Kerry-Boxer

Greenhouse Protection Racket

by Marlo Lewis on July 6, 2010 · 1 comment

in Odds & Ends

Climate policymaking in our Nation’s capital often resembles the heavy-handed dialogue of old-time mobster films.

“Are you gonna come along quietly, or do I have let the California Air Resources Board (CARB) muss ya up?” That was pretty much the line White House Environment Czarina Carol Browner took to obtain the auto industry’s support for the joint EPA/National Highway Traffic Safety Administration (NTSHA) greenhouse gas (GHG) emission/fuel economy standards rule. EPA is now in a position both to determine the stringency of fuel economy standards for the auto industry and to set climate policy for the nation. Yet the Clean Air Act provides no authority to regulate fuel economy and says nothing about greenhouse gases or global climate change. ”Badges? We don’t need no stinking badges.”  

Modus Operandi: Threaten in Order to Remove the Threat — for a Price

Here’s how the regulatory mugging went down. 

In February 2009, EPA Administrator Lisa Jackson commenced a rulemaking to reconsider Bush EPA Administrator Stephen Johnson’s denial of California’s request for a waiver to establish its own greenhouse gas emission standards program. Because the waiver would also allow other states to adopt the California program, because GHG emission standards are mainly fuel economy standards by another name, and because automakers would have to reshuffle the mix of vehicles delivered for sale in each “California” state to achieve the same average fuel economy in those states, Jackson’s proceeding threatened to subject automakers to inefficient, consumer-thwarting, regulatory patchwork.

In May 2009, Czarina Browner conducted secret negotiations with automakers, CARB Chairman Mary Nichols, and major environmental groups. Browner required participants to take a vow of silence and forbade anyone to take notes, violating the Presidential Records Act. The closed-door negotiations produced an “historic agreement” whereby automakers would support the EPA/NHTSA GHG/fuel economy standards rule and California and other states would deem compliance with the federal standards as compliance with their own.

In addition, observes Rep. Darrel Issa (R-Calif.), at the same time the Browner-led negotiations were taking place, ”the government was also engaged in bailout talks with General Motors (GM) and Chrysler,” resulting in “an ownership stake for the federal government of 61% of GM and 8% of Chrysler, respectively.” Whether Browner literally made the auto industry an offer it could not refuse, with the sweetener of financial assistance also contingent on the industry’s embrace of GHG regulation, we may never know.

This much is clear. By granting California’s request for a waiver, EPA created the threat of a regulatory patchwork, enabling the White  House to offer ”protection” in the form of the joint GHG/fuel economy standards rule. The protection “fee” was the auto industry’s unquestioning support for the joint rule and its prerequisite, EPA’s endangerment rule.

Thus, the Auto Alliance became the key industry lobby opposing Sen. Lisa Murkowski’s resolution to overturn EPA’s endangerment rule. The Alliance warned that if the endangerment finding were overturned, the “historic agreement” would unravel, confronting automakers with “the alarming possibility of having to comply with multiple sets of conflicting fuel economy standards.” 

That is correct, but only because EPA Administrator Jackson, reversing her predecessor’s decision, granted California a waiver to establish GHG emission standards for new motor vehicles. An obvious solution would be to overturn the waiver. After all, the Energy Policy and Conservation Act clearly prohibits states from adopting laws or regulations ”related to fuel economy,” and the California motor vehicle emissions program is basically a de facto fuel economy program. The waiver effectively repeals federal law, violating the separation of powers. Not that you’ll ever hear about that from Government Motors. Mum’s da woid.

Mirage of Regulatory Certainty

The auto industry is not the only target of the greenhouse protection racket. For years, the greenhouse gang has been saying that only cap-and-trade can end the intolerable ”regulatory uncertainty” facing the electric power sector, energy-intensive manufacture, and other CO2 emitters. But who created the uncertainty in first place if not the self-same advocates of cap-and-trade? If they were serious about relieving uncertainty, they would disavow the regulatory schemes for which they have been campaigning.

Businesses lobbying for cap-and-trade in the name of certainty should read the fine print. The Waxman-Markey and Kerry-Boxer bills, for example, have multiple escalater clauses setting the stage for dramatic increases in regulatory stringency well beyond the bills’ explicit emission reduction targets.  Similarly, the bills’ “findings” presenting the “scientific” rationale for cap-and-trade are not mere rhetorical fluff but precedents for litigation targeting emission sources considerably smaller than those explicitly identified as “covered entities.” Enact such legislation, and the only certainty is that regulatory burdens will grow unpredictably.

Too Clever by Half

Last but not least, cap-and-taxers sell their policy as protection from litigation-driven greenhouse gas regulation under the Clean Air Act.  The sales pitch goes something like this: “Pretty nice company you got deah, shame if sumpin’ bad waz to happen to it. Everybody needs protection. You need protection. It’s called Kerry-Lieberman.” Note the familiar pattern. The gang pushing cap-and-trade as protection from EPA are the same folks who sued EPA to regulate greenhouse gases and who vilified Sen. Murkowski and others for attempting to stop EPA.

This is all too clever by half. If cap-and-trade dies in the 111th Congress, which seems increasingly likely, the Obama administration and its allies on the Hill will take sole ownership of the compliance costs, job and GDP losses, and “absurd results“ arising from EPA regulation of greenhouse gases under the Clean Air Act. 

Democratic leaders may not recognize it yet, but they have painted themselves into a corner. They have become the Party of Endangerment — the party endangering the U.S. economy by championing the endangerment rule, with all its cascading regulatory effects.

Secretary Chu’s Befuddled Economics

by Marlo Lewis on October 27, 2009

in Global Warming

Revised 10/28/09

At the first Senate Environment and Public Works Committee hearing on S. 1733, the Kerry-Boxer “Clean Energy Jobs and American Power Act,” Department of Energy Secretary Steven Chu explained the economic rationale for adopting a Kyoto-style cap-and-trade program.

His argument, in a nutshell, goes like this:

  1. Reducing emissions globally will require a massive investment in “clean technologies” — an estimated $2.1 trillion in wind turbines and $1.5 trillion in solar voltaic panels by 2030. These investments will create many green jobs.
  2. “The only question is — which countries will invent, manufacture, and export these clean technologies and which will become dependent on foreign products.”
  3. The United States is falling behind. “The world’s largest turbine manufacturing company is headquartered in Denmark. 99 percent of the batteries that power America’s hybrid cars are made in Japan. We manufactured more than 40 percent of the world’s solar cells as recently as the mid-1990s; today we produce just 7 percent.”
  4. To seize the opportunity of clean tech and keep from falling farther behind, “we must enact comprehensive climate legislation,” the most important element of which is a “cap on carbon emissions that ratchets down over time. That critical step will drive investment decisions towards clean energy.”

There is so much silliness packed into Chu’s testimony that it’s hard to know where to begin.

Let’s start with Step 1: The world will need $3.6 trillion worth of clean tech by 2030. Suppose the world does decide to reduce emissions. There’s no good reason to suppose that wind turbines and solar panels will ever contribute more than a small fraction of the “solution,” because these technologies are not economically “sustainable” — they consume more wealth than they produce.

A recent report by the Rheinisch-Westfälisches Institut (RWI) finds that Germany’s Renewable Energy Sources Act (EEG) has utterly failed to make wind and solar power either commercially viable or cost-effective as an emission-reduction strategy. Herewith a few highlights.

First, renewable power is a net drain on Germany’s economy:

  • Germany subsidizes solar photovoltaics (PVs) at a rate of 59¢ per kWh. That is “more than eight times higher than the wholesale electricity price at the power exchange and more than four times the feed-in tariff [subsidy] paid for electricity produced by on-shore wind turbines.”
  • “Even on-shore wind, widely regarded as a mature technology, requires feed-in tariffs [subsidies] that exceed the per-kWh cost of conventional electricity by up to 300% to remain competitive.”
  • Germany has the second-largest installed wind capacity in the world, “behind the United States,” and the largest installed PV capacity in the world. However, installed capacity is not the same as production or contribution, and “by 2008 the estimated share of wind power in Germany’s electricity production was 6.3% . . . The amount produced by solar photovoltaics was a negligible 0.6% despite being the most subsidized renewable energy, with a net cost of about 8.4 Bn € (US 12.4 Bn) for 2008.”
  • “The total net cost of subsidizing electricity production by PV modules is estimated to reach 53.3 Bn € (US $73.2 Bn) for those modules installed between 2000 and 2010. . . .wind power subsidies may total 20.5 Bn € (US $28.1 Bn) for wind converters installed between 2000 and 2020.”

Even as a carbon-reduction strategy, wind and solar power are uneconomic:

  • “Given the net cost of 41.82 Cents/kWh for PV modules installed in 2008, and assuming that PV displaces conventional electricity generated from a mixture of gas and hard coal, abatement costs are as high as 716 € (US $1,050) per tonne [of carbon dioxide].”
  • “Using the same assumptions and a net cost for wind of 3.10 Cents/kWh, the abatement cost is approximately 54 € (US $80) [per tonne CO2]. While cheaper than PV, this cost is still nearly double the ceiling of the cost of a per-ton permit under Europe’s cap-and-trade scheme.”
  • Carbon permits are trading at 13.4 € per ton. “Hence, the cost from emission reductions as determined by the market is about 53 times cheaper than employing PV and 4 times cheaper than using wind power.”
  • Germany’s “increased use of renewable energy technologies generally attains no additional emission reductions beyond those achieved by ETS [European Trading System] alone. In fact, since establishment of the ETS in 2005, the EEG’s net climate effect has been equal to zero.”

Although the EEG creates some “green jobs,” the net impact on wealth and jobs is negative:

  • “While employment projections in the renewable sector convey seemingly impressive prospects for gross job growth, they typically obscure the broader implications for economic welfare by omitting any accounting of off-setting impacts. These impacts include, but are not limited to, job losses from crowding out of cheaper forms of conventional energy generation, indirect impacts on upstream industries, additional job losses from the drain on economic activity precipitated by higher electricity prices, and consumers’ overall loss of purchasing power due to higher electricity prices, and diverting funds from other, possibly more beneficial investment.”
  • “Proponents of renewable energies often regard the requirement for more workers to produce a given amount of energy as a benefit, failing to recognize that it lowers the output potential of the economy and is hence counterproductive to net job creation.”

As my colleague Don Hertzmark observes: “If you must continually pour external resources into an energy source, then it cannot be a net source of jobs in the economy, since those resources could have gone somewhere else to create real work.”

So, yes, via mandates and subsidies, governments around the world could pump $2.1 trillion into wind turbines and $1.5 trillion into PVs. But this is an unsustainable market that will make the world poorer, not wealthier, as Chu imagines.

Okay, now for Step 2: We must choose either to make clean tech or become dependent on foreign producers. This point is silly on many levels.

  • If we don’t enact cap-and-trade, then we won’t even have to consider buying or making trillions of dollars worth of “clean tech.”
  • Even if we choose to limit emissions, the German experience indicates that investing billions (let alone trillions) in clean tech is not cost-effective.
  • Even if we do enact a cap-and-trade program, and even if clean tech becomes cost-effective, why would we want to make our own wind turbines and PVs if imported products are cheaper?
  • Chu worries the United States could become “dependent on foreign products” — as if Denmark or Japan might refuse to sell us wind turbines or hybrid cars. Even oil is not the “energy weapon” it is sometimes cracked up to be, as Jerry Taylor and Peter Van Doren of the Cato Institute explain.
  • Besides, Toyota makes lots of cars — including hybrids — in the United States. Similarly, although Vestas, the world’s largest wind turbine manufacturer, is, as Chu says, ”headquartered” in Denmark, it is investing $1 billion in four Colorado plants. Chu’s fear of “dependence on foreign products” makes no sense in a globalized economy.

Step 3: The United States is falling behind in clean tech manufacture. If we’re “falling behind,” then why do Toyota and Vestas build factories here? Besides, “falling behind” is a problem only if the clean-tech industy is a net wealth-creator. As we have seen, this is not the case for wind turbines and PVs, which is why they require market-rigging subsidies, mandates, and penalties (caps or carbon taxes) levied against carbon-based energy.

If clean tech ever does become sustainable, the only legitimate role for policymakers would be to eliminate political impediments to market-driven investment. As MIT’s Thomas Lee, Ben Ball, Jr., and Richard Tabors wrote in the conclusion of Energy Aftermath, a retrospective on Carter-era energy policies:

The experience of the 1970s and 1980s taught us that if a technology is commercially viable, then government support is not needed and if a technology is not commercially viable, no amount of government support will make it so.

Step 4: To be leaders in clean tech manufacture, we must put a price on carbon — a cap that ratchets down every year.

This is convoluted. Chu began by arguing that we needed to invest in clean tech in order to reduce emissions. Now, he says we must reduce emissions to spur investment in clean tech! Apparently, if you can’t sell cap-and-trade on the basis of climate alarm, claim that it’s “about jobs.”

Another confusion — Chu suggests U.S. firms can’t or won’t develop clean-tech products for sale in the global marketplace unless the federal government boosts domestic market share by putting a price on carbon. Two problems here. First, a price on carbon does relatively little to increase the market share of wind and solar power, because even with a price on carbon to handicap fossil energy, renewable power is still uncompetitive. That’s why the Waxman-Markey bill includes a renewable portfolio standard in addition to a cap-and-trade program.

Second, a booming domestic market for a product is not a prerequisite to success in exporting that product. In the 1980s, the Asian Tigers produced enormous quantities of exports that were not widely purchased, and in some cases not even offered for sale, in domestic markets. If clean-tech products yield high returns in the global marketplace, enterprising U.S. firms will get into the game even if the products do not have a big market in the United States.

The irony is that a cap-and-trade program could actually be counter-productive to the development of an export-oriented clean-tech sector. Low-cost energy is a source of competitive advantage. By increasing energy costs, cap-and-trade would make all U.S.-based manufacture less competitive, including companies specializing in clean-tech products.

Kerry-Boxer’s not-so-hidden fangs: Why its bite is worse than its bark

by Marlo Lewis on October 27, 2009

in Global Warming

Today, on MasterResource.Org, the free-market energy blog, I examine the Kerry-Boxer bill’s not-so-hidden fangs.

Like its House companion bill, Waxman-Markey, Title VII, Part A of Kerry-Boxer contains language that will:

  1. encourage CO2 tort litigation against businesses smaller than those subject to the cap-and-trade program, and
  2. pressure policymakers to “move the goal posts” (amend the legislation to tighten the caps).

 Bottom Line: The costs of climate legislation may greatly exceed the most pessimistic estimates of recent modeling studies. Those looking for “regulatory certainty” in these bills haven’t read the fine print.

Waxman-Markey: A $3.6 trillion gas tax

by Marlo Lewis on October 21, 2009 · 1 comment

in Global Warming

Senators Kit Bond (R-MO) and Kay Bailey Hutchison (R-TX) have just released a report, Climate Change Legislation: A $3.6 Trillion Gas Tax, which estimates how much additional pain at the pump the Waxman-Markey would inflict on U.S. consumers.

The Waxman-Markey bill (like its Senate companion, Kerry-Boxer) aims to cap U.S. carbon dioxide (CO2) emissions from 2012 to 2050. Bond and Hutchison estimate the bill’s impacts on motor fuel prices during 2015 to 2050. Of course, their study depends on assumptions regarding population growth, GDP growth, and technology change out to 2050. But in that regard, the Bond-Hutchison report is no different from any other study of Waxman-Markey, including studies touted by the bill’s supporters.

A virtue of this report is its straightforward, uncomplicated methodology. Anyone who can do arithmetic can understand how Bond and Hutchison arrive at their conclusions.

Here’s how Bond and Hutchison proceeded:

  • For estimates of how Waxman-Markey would affect motor fuel prices, they relied on a study prepared by Charles River Associates for the National Black Chamber of Commerce (NBCC). The NBCC study estimates, for example, that Waxman-Markey would increase the average price per gallon of motor fuels by 24¢ in 2020, 38¢ in 2030, 59¢ in 2040, and 95¢ in 2050.
  • Bond and Hutchison also use the NBCC study’s estimate of how much fuel Americans would consume annually from 2015 through 2050.
  • Then, for each year during this period, they multiplied the number of gallons consumed times the price increase per gallon.
  • Bond and Hutchison note that the NBCC study’s fuel-price estimates take into account the relevant Waxman-Markey cost-containment provision, under which refiners get 2.25% of all emission allowances free-of-charge during 2014 to 2026.
  • Finally, Bond and Hutchison added up the increased annual fuel costs from 2015 through 2050.

Here are some of the results:

  • In 2020, Waxman-Markey will impose $43.6 billion in additional fuel costs on the American people. This will rise to $78.1 billion in 2030, $128.2 billion in 2040, and $215.8 billion in 2050.
  • Cumulatively, Waxman-Markey will impose $3.6 trillion dollars in additional total fuel costs on the United States.
  • In 2020, Waxman-Markey will increase each gallon of gasoline purchased by 24¢. With Americans expected to consume 122 bilion gallons of gasoline in that year, Waxman-Markey will impose $27.5 billion in additional gasoline costs.
  • In 2030, with Waxman-Markey forcing gasoline 38¢ higher per gallon, Americans will pay $42.3 billion more for gasoline.
  • Waxman-Markey will force the price of each of the 83 billion gallons of diesel fuel consumed by Americans in 2020 higher by 17¢ and $12.9 billion in total. By 2030, Waxman-Markey will force diesel 28¢ higher per gallon, totaling $28.3 billion.
  • In 2020, Waxman-Markey will make jet fuel 11¢ more expensive per gallon. Americans will consume 34 billion gallons of jet fuel in their air travel, imposing $3.2 billion in additinal jet fuel costs. This figure rises to an additional $7 billion in 2030.
  • In 2020, each farmer in the Northeast on average will pay $630 in additional fuel costs. Farmers in the South will pay an additional $966 on average, and farmers in the Midwest an additional $1,213 on average.
  • In 2020, the average  owner of a diesel-powered tractor-trailor will pay an additional $1,728 for fuel.

To wrap up, Bond and Hutchison make a significant contribution to the debate by clarifying the consumer impacts of cap-and-trade legislation.

“Advanced” biofuels lag behind mandate

by Marlo Lewis on October 5, 2009

in Ethanol, Features, Global Warming, Zeitgeist

In today’s ClimateWire (subscription required), reporter Jessica Leber describes a biofuel industry still totally dependent on government handouts and still pleading for more special favors.

First a bit of background.

In December 2007, Congress passed and President Bush signed the Energy Independence and Security Act (EISA). Among other things, EISA boosted the existing (2005 Energy Policy Act) Renewable Fuel Standard (RFS) from 7.5 billion gallons a year by 2012 to 36 billion gallons a year by 2022. Of those 36 billion gallons, 21 billion gallons must come from “advanced biofuels.”

The RFS is essentially a Soviet-style production quota. Congress, prodded by campaign contributions from the corn lobby, and by presidential candidates jockeying for support in the Iowa Caucuses, decided that central planning of the nation’s motor fuel markets was an idea whose time had come.

To qualify as “advanced” under EISA, a biofuel must (1) be made from plant matter other than corn kernels and (2) achieve a 50% reduction in greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions compared to gasoline, based on a “life-cycle” (wells-to-wheels) analysis. EISA also allows 15 billion gallons a year by 2022 to come from plain old corn ethanol, although to qualify as a “renewable fuel,” corn ethanol from newer plants must achieve a 20% reduction in GHG emissions relative to gasoline — again, based on life-cycle analysis.

EISA mandates the sale of 100 million gallons of advanced biofuel in 2009 and 200 million gallons in 2010 (see p. 6 of this presentation). For years, biofuel lobbyists have been telling us that advanced biofuels are “just around the corner.” But, Matt Carr of the Biotechnology Industry Organization estimated last month that in 2010 volumes will, optimistically, reach only 12 million gallons, Leber reports.

In a sop to the corn lobby, the Waxman-Markey cap-and-trade bill would suspend for five years the EISA requirement for life-cycle analysis to determine whether biofuels qualify as “advanced” or even as “renewable.” Several life-cycle analyses indicate that corn ethanol produces more greenhouse gases than the gasoline it replaces, once emissions from land use changes are taken into account (for a summary, see pp. 4-6 of this report).

The Kerry-Boxer cap-and-trade bill does not contain the five-year hold on life-cycle analysis, and the uncertainty as to which biofuels will qualify under future EPA implementing rules ”chills the investment community,” Carr complains. I’d put the point differently: Strong evidence that corn ethanol is not “climate friendly” jeopardizes the political rents that corn growers and ethanol distillers hoped to extract from climate hysteria.

Leber also notes that, “the industry is also concerned about ambiguous language in both the Senate and House versions of the bill that does not clearly exempt the biofuels component of blended petroleum fuels, such as E10 and E85, from an economy-wide carbon cap.”

Did you get that? The corn-ethanol lobby invoked climate doom to sell biofuel mandates to Congress and the public. But now they say the centerpiece of regulatory climate policy — the cap in “cap and trade” — should not apply to biofuels, even though biofuels emit CO2, and even though several life-cycle analyses indicate that corn-ethanol is more carbon-intensive than gasoline. One law for me, another for thee!

Producers of “advanced” ethanol also complain that they must compete for climate-tech loan guarantees against companies developing solar, wind, and compressed natural gas technologies. The outrage! Why should ethanol producers have to share the greenhouse gravy train with anybody else?

This just in: Sens. Barbara Boxer (D-CA) and Susan Collins (R-ME) today released Biofuels: Potential Effects and Challenges of Required Increases in Production and Use, an August 2009 study by the Government Accountability Office (GAO). One of GAO’s conclusions is that the 45-cent/gallon tax credit that refiners receive for blending ethanol into motor gasoline “may no longer be needed to stimulate conventional corn-ethanol production because the domestic industry has matured, its processing is well understood, and its use capacity is already near the effective RFS limit of 15 billion gallons a year of conventional ethanol.”

The Renewable Fuels Association “panned” the GAO study, Leber reports. Well, what else did you expect? Without the blenders’ credit, a national market for ethanol would not exist. In their PR (if not in their own minds), corn ethanol will always be an infant industry in need of special tax breaks to compete with the big bad oil companies.

What happens if, as seems likely, the industry falls farther and farther behind the EISA ”advanced” biofuel requirements? Here’s my prediction: The Renewable Fuels Association will not lobby to scale back the overall 36-billion RFS; rather, they’ll lobby to raise up the 15 billion gallon ceiling on corn ethanol.