980s, Regulation Q set the limit on the interest rates that could be paid on deposits.

[click to continue…]

There are all sorts of people today who normally talk about free markets but who have got themselves into a tizzy over the failed bailout. We need to get one thing straight – the bailout was the wrong answer to the wrong question. To begin with, the plan was merely postponing the inevitable, as a letter in the Wall Street Journal pointed out this morning:

The lesson of past financial inflection points is that we must let the markets reallocate capital from less efficient to more efficient uses. The sad fact is that we need to go through a brutal process of resizing down our financial and real-estate industries. Actions to try to recapitalize doomed financial companies only postpone the day of reckoning, which will make matters worse as the Japanese learned in the 1990s.

Secondly, we have to ask how to protect future viable assets and investments, not just what we should do about past failed assets and investments. The bailout plan is exactly the wrong approach. It puts in them in jeopardy because not only does it tread down the policy road that led to the Great Depression, as Martin Hutchinson powerfully argues, but because real capitalism provides strict disciplines that actually provide better protection than government regulation. We will not succeed in protecting our children from a future financial meltdown if we merely put in place the exact parameters for it to happen again.

Markets are all about the efficient allocation of capital. As has been demonstrated on this page repeatedly, government caused the market to misallocate badly. If we go further and have government misallocate the capital by design, then we will have made one of the biggest missteps in economic history, worse than FDR and co, because we will have completely ignored the lessons of the great depression. A market correction is, in a very real sense, necessary. Government cannot bring that about.

Best short explanation of the mark-to-markets issue I have yet seen:

Imagine if you had a $200,000 mortgage on a $300,000 house that you planned on living in for 20 years. But a neighbor, because of very special circumstances had to sell his house for $150,000. Then, imagine if your banker said you had to mark to this “new market” and give the bank $80,000 in cash immediately (so that you would have 20% down), or lose your home. Would this reflect reality? Not at all. Would this create chaos? Absolutely.

More on this here (hat-tip Ramesh Ponnuru).