james hansen

Is tax-and-dividend (aka “carbon fee and green check”) a morally compelling alternative to cap-and-trade?

Is it the path to presidential greatness?

Will it be good for the economy?

Will China adopt it if we do?

Yes to all of the above, climatologist James Hansen argues in the Huffington Post.

No, says your humble servant, today on MasterResource.Org.

Certain influential forces in the environmental movement – most notably James Hansen of NASA – have expressed disquiet with the inability of democracies to deal with their imagined “climate crisis,” leading to sentiments like this one from Australian authors David Shearman and Joseph Wayne Smith:

We need an authoritarian form of government in order to implement the scientific consensus on greenhouse gas emissions

Climatologists Nico Stehr and Hans von Storch discuss this argument at Roger Pielke Jr’s blog.  Thankfully, the demands for an “Ecologocracy,” for want of a better term, are not yet universal in the environmental movement.  They conclude:

Finally, the growing impatience of prominent climate researchers constitutes an implicit embrace of now popular social theories. We think in this context especially of Jared Diamond’s theories on the fate of human societies. Diamond argues that only those societies have a chance of survival which practice sustainable lifestyles. Climate researchers have evidently been impressed by Diamond’s deterministic social theory. However, they have drawn the wrong conclusion, namely that only authoritarian political states guided by scientists make effective and correct decisions on the climate issue. History teaches us that the opposite is the case.

Therefore, today’s China cannot serve as a model. Climate policy must be compatible with democracy, otherwise the threat to civilization will be much more than just changes to our physical environment.

Indeed.  In fact, there may be another reason for those who despise greenhouse gas emissions also to despise democracy. and it is precisely linked to the threat to civilization.  We know that the best indicator of low greenhouse gas emissions is poverty.  As Daron Acemoglu shows, rejecting Diamond, poverty is strongly linked to the lack of market institutions that democracy protects:

People need incentives to invest and prosper; they need to know that if they work hard, they can make money and actually keep that money. And the key to ensuring those incentives is sound institutions — the rule of law and security and a governing system that offers opportunities to achieve and innovate. That’s what determines the haves from the have-nots — not geography or weather or technology or disease or ethnicity.
Put simply: Fix incentives and you will fix poverty. And if you wish to fix institutions, you have to fix governments.

To put it another way, the authoritarian solution to the global warming problem, in so far as it exists, is the imposition of poverty, for that is the inevitable result of the restriction of energy use that is the authoritarians’ sine qua non. Those of us who are trying to think of alternative solutions to the problem, however, are convinced that it is the same institutions that have delivered us from poverty that will deliver us from whatever ills a warmer world might impose. To see more on this, check out Marlo Lewis’ film Policy Peril, in particular this segment.

Next week, the Senate Environment and Public Works Committee will hold three hearings on S. 1733, the Clean Energy Jobs and American Power Act,” also known as Kerry-Boxer after its co-sponsors Senators John Kerry (D-MA) and Barbara Boxer (D-CA). Kerry-Boxer is the Senate companion bill to H.R. 2454, the American Clean Energy and Security Act (ACESA), also known as Waxman-Markey after its co-sponsors Reps. Henry Waxman (D-CA) and Ed Markey (D-MA).

Part A of Title VII of Kerry-Boxer sets forth the emission reduction targets and timetables of the bill’s proposed greenhouse gas emissions cap-and-trade program. It is nearly identical to the corresponding section of the Waxman-Markey bill, the main substantive difference being a tougher emissions reduction target for the year 2020. Waxman-Markey requires a 17% reduction below 2005 levels by 2020; Kerry-Boxer, a 20% reduction. 

It would be a mistake, though, to suppose that those numbers reflect the full extent of the regulatory burdens Title VII Part A could impose on the U.S. economy. Identical language in both bills could (1) unleash a torrent of lawsuits against tens of thousands of relatively small emitters of carbon dioxide (CO2), and (2) put pressure on future presidents and congresses to adopt substantially tougher emission reduction targets. 

Section 701 Findings: Setup for CO2 Tort Litigation

Under the Kerry-Boxer and Waxman-Markey bill, business entities would be subject to the cap-and-trade program only if they emit at least 25,000 metric tons per year of carbon dioxide-equivalent (CO2-e) greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions. So on superficial inspection, if you are small manufacturer or just about any type of non-industrial facility, you will have no emission reduction obligations. That perception helps the bills’ proponents divide-and-conquer the business community.

In reality, the Findings in Kerry-Boxer and Waxman-Markey are the setup for litigation demanding additional emission reductions beyond those specified in the bills’ cap-and-trade programs. This is particularly worrisome because state attorneys general and environmental groups are already suing energy companies under tort law for emitting CO2.

The Findings say that “each increment of emission … causes or contributes … to the acceleration and extent of global warming and its adverse effects,” and “accordingly, controlling emissions in small as well as large quantities is essential” to reduce “threats” and “injuries,” including disease, death, property damage, bad weather, business losses; harm to forest, plants, wildlife, water resources, and air quality; and – as if that list weren’t inclusive enough — “other harm.”
 
Worse, the Findings go on to equate risk of harm with actual harm: “the fact that some of the adverse and potentially catastrophic effects of global warming are at risk of occurring and not a certainty does not negate the harm persons suffer from actions that increase the likelihood, extent, and severity of future impacts.” Get that? All plaintiffs will need is some remote, speculative possibility of catastrophic impacts — and of course that’s what the global warming scare is all about — and voila, harm has been done, injuries cry out for redress.
 
If the language in the Findings becomes the law of the land, there will be no stopping the flood of common law nuisance suits. Any increment of emissions, no matter how small, will be deemed to cause or contribute to global warming and its harmful effects. And even if no harm can be proved, the risk of harm will count as actual injury.

Bottom line: Although EPA, initially, may only regulate entities emitting at least 25,000 tons of CO2-e per year, the Findings implicitly authorize litigation targeting vast numbers of small entities.

Section 705 Review and Program Recommendations: Setup for Moving Goal Posts
 
There’s a lot of mischief in this section, too. To begin with, Sec. 705 requires the EPA Administrator, every four years, to address “existing scientific information and reports, considering, to the greatest extent possible, the most recent assessment report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, reports by the United States Global Change Research Program … ” This provision will turn EPA into an even more uncritical rubber stamp for the IPCC and USGCRP than it already is. More than ever, IPCC and USGCRP will write their reports to influence U.S. policy (i.e. they will be even more politicized) and their influence will increase. Cheer if you like agenda-driven science!
 
Sec. 705 also requires EPA to report on annual emissions and annual per-capita emissions by country. Not a word, though, about tracking emission intensity (greenhouse gas emissions per dollar of output) by country. In other words, the metrics have been selected to paint the United States in the worst possible light.
 
Also, as you’d expect, the Administrator is required to assess the impacts of climate change on everything under the Sun — populations, health, livelihoods, tribal culture, weather, fresh water, ecosystems, agriculture, etc. — but there is no requirement to assess the impacts of climate policy on anything. This despite a requirement that the Administrator use a “risk management framework.”
 
Similarly, the Administrator is supposed to assess the potential non-linear, abrupt, or essentially irreversible changes in the climate system but he is under no corresponding obligation to assess factors that might stabilize the climate and counteract the forcing effects of greenhouse gases.
 
Now here’s where it gets serious. The Administrator is also required to assess what terrible things won’t be prevented by limiting CO2 equivalent emissions to 450 ppm or global warming to 2°C (3.6°F) beyond pre-industrial temperatures. This sets up the Administrator to advocate 350 as the new 450. It specifically requires the Administrator to identify “alternative thresholds or targets that may more effectively limit the risks” of climate change.
 
Similarly, the Administrator must assess whether the Kerry-Boxer bill, taking into account international actions and commitments, is sufficient to limit GHG concentrations to 450 ppm and global warming to 2°C above pre-industrial temperatures, or whether ”other temperature or greenhouse gas thresholds identified” by the Administrator would be more protective.
 
So the U.S. Climate Action Partnership gang are naive if they think the Kerry-Boxer and Waxman-Markey emission reduction targets, once enacted, will be set in stone. These bills are just the framework for more aggressive emission reduction requirements to come. Regulatory certainty is an illusion.
 
Perhaps because some people just don’t trust EPA — imagine that! — Kerry-Boxer requires the National Academy of Science (NAS) to undertake a similar four-year review of climate science and policy. If the NAS concludes that the United States will not meet the Kerry-Boxer targets, or that 450 ppm and 2°C are not sufficiently protective, the President “shall” submit a plan to Congress identifying the domestic and international actions that will achieve the additional reductions. This language implicitly makes the president a handmaid of the National Academy. Once Jim Hansen and his NAS buddies decide that 350 is the new 450, the president “shall” submit a plan explaining how we get there.

Much of the debate on Kerry-Boxer and Waxman-Markey has centered on the bills’ emission reduction targets. Meeting those targets could destroy millions of jobs. The not-so-hidden fangs lurking in Sections 701 and 705 pose additional significant threats to the economy — and provide additional reasons to oppose such legislation.

On February 25, 2009, Dr. James Hansen of Columbia University’s Earth Institute and Dr. John Christy of the University of Alabama in Huntsville testified on “Scientific Objectives for Climate Change Legislation,” before the House Ways and Means Committee.

Dr. Hansen is probably the world’s most influential scientist in the climate alarmist camp. His 1988 congressional testimony, which projected significant increases in global temperatures over the next two decades, gave birth to the warming movement.

At the Ways and Means hearing, Christy testified that datasets he and his colleagues have developed contradict the climate model hypotheses and surface temperature records on which alarmism rests. His leading example was the discrepancy between Hansen’s 1988 model forecasts and actual temperatures as measured by two independent satellite monitoring systems.

christy-observations-vs-hansen-1988-models1

“GISS” A, B, and C are Hansen’s 1988 global warming model projections. “A” and “B” are model projections assuming business-as-usual emission levels similar to what happened (actually a bit lower than what occurred). ”C” is a model projection assuming drastic CO2 cuts. ”UAH” and “RSS” are, respectively, the University of Alabama in Huntsville and Remote Sensing Systems satellite records.

Christy comments:

All model projections show a high sensitivity to CO2 while the actual atmosphere does not. It is noteworthy that the model projection for drastic CO2 cuts still overshot the observations. This would be considered a failed hypothesis test for the models from 1988.

 Ancient history, you say? Maybe, but Christy also compared the IPCC Fourth Assessment Report’s (AR4) climate model warming projections with actual temperature data.

christy-observations-vs-ipcc-models

The red and orange lines mark the upper and lower bounds of 95% of the global warming projections calculated by 21 IPCC AR4 models for multi-year segments ending in 2020. The blue and green lines show temperature trends calculated from the UAH satellite record and the U.K. Hadley Center surface temperature record, respectively.

Christy comments:

The two main points here are (1) the observations are much cooler than the mid-range of the model spread and are at the minimum of the model simulations and (2) the satellite adjustment for surface comparisons is exceptionally good. The implication of (1) is that the best estimates of the IPCC models are too warm, or that they are too sensitive to CO2 emissions.

By now you may be wondering what any of this has to do with peer review at the Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences (PNAS). Patience, grasshopper.

At the hearing, Hansen declined to address Christy’s critique of model sensitivity assumptions on the merits. Rather, he asserted that climate sensitivity is “crystal clear,” and advised the Committee to ask the National Academy of Sciences (NAS) to produce a report and accept its verdict as “authoritative.”

Now, if you’re like me, you probably assume that the National Academy insists on the most rigorous standards of peer review for PNAS, the organization’s flagship publication. But an article in the current (19 September 2009) issue of Science magazine (subscription required) suggests otherwise.

The article, “PNAS Nixes Special Privileges for (Most) Papers,” reports that:

National Academy members, as elite scientists, could shepherd their own work through peer review with less vetting than at other publications by “contributing” a paper. They could also “communicate” a paper on behalf of colleagues who had not been elected to the academy’s august ranks.

The article goes on to explain that:

In practice, “communicating” a colleague’s paper meant that a member lined up referees to review it before PNAS ever saw it. This increased the chance of a favorable reception — and looked suspiciously like cronyism to outsiders.

Because of that perception, PNAS announced last week that it will end the “communicated” option for submitting papers by July 2010. However, Science reports, “The move will not affect the privileges of academy members to line up reviews before they submit their own papers to PNAS …”

I don’t know about you, but my college GPA would have been higher had I been allowed to ”line up” friends to grade my term papers and tests. And wouldn’t it be nice if, during job performance reviews at work, we could “line up” allies to decide whether we deserve a raise and a bonus?

Science further reports that the “rejection rate for communicated or contributed papers that reach the PNAS is a few percent, whereas the rejection rate for standard submissions is 80%.” Membership doth seem to have its privileges at the National Academy.

Having spent a few years in institutions of higher learning, both as a student and a teacher, I have seen how our alleged bastions of academic freedom breed conformity and group-think. 

First, there’s the quest for tenure. A young professor serious about his career dare not challenge the methodological or ideological pieties of his colleagues, lest they deny him the coveted job security he seeks. And if the acolyte makes it into the ranks of the tenured, he will think twice about offending colleagues with whom he may be stuck for decades, and he’ll take care not to jeopardize his department’s research contracts and grants by offending the political pieties of grantmakers in Washington, D.C.

Most people admitted into the august ranks of the National Academy will have been shaped by the conformity mills that our institutions of higher learning have become. Moreover, once ensconced in the club, they will be loathe to offend other members, many of whom may have voted to admit them in the first place.

So it should come as no surprise that “the rejection rate for communicated or contributed papers that reach the PNAS is a few percent, whereas the rejection rate for standard submissions is 80%.” 

Even apart from these considerations, cronyism seems to be a significant problem in climate-related research. The IPCC reports are collections of literature reviews in which the lead authors often review their own work. Statistician Edward Wegman noted in his assessment of the infamous “hockey stick“ reconstruction of global temperatures (which allegedly proved that 1998 was the warmest year of the past 1,000 years) that “authors in the area of paleoclimate studies are closely connected and thus ‘independent studies’ may not be as independent as they seem on the surface.” 

So when National Academy member James Hansen declines to debate John Christy on the merits, and instead advises Congress to let the NAS decide the scientific basis of climate legislation, he is actually asking Congress to let the old-boy network to which he belongs call the shots.

That Hansen would proffer such self-serving advice rather than debate the core issue on the merits is reason enough to be skeptical of the science he espouses.

Today’s excerpt from CEI’s film, Policy Peril: Why Global Warming Policies Are More Dangerous Than Global Warming Itself, is on the global warming movement’s anti-coal campaign and the dangers it poses to U.S. consumers and the economy. To watch today’s clip, click here. To watch the entire film, click here.

The text of today’s excerpt follows. I provide additional commentary and links to supporting information in the footnotes.

Narrator: First and foremost, they want to ban construction of new coal-fired power plants. [1] Why? Coal is the most carbon-intensive fuel. It releases the most carbon dioxide per unit of energy produced. [2]

More importantly, emissions from new coal plants are expected to swamp, by as much as five to one, all the emission reductions that Europe, Canada, and Japan might achieve under the U.N. global warming treaty, the Kyoto Protocol. Either global warming activists kill coal, or coal will bury Kyoto. [3]

coal-v-kyoto

Figure Source: Myron Clayton, New coal plants bury ‘Kyoto,’ Christian Science Monitor, 23 December 2004.

Narrator: To be fair, the activists say they’ll allow new coal generation, if the power plants deploy something called CCS, carbon capture and storage technology. [5] The idea is that instead of releasing CO2 into the air, the power stations would capture it, liquefy it, and then transport it to underground storage sites. [6] There’s just one problem. No commercial coal plants today have CCS technology. [7]

I asked Mary Hutzler, formerly head of analysis at the Energy Information Administration, how long it would take just to determine whether a CCS system would be economical for utilities to build.

Mary Hutzler, former Acting Acting Administrator, Energy Information Administration: It probably requires an immense amount of research and development. People have told me 1o to 15 years alone. [8]

Narrator: Mary also told me that building a national CCS pipeline network could take another decade. Developing the regulations would also take years. [9] So the proposed moratorium is really a ban on new coal plants for 20 years or more.

What’s the risk here? New coal generation is forecast to supply two-thirds of all new electric power over the next two decades. By 2030, new coal generation is expected to provide 15% of all our electricity. [10] So banning it, could create one heck of a power deficit. Frequent blackouts and power failures–an energy crisis would not be an unlikely consequence. At a minimum, our electric bills would go way up.

Narrator: But Al Gore is not content to ban new coal plants. He now proposes to scrap all existing coal plants and natural gas power plants too. He says we must replace all carbon-based electricity with carbon-free electricity in just 10 years–by 2018. [11]

Ben Lieberman (Heritage Foundation): The idea is absolutely off the charts, unrealistic. [12]

Dr. Patrick Michaels (Cato Institute): Al Gore is proposing the literally, physically impossible. [12]

 Commentary

[1] James Hansen, the NASA scientist whose congressional testimony during the hot summer of 1988 launched the global warming movement, calls coal power plants ”factories of death“ and “the single greatest threat to civilization and all life on our planet.” The “top priority of any climate policy must be to stop the building of traditional coal plants,” writes climate crusader Joe Romm. He continues: “A climate policy that does not start by achieving at least the first goal, a moratorium on coal without CCS, must be labeled a failure.” “The silver bullet [for global warming] is no more coal,” says Architecture 2030. “Kill Coal. Coal is the enemy of the human race,” declares the Sustainable Development Issues Network. My Google search shows that global warming and coal are discussed on some 4,470,000 Web sites. It’s a safe bet most of those sites share the Gorethodox sentiments quoted above. 

[2] Different fossil (carbon-based) fuels emit different amounts of CO2 in relation to the energy they produce. For a variety of fuels, the U.S. Energy Information Administration compares pounds of CO2 emitted per energy output measured in British thermal units (Btu).

Fuel                                                        Pounds/Btu

Natural Gas                                          117

Liquefied petroleum gas                 139

Gasoline                                                156

Coal (bituminous)                             205

Coal (subituminous)                        213

Coal (lignite)                                       215

Petroleum coke                                 225

Coal (anthrocite)                              227

From these numbers, we can calculate the emission ratios (or relative CO2 intensity) of the fuels. For example, bituminous coal is 1.37 times more CO2-intensive than gasoline, and 1.75 more CO2-intensive than natural gas.

[3] The Christian Science Monitor chart shown above and in the film clip is based on late 2004 estimates by UDI-Platts, the U.S. Energy Information Administration (EIA), and unspecified industry sources. David Hawkins of the Natural Resources Defense Council (NRDC), in a February 2005 speech, presented a similar bottom line, based on International Energy Agency (IEA) data. He said:

 The International Energy Agency (IEA) forecasts that 1400 GW of new coal plants will be built worldwide in the next 25 years alone. To put that in context, current U.S. coal capacity is about 330 GW and global capacity is 1000 GW. This enormous increase in coal capacity will lock us into a huge additional commitment to global warming unless we use technologies that reduce CO2 emissions to minimal levels; marginal efficiency improvements will not prevent this lock-in.

The lifetime emissions from just this next wave of coal investment will be about 580 billion tons of CO2. That amount is more than half the total loading of the atmosphere with CO2 from all forms of fossil fuel combustion in the past 250 years!

Build scores or hundreds of new coal plants, and the Kyoto CO2 reductions barely amount to a drop in the bucket. As has been widely reported, China is building coal power plants at the rate of one a week.

[5] A wide-ranging coalition of environmental groups called “Coal Moratorium Now“ demands that no new coal-fired power station be built unless it is equipped with carbon capture and storage. In 2008, Reps. Henry Waxman (D-CA) and Ed Markey (D-MA)–the authors of the 2009 Waxman-Markey cap-and-trade bill (H.R. 2454, the American Clean Energy and Security Act)–introduced legislation (H.R. 5575) to impose a moratorium on new coal plants lacking CCS. In March 2009, state legislators introduced a similar bill in Texas. In April 2009, the UK Government proposed regulations requiring new coal plants to install CCS on at least 400 MW of output–about 25% of the output of an average power station. In addition, the power stations would have to capture 100% of their emissions by 2025–if the applicable technology exists by then. That’s a big “if.”

[6] A wealth of both basic and technical information on CCS is available in studies by MIT, the U.S. Government Accounting Office, the Electric Power Research Institute (EPRI), the Congressional Research Service, the Department of Energy (DOE), and Glaser et al. (2008).

[7] Oil companies sometimes inject CO2 into wells to squeeze more petroleum out of them–a technique called enhanced oil recovery (OER). Sometimes people talk as if a CCS system could piggy-back on EOR projects. But, as MIT’s Future of Coal report points out, CO2 injection for EOR has “limited significance for long-term, large-scale CO2 sequestration–regulations differ, the capacity of EOR projects is inadequate for large-scale deployment, the geologic formation has been disrupted by production, and EOR projects are usually not well instrumented [monitored for CO2 leakage; p. xiii].”

The Department of Energy (DOE), citing rising costs, pulled the plug on FutureGen, a $1.5 billion government-industry partnership to build the world’s first commercial scale CCS power plant. In July 2009, however, FutureGen Alliance, Inc. announced it had reached an agreement with DOE to begin “construction of the first commercial-scale, fully integrated carbon capture and sequestration project in the country in Matton, Ill.” So there is still not even a commercial-scale demonstration project, though there may be in the next few years.

[8] MIT’s March 2007 Future of Coal report calls for large demonstration projects in 3-4 sites in different regions of the country costing “$500 million over eight years.” Better still, MIT argues, “Five large tests could be planned an executed for under $1 billion, and address the chief concerns for roughly 70% of U.S. [coal generation] capacity. Information from these projects would validate the commercial scalability of  geologic carbon storage and provide a basis for regulatory, legal, and financial decisions needed to ensure safe, reliable, economic sequestration” (p. 54).

EPRI’s Bryan Hannegan estimated in March 2007 that CO2 capture (including compression, transportation, and storage) would increase the levelized cost of an Integrated Gassification Combined Cycle (IGCC) coal power plant by ”about 40-50%” (p. 5). IGCC is already more costly than the more common pulverized coal (PC) power plants. EPRI is confident that additional RD&D will lower carbon capture costs. But by how much and how soon is uncertain.

A February 2009 Stanford University study, citing a September 2008 McKinsey & Co. study and other sources, says that CCS is projected to increase the capital costs of new coal power plants by almost 50%. “On the basis of avoided emissions, the cost of CCS ranges from $30-$90/ tonne CO2, which translates into a 60-80% increase in the levelized cost of electricity ($/MWh).” 

A July 2009 Harvard University study estimates that early adopters of carbon capture technology will incur a cost of $100-$150/ton of CO2 avoided (equivalent to 8-12 cents/kWh). Once the technology matures, the additional cost will fall to $35-$50/ton of CO2 avoided (equivalent to 2-5 cents/kWh), the researchers estimate. For comparison, in 2009, residential electric rates were 20.9 cents/kWh in Connecticut, 9.2 cents/kWh in Kansas, and 14.6 cents/kWh in California.

How long between early adoption and technological maturity? According to the researchers, increasing scale, learning by doing, and technological innovation “are expected to reduce abatement [CO2 capture] costs by approximately 65% by 2030, although such estimates are inevitably uncertain” (emphasis added). 

In plain speak, it may take many years to sort out the economics of CCS.

[9] The scale of the network of pipelines and storage sites required to transport and bury CO2 from U.S. coal power plants is staggering. According to MIT’s Future of Coal report (p. ix):

  • The United States produces about 1.5 billion tons per year of CO2 from coal-burning power plants.
  • If all of this is CO2 is transported for sequestration, the quantity is equivalent to three times the weight and, under typical operating conditions, one-third the annual volume of natural gas transported by the U.S. gas pipeline system.
  • If 60% of the CO2 produced from U.S. coal-based power generation were to be captured and compressed into a liquid for geologic sequestration, its volume would about equal the total U.S. oil consumption of 20 million barrels per day.
  • At present the largest sequestration project is injecting one millions tons/year of carbon dioxide (CO2) from the Sleipner gas field into a saline aquifer under the North Sea.

Even if Congress approves such a system, and major environmental groups support it, NIMBY (“not in my backyard”) protests and litigation could block or delay implementation for many years. Some people just don’t like energy projects, regardless of how “green” the projects purport to be. For the gory details, check out the U.S. Chamber of Commerce’s ”Project No Project“ Web site. 

[10] Two-thirds of all new generation and 15% of total U.S. electric supply–these estimates came from the Energy Information Administration’s (EIA) 2008 Annual Energy Outlook. See the figure below.

eia-2008-coal-electric-generation

Coal’s estimated share of new generation and total generation are lower in EIA’s Annual Energy Outlook 2009. EIA forecasts that from 2007 to 2030, new coal generation will provide 64% of all new generation and 9% of total U.S. electric supply. See the figure below.

eia-2009-coal-electric-generation1

Actually, it’s remarkable that EIA still forecasts a robust increase in electric generation from coal. Coal increasingly operates in a politically hostile, litigious environment. The Sierra Club, for example, claims that its activists, lawyers, and allies, working with state and local leaders, have prevented 100 planned coal power plants from being built over the past eight years. Click here for a partial list.

For example, even in Texas, an energy-producing state, environmental activists stopped TXU Corp. from building eight of 11 planned new coal power plants, despite estimates by the Perryman Group that investment in the new plants, over five years, would add $25.8 billion to state GDP, $17.3 billion to in-state personal income, and 389,000-plus person-years of employment.

[11] I’m not making this up. The text and video of Gore’s speech calling for carbon-free electricity by 2018 are available here.

[12] According to the EIA, in 2008, renewable sources generated 356 billion kWh, of which 259.7 billion kWh, or 73%, came from conventional hydro-electric dams. Total net generation by the electric power sector was 3852 billion kWh. So renewables provided only 9% of total generation, which means that only about 2.4% came from the politically-correct renewables–wind, biomass, solar, and geothermal.

Note that non-hydro renewable sources would provide even less electricity but for a plethora of market-rigging federal and state tax breaks and subsidies and Soviet-style production quotas known as renewable portfolio standards.

Coal and natural gas provided 2654 billion kWh, or about 69% of total U.S. electric generation in 2008. Gore and his allies would undoubtedly oppose the construction of new large hydroelectric dams even if suitable sites were available. So what Gore and “We Can Solve It” are proposing to do, is replace the 69% of our electricity that comes from coal and natural gas with the non-hydro renewables that currently supply only 2.4%–all in 10 years. 

This plan would fail–dismally. Our electricity rates would skyrocket, because the demand for renewable electricity, ramped up by mandates, would vastly exceed supply. No transition that big and that fast would be smooth. Service disruptions and blackouts would likely be frequent and perversive–a chronic energy crisis.

Gore’s plan would also set a world record for government waste, since hundreds of profitable coal and natural gas power plants would have to be decommissioned long before the end of their useful lives.   

 To read previous posts in this series, click on the links below:

Today’s post in my series of commentaries on excerpts from CEI’s film, Policy Peril: Why Global Warming Policies Are More Dangerous Than Global Warming Itself, challenges the Gorethodox dogma that the science debate on global warming is “over.”

There are three basic issues in the climate change science debate:

  • Detection – Has the world warmed, and if so, by how much?
  • Attribution – How much of the observed warming (especially since the mid-1970s) is due to increases in atmospheric greenhouse gas concentrations?
  • Sensitivity – How much additional warming should we expect from continuing increases in greenhouse gas concentrations?

Despite what you’ve heard over and over again, these basic issues are unsettled, and more so now than at any time in the past decade. The science debate is not “over.” Reports of the death of climate skepticism have been greatly exaggerated.

Because of time constraints (Policy Peril runs under 40 minutes), the film briefly explores only the most important of the three basic issues: climate sensitivity. Today’s clip comes from that part of the film: an interview with University of Alabama in Huntsville atmospheric scientist Dr. Roy Spencer. To watch the Spencer interview, click here. To watch the entire movie, click here.

Here’s how this post is organized. First, I’ll reproduce the text of Spencer’s interview. Then, I’ll review some recent research bearing on the three fundamental science issues: detection, attribution, and sensitivity.

Text of today’s film clip:

Narrator: All the IPCC models assume that a CO2-induced warming will produce more high-altitude cirrus clouds, which then trap even more heat in the atmosphere. This is what’s called a positive climate feedback. Roy Spencer and his colleagues use satellites to study cirrus cloud behavior.

Dr. Roy Spencer (University of Alabama in Huntsville): Last August, August of 2007, we published research which showed from a whole bunch of satellite data that when the tropical atmosphere heats up–there are these periods when the atmosphere heats up from more rain activity or cools down from less rain activity–that when it heats up, the skies actually open up. The cirrus clouds that are up high, in the troposphere, in the upper atmosphere, open up and let more cooling infrared radiation escape to space. And it was a very strong effect.

Narrator: Spencer says that if climate models incorporated the negative feedback his team discovered, the models might forecast 75% less warming.

This is definitely not the Al Gore view of climate sensitivity. In fact, in An Inconvenient Truth (p. 67), Gore suggests we could get “three times as much” warming by mid-century as has occurred since the “depth of the last ice age.” That would mean a warming of 10ºC-12ºC by mid-century! Gore’s implicit warming forecast goes way beyond the IPCC best-estimate forecast range of 1.8ºC  to 4.0ºC (IPCC WWI AR4, Summary for Policymakers, p. 13). As we’ll see below, several strands of evidence suggest that the IPCC models are also too “hot.”

Detection

The world has warmed overall during the past 130 years, as evidenced by melting glaciers, longer growing seasons, and both proxy and instrumental data. However, the main era of “anthropogenic” global warming supposedly began in the mid-1970s, and ongoing research by retired meteorologist Anthony Watts leaves no doubt that in recent decades, the U.S. surface temperature record–reputed to be the best in the world–is unreliable and riddled with false warming biases.

Watts and a team of more than 650 volunteers have visually inspected and photographically documented 1003, or 82%, of the 1,221 climate monitoring stations overseen by the U.S. Weather Service. In a report summarizing an earlier phase of the team’s investigation (a survey of 860+ stations), Watts says, “We were shocked by what we found.” He explains:

We found stations located next to exhaust fans of air conditioning units, surrounded by asphalt parking lots and roads, on blistering-hot rooftops, and near sidewalks and buildings that absorb and radiate heat. We found 68 stations located at wastewater treatment plants, where the process of waste digestion causes temperatures to be higher than in surrounding areas.

In fact, we found that 89 percent of the stations–nearly 9 of every 10–fail to meet the National Weather Services’s own siting requirements that stations must be 30 meters (about 100 feet) or more away from an artificial heating or radiating/reflecting heat source. In other words, 9 or every 10 stations are likely reporting higher or rising temperatures because they are badly sited.

“It gets worse,” Watts continues:

We observed that changes in the technology of temperature stations over time also have caused them to report a false warming trend. We found gaps in the data record that were filled in with data from nearby sites, a practice that propagates and compounds errors. We found adjustments to the data by both NOAA and another government agency, NASA, cause recent temperatures to look even higher.

How big a problem is this? According to Watts, “The errors in the record exceed by a wide margin the purported rise in temperature of 0.7ºC (about 1.2ºF) during the twentieth century.” Based on analysis of 948 stations rated as of May 31, 2009, Watts estimates that 22% of stations have an expected error of 1ºC, 61% have an expected error of 2ºC, and 8% have an expected error of 5ºC.

watts_fig23

Watts concludes that, “this record should not be cited as evidence of any trend in temperature that may have occurred across the U.S. during the past century.” He further concludes: “Since the U.S. record is thought to be ‘the best in the world,’ it follows that the global database is likely similarly compromised and unreliable.”

A related issue is the influence of urban heat islands on long-term temperature records. Climate Change Reconsidered, a report by the Nongovernmental International Panel on Climate Change (NIPCC), written by Drs. Craig Idso and S. Fred Singer with 35 contributors and reviewers, reviews more than 40 studies on urban heat islands. For example, a study by Oke (1973) of the urban heat island strength of 10 settlements in the St. Lawrence Lowlands of Canada found that a population as small as 1,000 people could generate a heat island effect of 2ºC-2.5ºC. From this study and the others reviewed, the NIPCC concludes:

It appears almost certain that surface-based temperature histories of the globe contain a significant warming bias introduced by insufficient corrections for the non-greenhouse-gas-induced urban heat island effect. Furthermore, it may well be impossible to make proper corrections for the deficiency, as the urban heat island of even small towns dwarfs any concommitant augmented greenhouse effect that may be present [p. 95; emphasis in original].

In a comment submitted to EPA regarding its proposed endangerment finding, University of Alabama in Huntsville (UAH) atmospheric scientist John Christy notes two additional reasons to conclude that the IPCC surface data records exaggerate warming trends:

As a culmination of several papers and years of work, Christy et al. (2009) demonstrates that popular surface datasets overstate the warming that is assumed to be greenhouse related for two reasons. First, these datasets use only stations that are electronically (i.e. easily) available, which means the unused, vast majority of stations (usually more rural and representative of actual trends but harder to find) are not included. Secondly, these popular datasets use the daily mean surface temerpature (TMean) which is the average of the daytime high (TMax) and nighttime low (TMin). In this study (and its predecessors, Christy 2002, Christy et al. 2006, Pielke Sr. et al. 2008, Walters et al. 2007 and others) we show that TMin is seriously impacted by surface development, and thus its rise is not an indicator of greenhouse gas forcing. Some have called this the Urban Heat Island effect, but, as described in Christy et al. 2009, it is much more than this and encompasses any development of the surface (e.g. irrigated agriculture).

For example, the UK Hadley Center, relying on two electronic surface stations, computed a TMax temperature trend in East Africa of 0.14ºC per decade during 1905-2004. Christy, using data from 45 stations, found a trend of only 0.02ºC per decade.

christy-uah-v-hadcrut3

In California, Christy found that the only significant warming trend is for TMin in the irrigated San Joaquin Valley. Note, in the non-irrigated Sierra mountains, where models project a greenhouse gas-induced warming should occur, there is actually a decreasing temperature trend.

christy-tmin-ca

Obviously, temperature data are the starting point of any analysis of global warming. But if we can’t trust the U.S. and IPCC temperature records, how do we know how much global warming has actually occurred?

Satellite observations are not influenced by heat islands and irrigation, or subject to the quality control problems detailed by Watts. Moreover, satellite records tally well with weather balloon observations–an independent database. So maybe detection should be based solely on satellite data, which do show some warming over the past 30 years. However, the “debate is over” crowd is unlikely to embrace this solution.  The satellite record shows a relatively slow rate of warming–about 0.13ºC per decade–hence a relatively insensitive climate.

uah-temperature-anomalies-jan-1979-june-20093

Moreover, as can be seen in the above chart of the University of Alabama-Huntsville (UAH) satellite record, some of the 0.13ºC/decade ”trend” comes from the 1998 El Nino warming pulse. Remove 1998, and the 30-year satellite record trend drops to 0.12ºC/decade.

Attribution

The IPCC, the leading spokesman for the alleged scientific consensus, claims that, “Most of the observed increase in global average temperatures since the mid-20th century is very likely due to the observed increase in anthropogenic greenhouse gas concentrations.” How does the IPCC know this? The IPCC offers three main reasons.

First, according to the IPCC, “Paleoclimate reconstructions show that the second half of the 20th century was likely the warmest 50-year period in the Northern hemisphere in 1300 years” (IPPC AR4, WGI, Chapt. 9, p. 702).  The warmth of recent decades coincided with a rapid increase in GHG concentrations. Therefore, the IPCC reasons, most of the recent warming is likely due to anthropogenic GHG emissions.

This argument is unconvincing if the warming of recent decades is not unusual or unprecedented in the past 1300 years. As it happens, numerous studies indicate that the Medieval Warm Period (MWP)–roughly the period from AD 800 to 1300, with peak warmth occurring about AD 1050–was as warm as or warmer than the Current Warm Period (CWP).

The Center for the Study of Carbon Dioxide and Global Change has analyzed more than 200 peer-reviewed MWP studies produced by more than 660 individual scientists working in 385 separate institutions from 40 countries. The Center divides these studies into three categories–those with quantitative data enabling one to infer the degree to which the peak of the MWP differs from the peak of the CWP (Level 1), those with qualitative data enabling one to infer which period was warmer (Level 2), although not by how much, and those with data enabling one to infer the existence of a MWP in the region studied (Level 3). An interactive map showing the sites of these studies is available at CO2Science.org.

Only a few Level 1 studies determined the MWP to have been cooler than the CWP; the vast majority indicate a warmer MWP. On average, the studies indicate that the MWP was 1.01ºC warmer than the CWP.

mwpquantitative

Figure Description: The distribution, in 0.5ºC increments, of Level 1 studies that allow one to identify the degree to which peak MWP temperatures either exceeded (positive values, red) or fell short of (negative values, blue) peak CWP temperatures.

Similarly, the vast majority of Level 2 studies indicate a warmer MWP:

mwpqualitative

Figure Description: The distribution of Level 2 studies that allow one to determine whether peak MWP temperatures were warmer than (red), equivalent to (green), or cooler than (blue), peak CWP temperatures.

The IPCC’s second main reason for attributing most recent warming to the increase in GHG concentrations is that climate models “cannot reproduce the rapid warming observed in recent decades when they only take into account variations in solar output and volcanic activity. However . . . models are able to simulate observed 20th century changes when they include all of the most important external factors, including human influences from sources such as greenhouse gases and natural external factors” (IPCC, AR4, WGI, Chapt. 9, p. 702).

This would be decisive if today’s models accurately simulate all important modes of natural variability. In fact, models do not accurately simulate the behavior of clouds and ocean cycles. They may also ignore important interactions between the Sun, cosmic rays, and cloud formation.

Richard Lindzen of MIT spoke to this point at the Heartland Institute’s recent (June 2, 2009) Third International Conference on Climate Change:

What was done [by the IPCC], was to take a large number of models that could not reasonably simulate known patterns of natural behavior (such as ENSO, the Pacific Decadal Oscillation, the Atlantic Multi-Decadal Oscillation), claim that such models nonetheless adequately depicted natural internal climate variability, and use the fact that models could not replicate the warming episode from the mid seventies through the mid nineties, to argue that forcing was necessary and that the forcing must have been due to man. The argument makes arguments in support of intelligent design seem rigorous by comparison.

“Fingerprint” studies are the third basis on which the IPCC attributes most recent warming to anthropogenic greenhouse gases. Climate models project a specific pattern of warming through the vertical profile of the atmosphere–a greenhouse “fingerprint.” If the observed warming pattern matches the model-projected fingerprint, that would be strong evidence that recent warming is anthropogenic. Conversely, notes the NIPCC, “A mismatch would argue strongly against any signficant contribution from greenhouse gas (GHG) forcing and support the conclusion that the observed warming is mostly of natural origin” (NPICC, p. 106).

Douglass et al. (2007) compared model-projected and observed warming patterns in the tropical troposphere. The observed pattern is based on three compilations of surface temperature records, four balloon-based records of the surface and lower troposphere, and three satellite-based records of various atmospheric layers–10 independent datasets in all.

“While all greenhouse models show an increasing warming trend with altitude, peaking around 10 km at roughly two times the surface value,” observes the NIPCC, “the temperature data from balloons give the opposite result; no increasing warming, but rather a slight cooling with altitude” (p. 107). See the figures below.

hot-spot

The mismatch between the model-predicted greenhouse fingerprint and the observed pattern is profound. As the Douglass team explains: “Model results and observed temperature trends are in disagreement in most of the tropical troposphere, being separated by more than twice the uncertainty of the model mean. In layers near 5 km, the modeled trend is 100% to 300% higher than observed, and above 8 km, modeled and observed trends have opposite signs.”

douglass

Figure description: Temperature trends for statellite era (ºC/decade). HadCRUT, GHCH and GISS are compilations of surface temperature observations. IGRA, RATPAC, HadAT2, and RAOBCORE are balloon-based observations of surface and lower troposphere. UAH, RSS, UMD are satellite-based data for various layers of the atmosphere. The 22-model average comes from an ensemble of 22 model simulations from the most widely used models worldwide. The red lines are the +2 and -2 standard errors of the mean from the 22 models. Source: Douglass et al. 2007.

The NIPCC concludes that the mismatch of observed and model-calculated fingerprints “clearly falsifies the hypothesis of anthropogenic global warming (AGW)” (p. 108). I would put the state of affairs more cautiously. In view of (1) significant evidence that the MWP was as warm as or warmer than the CWP, (2) the inability of climate models to simulate important modes of natural variability, and (3) the failure of observations to confirm a greenhouse fingerprint in the tropical trosophere, the IPCC claim that “most” recent warming is “very likely” anthropogenic should be considered a boast rather than a balanced assessment of the evidence.

Climate Sensitivity

The most important unresolved scientific issue in the global warming debate is how sensitive (reactive) the climate is to increases in GHG concentrations.

Climate sensitivity is typically defined as the global average surface warming following a doubling of carbon dioxide (CO2) concentrations above pre-industrial levels. The IPCC says a doubling is likely to produce warming in the range of 2ºC to 4.5ºC, with a most likely value of about 3ºC (IPCC, AR4, WGI, Chapt. 10, p. 749). The IPCC presents a range rather than a specific value because of uncertainty regarding the strength of the relevant feedbacks.

In a hypothetical climate with no feedbacks, positive or negative, a CO2 doubling would produce 1.2ºC of warming (IPCC, AR4, WGI, Chapt. 8, p. 631). In most climate models, the dominant feedbacks are positive, meaning that the warmth from rising GHG levels causes other changes (in water vapor, clouds, or surface reflectivity, for example) that either increase the retention of outgoing long-wave radiation (OLR) or decrease the reflection of incoming short-wave radiation (SWR).

In his speech at the June 2 Heartland Institute conference, Professor Lindzen summarized his research on climate sensitivity, which has since been accepted for publication by Geophysical Research Letters. Lindzen argues that climate feedbacks and sensitivity can be inferred from observed changes in OLR and SWR following observed changes in sea-surface temperatures. For fluctuations in OLR and SWR, Lindzen and his colleagues used the 16-year record (1985-1999) from the Earth Radiation Budget Experiment (ERBE), as corrected for altitude variations associated with satellite orbital decay. For sea surface temperatures, they used data from the National Centers for Environmental Prediction. For climate model simulations, they used 11 IPCC models forced with the observed sea-surface temperature changes.

The results are striking. All 11 IPCC models show positive feedback, “while ERBE unambiguously shows a strong negative feedback.”

lindzen-erbe-vs-models1

Figure description: ERBE data show increasing top-of-the-atmosphere radiative flux (OLR plus reflected SWR) as sea surface temperatures rise whereas models forecast decreasing radiative flux. Source: Lindzen and Choi 2009.

The ERBE data indicate that the sensitivity of the actual climate system “is narrowly constrained to about 0.5ºC,” Lindzen estimates. ”This analysis,” says Lindzen in a recent commentary, “makes clear that even when all models agree, they can be wrong, and that this is the situation for the all important question of climate sensitivity.”

erbe-v-model-sensitivity4

At the Heartland Institute’s Second International Conference on Climate Change (March 2009), Dr. William Gray of Colorado State University presented satellite-based research that may explain the low climate sensitivity the Lindzen team infers from the ERBE data.

The IPCC climate models assume that CO2-induced warming significantly increases upper troposphere clouds and water vapor, trapping still more OLR that would otherwise escape to space. Most of the projected warming in the models comes from this positive water vapor/cloud feedback, not from the CO2. Satellite observations do not support this hypothesis, Gray contends:

Observations of upper tropospheric water vapor over the last 3-4 decades from the National Centers of Environmental Prediction/National Center for Atmospheric Research (NCEP/NCAR) reanalysis data and the International Satellite Cloud Climatology Project (ISCCP) data show that upper tropospheric water vapor appears to undergo a small decrease while Outgoing Longwave Radiation (OLR) undergoes a small increase. This is the opposite of what has been programmed into the GCMs [General Circulation Models] due to water vapor feedback.

The figure below comes from the NCEP/NCAR reanalysis of upper troposphere water vapor and OLR.

reanalysis-olr-and-water-vapor-50

Figure description: NCEP/NCAR renalysis of standardized anomalies at 400 mb (~7.5 km altitude) water vapor content (i.e. specific humidity — in blue) and OLR (in red) from 1950 to 2008. Note the downward trend in moisture and upward trend in OLR.

Gray’s paper deals with water vapor in the upper troposphere. What about high-altitude cirrus clouds, which climate models also predict will increase and trap more OLR as GHG concentrations increase?

Spencer et al. (2007), the study Dr. Spencer spoke about in today’s Policy Peril film clip, found a strong negative cirrus cloud feedback mechanism in the tropical troposphere. Instead of steadily building up as the tropical oceans warm, cirrus cloud cover suddenly contracts, allowing more OLR to escape. As mentioned, Spencer estimates that if this mechanism operates on decadal time scales, it would reduce model estimates of global warming by 75%.

A 2008 study by Spencer and colleague William D. Braswell examines the issue of climate feedbacks related to low-level clouds. Lower troposphere clouds tend to cool the Earth by reflecting incoming SWR. Observations indicate that warmer years have less cloud cover compared to cooler years. Modelers have interpreted this correlation as positive feedback effect in which warming reduces low-level cloud cover, which then produces more warming.

Spencer and Braswell found that climate modelers could be mixing up cause and effect. Random variations in cloudiness can cause substantial decadal variations in ocean temperatures. So it is equally plausible that the causality runs the other way, and increases in sea-surface temperature are an effect of natural cloud variations. If so, then climate models forecast too much warming. For more on this, visit Spencer’s Web site.

In a study now in peer review for possible publication in the Journal of Geophysical Research, Spencer and colleagues analyzed 7.5 years of NASA satellite data and “discovered,” he reports on his Web site, “that, when the effects of clouds-causing-temperature-change is accounted for, cloud feedbacks in the real climate system are strongly negative.” “In fact,” he continues, “the resulting net negative feedback was so strong that, if it exists on the long time scales associated with global warming, it would result in only 0.6ºC of warming by late in this century.”

In related ongoing satellite research, Spencer finds new evidence that “most” warming of the past century “could be the result of a natural cycle in cloud cover forced by a well-known mode of natural climate variability: the Pacific Decadal Oscillation (PDO).”

Whether or not the PDO proves to be a major player in climate change, Spencer has identified a potentially serious error in all IPCC modeling efforts:

Even though they never say so, the IPCC has simply assumed that the average cloud cover of the Earth does not change, century after century. This is a totally arbitrary assumption, and given the chaotic variations that the ocean and atmosphere circulations are capable of, it is probably wrong. Little more than a 1% change in cloud cover up or down, and sustained over many decades, could cause events such as the Medieval Warm Period or the Little Ice Age.

Finally, recent temperature history also suggests that most climate models are too “hot.” Dr. Patrick Michaels touched on this topic in Policy Peril (albeit not in today’s excerpt).

Carbon dioxide emissions and concentrations are increasing at an accelerating rate (Canadell, J.G. et al. 2008). Yet, there has been no net warming since 2001 and no year was as warm as 1998.

global-temperature-past-decade

Figure description: Observed monthly global temperature anomalies, January 2001 through April 2009, as compiled by the Climate Research Unit. Source: Paul C. Knappenberger.

Paul C. Knappenberger (“Chip” to his friends) quite reasonably wonders, “[H]ow long a period of no warming can be tolerated before the forecasts of the total warming by century’s end have to be lowered?” After all, he continues, “We’re already into the nineth year of the 100 year forecast and we have no global warming to speak of.” It is instructive to compare these data with climate model projections.

A good place to start is with the climate model projections that NASA scientist James Hansen presented in his 1988 congressional testimony, which launched the modern global warming movement.

The figure below, from congressional testimony by Dr. John Christy, a colleague of Roy Spencer at the University of Alabama in Huntsville, shows how Hanesn’s model and reality diverge.

hansen-models-vs-reality1

Figure description: The red, orange, and purple lines are Hansen’s model forecasts of global temperatures under different emission scenarios. The green and blue lines are actual temperatures from two independent satellite records. Source: John Christy.

“All model projections show high sensitivity to CO2 while the actual atmosphere does not,” Christy notes. “It is noteworthy,” he adds, “that the model projection for drastic CO2 cuts still overshot the observations. This would be considered a failed hypothesis test for the models from 1988.”

What about the models used by the IPCC in its 2007 Fourth Assessment Report (AR4)? How well are they replicating global temperatures?

ipcc-models-vs-recent-temperatures

This figure, also from Dr. Christy’s testimony, is adapted from Dr. Patrick Michaels’s testimony of February 12, 2009. The red and orange lines show the upper and lower significant range (95% of all model runs are between the lines) of global temperature trends calculated by 21 IPCC AR4 models for multi-year segments ending in 2020. The blue and green lines show observed temperatures ending in 2008 from satellite (University of Alabama in Huntsville) and surface (U.K. Hadley Center for Climate Change) records.

Christy comments:

The two main points here are (1) the observations are much cooler than the mid-range of the model spread and are at the minimum of the model simulations and (2) the satellite adjustment for surface comparisons is exceptionally good. The implication of (1) is that the best estimates of the IPCC models are too warm, or that they are too sensitive to CO2 emissions.

Christy illustrates this another way in his comment on EPA’s endangerment proposal.

christy-models-standard-error1

Figure description: Mean and standard error of 22 IPCC AR4 model temperature projections in the mid-range (A1B) emissions scenario. From 1979 to 2008, the mean projection of the models is a warming of 0.22ºC per decade. HADCRUT3v (green) is a surface dataset, UAH (blue) and RSS (purple) are satellite data sets.

Christy comments:

. . . even with these likely spurious warming effects in HADCRUT3v and RSS, the mean model trends are still significantly warmer than the observations at all time scales examined here. Thus, the model mean sensitivity, a quantity utilized by the IPCC as about 2.6ºC per doubled CO2, is essentially contradicted in these comparisons.

Michaels, in his testimony, shows that if year 2008 temperatures persist through 2009, then the observed temperature trend will fall below the 95% confidence range of model projections. In other words, the models will have less than a 5% probability of being correct.

ipcc-models-vs-temperatures-through-2009

Although the IPCC AR4 models have not failed yet, they are, in Michaels’s words, “in the process of failing,” and the longer the current temperature regime persists, the worse the models will perform.

Conclusion

The climate science debate is not “over.” In fact, it is just starting to get very, very interesting. All the basic issues–detection, attribution, and sensitivity–are unsettled and more so today than at any time in the past decade.

A final thought–anyone who wants further convincing that the debate is not over should read the marvelous NIPCC report. On a wide range of issues (nine main topics and 60 sub-topics), the report demonstrates that the scientific literature allows, and even favors, reasonable alternative assessments to those presented by the IPCC.

P.S. Previous posts in this series are available below:

  • Policy Peril: Looking for an antidote to An Inconvenient Truth? Your search is over
  • Policy Peril Segment 1: Heat Waves
  • Policy Peril Segment 2: Air Pollution
  • Policy Peril Segment 3: Hurricanes
  • Policy Peril Segment 4: Sea-Level Rise
  • In today’s Guardian, Juliana Glover reports that carbon permit prices in Europe’s Emission Trading System (ETS) have crashed from €31 last summer to €8 today. This price is too low to create any incentive for covered entities to invest in ‘green’ technology. [click to continue…]

    It must be nice to be so certain of one’s moral purity and political correctness to believe that anything, including, well, lying, is fine and appropriate to advance the cause.

    Consider physicist Richard A. Muller’s recent interview with Grist:

    question What’s your take on NASA climate scientist James Hansen?
    answer Hansen I’ve known for many years. He’s a very good climate scientist, but he’s decided to do the politics. I feel that he’s doing some cherry-picking of his own [when it comes to the science]. At that point, he’s not really being a scientist. At that point, you’re being a lawyer. He’s being an effective advocate for his side, but in the process of doing that he’s no longer a neutral party and he’s no longer giving both sides of the issues.
    question I know you drive a Prius. What else are you doing to reduce your carbon emissions?
    answer My house is lit by compact fluorescent light bulbs. Let me just tell you, though: Suppose I drove an SUV and lit my house with the worst kind of light — I could still be an environmentalist. Al Gore flies around in a jet plane — absolutely fine with me. The important thing is not getting Al Gore out of his jet plane; the important thing is solving the world’s problem. What we really need are policies around the world that address the problem, not feel-good measures. If [Al Gore] reaches more people and convinces the world that global warming is real, even if he does it through exaggeration and distortion — which he does, but he’s very effective at it — then let him fly any plane he wants.
    At least Muller admits that James Hansen no longer is a real scientist, but rather is doing politics.  That doesn’t seem to bother Muller.  And his assessment of Gore–well, what’s a little “exaggeration and distortion” among friends?  If the facts about catastrophic warming are so compelling, then why aren’t the facts enough?  Presumably because, well, the facts aren’t nearly as compelling as the alarmist lobby wishes to believe.
    If one is pushing a good cause, and who in Washington doesn’t believe they are doing so?, then who is not entitled to exaggerate, distort, and even lie?

    Yesterday the UK saw a large group of protesters bring a major London airport to a halt. Plane Stupid (you can’t get them for false advertising, that’s for sure) managed to cancel over 50 flights as the airport closed for five hours while police arrested 56 people, of whom 49 have now been charged.

    As Christopher Booker reminds us, eco-activists in the UK were encouraged when a jury found a gang of Greenpeace protesters not guilty of criminal damage to a power station on the grounds that they had a lawful excuse in that they believed they were stopping further global warming. The jury was swayed on what should have been an open-and-shut case by the testimony of none other than James Hansen, NASA’s climate bigwig.

    I am not sure if the same “lawful excuse” defense applies in the case of aggravated trespass (perhaps m’learned friends could advise), but it is clear that the Plane Stupid types felt they had such an excuse, declaring that they were “terrified” by the threat of global warming. If it does apply, and Hansen flies in (dwell for a second on the hypocrisy involved) to support these protesters, with the Crown Prosecution Service once again failing to challenge or even balance his evidence, we may be set for a cascade where climate protesters can essentially do anything they want. Property rights will cease to have meaning and the rule of law will collapse, for the law can be set aside in the name of the environment. Britain’s unwritten constitution will have adopted a clause similar to that just adopted by Ecuador. What happens in this case will be of profound importance.

    If you go to the web site of the Alliance for Climate Protection, the group that is sponsoring the $300 million “We Can Solve It” ad campaign, you’ll find the second name on the list of board members is very interesting:

    Theodore Roosevelt IV
    Managing Director, Lehman Brothers
    Chair of the Pew Center for Global Climate Change

    Theodore Roosevelt IV is Managing Director at Lehman Brothers and a member of the Firm’s senior client coverage group, which oversees the Firms client and customer relationships. Mr. Roosevelt is an active conservationist. He is Chair of the Pew Center for Global Climate Change, Vice Chair of the Wilderness Society, and a Trustee for the American Museum of Natural History, The World Resources Institute, the Institute for Environment and Natural Resources at the University of Wyoming, and a Trustee of Trout Unlimited.

    That’s quite the environmentalist resume, isn’t it? We should also note that Lehman Bros issued a couple of reports on “The Business of Climate Change,” which are rent-seeker’s guides to making money off global warming regulation. If this sounds familiar, it’s the path down which Enron trod.

    These reports were enthusiastically greeted by the environmental lobby. They were advised by James Hansen, head of NASA’s Goddard Institute of Space Studies and chief scientific adviser to Al Gore.

    Now, I am not saying that Lehman Bros fell because its MD was an enthusiastic environmentalist. It failed because of risky decisions made in the mortgage market. However, its failure – like Enron’s before it – demonstrates that attempting to trade in artificial assets that represent no real value is a supremely risky business. Carbon trading would be just such a risk, dependent as it is on fickle government action. Lehman Bros’ collapse should make Wall Street, utilities and investors equally wary of lobbying for such a market.

    Meanwhile, it will be interesting to see if Mr Roosevelt’s name disappears from the boards of the environmentalist organizations as quickly as Ken Lay’s did following the Enron collapse. Of course, Mr Roosevelt is not facing any criminal charges as far as I can make out and he does have a rather spiffy name (who says America has no aristocracy?) so it is quite possible that he will find a happy home heading up an environmental group. After all, his management skills would be just what they need.

    Hat-tip: EU Referendum and Icecap