The Obama administration is now working with state attorney generals to rip off pension funds to bail out mortgage borrowers who don’t even need help. Pension funds that millions of Americans rely on for their retirement will suffer. Bank shareholders will also suffer. I explain how and why in a commentary at The Washington Examiner website. The government is trying to get mortgage servicers to write off portions of loans that are owned by other people or institutions — like the pension funds that millions depend on. That undermines property rights. Last fall, intellectuals with ties to the Obama administration proposed a much larger, but conceptually similar, bailout that could cost taxpayers a trillion dollars, the idea being to temporarily increase consumer spending through the next election.
Foreclosure
Express, a publication of The Washington Post, notes that as a result of a stoppage in mortgage foreclosures: “Prices might stabilize because so many homes are penned up.”
The underlying logic is that:
(1) If there are fewer foreclosures today, then the supply of houses on the market will be reduced.
(2) If supply is reduced, prices will go up (or “stabilize,” i.e., not go down).
Their logic is sound, but they must follow through with the analysis. Yes, the foreclosures are delayed. But we know that they are coming eventually. Therefore in, say a year, we expect prices will decrease once the foreclosure process is re-initiated because those houses then show up on the market.
They [Express] imply that expected future prices are lower than today’s current prices. This won’t do however.
If sellers expect that prices will fall in the future, they will want to sell at today’s relatively higher prices. As a result more people start selling now which increases today’s supply and this brings down today’s prices. This will continue until future prices are equated with today’s prices. Why? Because if expected future prices are low relative to today’s prices more people would like to sell to capture the relatively higher selling prices of today.
A similar effect occurs on the demand side of the market: some potential home buyers expecting prices to fall in a year will wait to buy, until houses become relatively cheaper. Fewer home buyers today mean less demand today, and this entails lower prices today.
The main idea here is that expectations of future prices held by sellers and buyers affects today’s prices, such that future prices and today’s prices move to equality. In this case it means prices go down. The unfortunate take away from this is that the healing period is far from over.
Well-to-do people will receive an unnecessary mortgage bailout, under a new federal program that will cut their payments to just 31 percent of their income — a ridiculously low level lower than many thrifty homeowners have made for years. Taxpayers and the economy will suffer in the long-run. And people with modest incomes will end up subsidizing the more fortunate.
Yesterday, the Obama Administration announced a “mortgage bailout to aid 1 in 9 U.S. Homeowners,” according to today’s Wall Street Journal. The cost is estimated by the Administration at $75 billion, and by independent experts at much more than that.
“Homeowners with loans as large as $729,750 could see their interest rates temporarily cut to as low as 2 percent under the program,” and perhaps have their mortgage balances reduced, according to today’s Washington Post. Thus, American taxpayers — including low-income renters — will pay to subsidize people with high incomes who bought big homes with values approaching a million dollars.
As the Washington Post notes, “Under the program, lenders are encouraged to lower homeowners’ payments to 31 percent of their income. That could come from lowering the interest rate to as little as 2 percent . . .Lenders could also lower the principal owed by the borrower.”
This is simply insane. Paying more than 31 percent of your income on a mortgage is not a hardship. I paid more than that when I first purchased my home. In wealthy, high-living cost areas like San Francisco, people have long paid more than that, well before the current financial crisis. And in densely-populated nations like Japan, people have often paid more than that. Many beneficiaries of this bailout would never have defaulted, and the program’s requirement that they submit an “affidavit of hardship” is virtually meaningless, given the program’s low threshold for “hardship.” Even if they did face foreclosure, they could still find a place to rent, as most people who have been foreclosed on do.
Why on Earth should someone with a huge $700,000 home be able to reduce their payments on that home to 31 percent of their income, at taxpayer expense, when they could, with a little “hardship” — say, giving up an automobile not needed for work, or no longer eating out at restaurants — afford their mortgage payments on the big house they live in?
Yesterday, I went to the Washington Post web site, and used its interactive function which tells you whether you qualify for a bailout. I entered my mortgage as a percent of my income at the time I purchased my home, and it told me that I “probably” qualified for a bailout. (Today, my income is too high, but not at the time I purchased the home). But I have never needed a bailout. By being thrifty over the years — like avoiding expensive cars and travel, eating cheap foods, and not eating out — I have always been able to afford to pay more than 31 percent of my income on housing.
Before I and my wife bought our small home, we were outbid for a bigger, better home by another couple who made virtually no downpayment and ended up with big mortgage payments. Unless their income has increased substantially since then, they will likely be eligible for a bailout by claiming “hardship” — even though their income is much higher than the average American household.
Only someone indifferent to what housing actually costs — like a policymaker with political rather than economic goals in mind (like buying votes in states with high housing costs) — could have designed this plan. (I have some clue about what housing costs, since I used to produce cost and wage data for the federal government, and since I have a degree in economics as well as in law.).
Bailouts and stimulus plans don’t increase the size of the economy in the long run. They actually shrink the economy in the long run, while exploding government debt, as Japan found to its chagrin in the 1990s. But politicians like them because they do slightly increase the economy’s size in the short run — like by the next election. Bailouts provide short-term gain but long-term pain.
Even the Congressional Budget Office, controlled by the very body that enacted the $800 billion stimulus package, admits that the $800 billion stimulus package signed by President Obama will slightly reduce the economy’s size in the long-run. How will it shrink the economy? By increasing the national debt, which drives up interest payments on the debt, which in turn crowds out private investment. This mortgage bailout plan will similarly reduce the size of the economy over the long-run, since it will be financed by government borrowing that increases the size of the national debt.
Unfettered greed is the suspect many point at to explain the current economic crisis. To some extent, they are right, but it isn’t irrational greed on the part of bank managers or fat cat CEOs. It is the unwieldy bank regulations that forced the entire industry to walk the proverbial plank and then blame it for drowning.
Critics have alternately claimed that over-regulation and under-regulation are the causes for the current crisis. I believe one specific regulation, the Community Reinvestment Act (CRA), should shoulder a lot of the blame for creating an environment where a lending institution’s short-term survival hinged on it making the decisions that in the long-term would likely cause its demise.
As I noted in my paper The Community Reinvestment Act’s Harmful Legacy, one of the effects of the CRA was the creation of a weapon that has been effectively utilized to extort money from lenders. When lending institutions wish to open a new branch, expand, or merge, they must apply for permission from one of the four governing bodies (Federal Reserve, Office of Comptroller of the Currency, Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, and Office of Thrift Supervision). Their request can be postponed or outright denied if any community group files a CRA protest. Lending institutions can of course fight these protests, but CRA investigations can take months and cost large sums of money.