- 1965, Medicare health insurance authorized for all Americans over age 65 along with Medicaid that covers both seniors and the poor. Somehow for 190 years Americans were able to make do without it.
- 2006, Largest expansion of Medicare since origin in also covering prescription drugs but only to and beyond a certain point, leaving what’s referred to as a “doughnut hole.”
- 2009, With the nation running a historic deficit that’s skyrocketing and having just passed a budget-busting health care bill in the Senate, Sen. Maj. Leader Harry Reid declares of the “doughnut hole” we must “forever end this indefensible injustice for American’s seniors.”
Medicare
A college professor once described what he called the “Rudy’s Test” to his class. The Rudy’s test involves going into Rudy’s (a bar) sitting down next to any guy at the bar, and asking them their opinion about a proposed policy. Typically, the professor said, the Rudy’s Test would reveal what the policy would really do. Many times, the average man’s common sense view of government will provide a simple, clear insight into public policy.
One current statement that fails the Rudy’s Test is that health care reform is going to save us money. As Saturday Night Live satirically noted, “How exactly is extending health care coverage to 30 million people going to save you money?”
The savings in the health care bills are predicted over the course of the next 10 years. These predictions are derived by comparing the projected savings with the projected costs of health care reform. This approach is flawed on both sides. Government routinely fails to predict how much an entitlement will cost, and also fails in predicting exactly how much a new tax can gather in terms of revenue.
A recent Washington Times story shows fairly conclusively that government economists and bureaucrats do not possess the gift of prophecy. In 1965, Medicare’s hospital insurance program was estimated at 9 billion dollars. The actual cost of the program was 67 billion dollars. In 1987, Medicaid’s projected cost was less than 1 billion dollars. The actual cost of the program was 17 billion dollars. In 1993 the cost of Medicare’s home care benefit program was projected to be 4 billion dollars. The actual cost of the program was 10 billion dollars. These are only a few examples of how estimated and actual costs are rarely consistent. There are many reasons for this, as Michael Cannon points out in his article on Medicare Part D cost overruns, including the facts that politicians intentionally conceal costs (accurate in this case because the “doc fix” of Medicare reimbursements, which will cost an estimated 250 billion dollars, has been moved into another bill), that people alter their behavior to maximize the benefits of an entitlement, and that Congress often later expands programs. I would add a fourth item to this list; that politicians and economists simply do not have the detailed knowledge of every human being in America to be able to predict the future. In a complex economy filled with rational actors, no economic projection can ever truly capture the future. There are simply too many parts moving independently of each other to boil down the human behavior of 300 million people into an accurate mathematical formula. Cost estimates simply cannot be accurately predicted with any regularity.
Further, income estimates are impossible to predict. Take, for instance, the cosmetic surgery tax included in the Senate’s health care reform proposal. A similar tax has been instituted in New Jersey, and has been such a failure at bringing in the amount of revenue expected that the assemblyman who first introduced the tax in 2004 introduced a measure to repeal it in 2006. At the time of it was enacted, the tax was estimated to generate 24 million dollars. It actually generated 6.8 million dollars. We have tried this kind of tax before, and it simply doesn’t work the way it is expected. No doubt the amount of revenues expected by the Obama administration from a host of new taxes will be lower than expected.
Always think about the Rudy’s Test when considering a new policy. If it sounds too good to be true, it probably is.
The Wall Street Journal calls the House version of President Obama’s health care plan “the worst bill ever,” noting that it will lead to “epic new spending and taxes, pricier insurance, rationed care, dishonest accounting,” and other problems.
At the Atlantic, Megan McArdle, who voted for Obama, explains how ObamaCare will cost much more than promised — at least $150 billion more. That’s true even if promised cuts to Medicare included in ObamaCare actually take place — but as McArdle notes, even the head of the Congressional Budget Office “does not think the cuts will take place” (which didn’t stop him from pretending those cuts would occur in giving ObamaCare its original $900 billion price tag).
ObamaCare is based on deceptive accounting that makes Enron look good. As The Wall Street Journal notes:
“The House disguises hundreds of billions of dollars in additional costs with budget gimmicks. It ‘pays for’ about six years of program with a decade of revenue, with the heaviest costs concentrated in the second five years. The House also pretends Medicare payments to doctors will be cut by 21.5% next year and deeper after that, ‘saving’ about $250 billion. ObamaCare will be lucky to cost under $2 trillion over 10 years; it will grow more after that…
“All this is particularly reckless given the unfunded liabilities of Medicare—now north of $37 trillion over 75 years. Mrs. Pelosi wants to steal $426 billion from future Medicare spending to ‘pay for’ universal coverage. While Medicare’s price controls on doctors and hospitals are certain to be tightened, the only cut that is a sure thing in practice is gutting Medicare Advantage to the tune of $170 billion. Democrats loathe this program because it gives one of out five seniors private insurance options.
“As for Medicaid, the House will expand eligibility to everyone below 150% of the poverty level . . . at a cost of $425 billion [to state and federal governments at a time when] when budgets from Albany to Sacramento are in fiscal collapse. . .
“All told, the House favors $572 billion in new taxes, mostly by imposing a 5.4-percentage-point ‘surcharge’ on joint filers earning over $1 million, $500,000 for singles. This tax will raise the top marginal rate to 45% in 2011 from 39.6% when the Bush tax cuts expire—not counting state income taxes and the phase-out of certain deductions and exemptions. . . .Meanwhile, a tax equal to 2.5% of adjusted gross income will also be imposed on some 18 million people who CBO expects still won’t buy insurance in 2019.”
A study by PriceWaterhouseCoopers found that the provisions in the Senate version of ObamaCare would add $1,700 a year to the cost of family coverage in 2013 and $600 for a single person. By 2019, family premiums could be $4,000 higher and individual premiums could be $1,500 higher.
Greg Conko calls the bill “worse than the disease.” In a recently-released paper, “A Cure Worse than the Disease: Obama Care Won’t Cut Costs, But May Cut Quality,” Conko notes that most of the alleged cost-cutting measures in the Baucus bill merely shift costs from the federal government onto the states or private payers, without reducing long-term health care inflation. The only measures that could conceivably reduce the annual rate of growth in health care costs would erect government barriers between patients and their doctors, while jeopardizing long-term medical innovation.
Another new study found that provisions contained in the health care reform bills, like guaranteed issue and community rating mandates, would drive up premiums by 50 percent for individual policies and 19 percent for small group plans.
A study from the Independence Institute says that ObamaCare would drive up inflation and medical care costs, while shrinking the economy.
As Conko notes, many states have highly concentrated markets. In Hawaii, Rhode Island, and Alaska, for example, 95 percent or more of the health insurance market is served by just two insurers. But Obama and congressional Democrats oppose letting insurers compete across state lines, blocking competition that could make health insurance cheaper. Other countries with cheaper health insurance permit insurers to compete nationally.
ObamaCare would raise taxes. It would also explode state and federal budget deficits, and would actually cost $2 trillion — far more than its promised $800 billion price tag. It contains special-interest pork, like racial preferences.
It contains provisions sought by trial lawyers that will increase medical costs. Doctors afraid of being wrongly sued for malpractice despite providing good quality care order unnecessary tests (or defensive medicine), which wastes $200 billion annually.
In his health care speech, Obama falsely promised tort-reform pilot projects, as a token gesture to doctors. But the health care bill he backs does just the opposite, requiring states to repeal existing reforms to their medical malpractice laws if they want federal funds. For example, they lose money if they do anything to “limit attorneys fees.”
The health care bills backed by Obama and congressional leaders ignore reforms that would help doctors and patients alike, like setting up specialized health courts to rule on malpractice claims instead of having them ruled on by juries that have little understanding of medicine or technology.
With Democratic support coalescing around Sen. Max Baucus’s (D-Mt.) health care reform proposal, passage of a comprehensive overhaul now appears more likely than ever. Opponents had their summer of protests. But, Democrats have shown a renewed sense of energy since discrediting Sarah Palin’s “death panels” and Sen. Charles Grassley’s claim that ObamaCare would “pull the plug on grandma.” Still, while those charges may have been a little overwrought, there is plenty to be concerned about with the Democratic health reform effort.
As I explain in a new Competitive Enterprise Institute paper out today, “A Cure Worse than the Disease: Obama Care Won’t Cut Costs, But May Cut Quality,” most of the alleged cost-cutting measures in the Baucus bill merely shift costs from the federal government onto the states or private payers, without affecting long-term health care inflation. The only measures that could reduce the annual rate of growth in health care costs would erect government barriers between patients and their doctors, while jeopardizing long-term medical innovation.
Skeptics have made hay arguing that the so-called Sustainable Growth Rate can’t be counted on to cut $245-billion in Medicare spending. But Senate Finance Committee negotiators have designed a Medicare Commission—what the White House previously called an Independent Medicare Advisory Commission—to make similar cuts in physician and hospital payment rates in a more opaque way.
In an April New York Times interview, President Obama suggested that such a group, working outside of “normal political channels,” should guide decisions regarding that “huge driver of cost…the chronically ill and those toward the end of their lives.” That’s not exactly a death panel roving the country to pull the plug on innocent grandmas who’ve survived past their sell-by dates, but the effects could be equally pernicious.
What the Medicare Commission is likely to do is work with the Patient-Centered Outcomes Research Institute also established by the Baucus bill to incorporate comparative clinical effectiveness recommendations into Medicare and Medicaid payment policies.
In theory, there’s nothing wrong with comparative effectiveness research, or what used to be called evidence-based medicine. Good research comparing the clinical effectiveness, risks, and benefits of two or more medical treatments can help doctors better understand the likely benefits of the treatments they prescribe and improve the quality of care they deliver. But patients vary substantially in their individual physiology, their response rates to drugs and surgical procedures, and their willingness to tolerate side effects. Doctors know this, and they realize that one size definitely does not fit all. That’s why, in practice, evidence-based medicine in the U.S. and abroad has produced incrementally useful information, but has failed to systematically change the practice of medicine.
Generally, we should encourage efforts to eliminate waste and reduce the use of ineffective treatments, especially when we’re talking about public programs and taxpayer money. But the only way these programs would result in significant savings is if legislation or subsequent implementation tries to force the square peg of comparative effectiveness research results into the round hole of clinical practice by requiring physicians to always pick the treatment deemed best for the average patient.
That’s not just bad for patients in the near term, it would also wreak havoc on long term medical innovation. If every new medicine were required, immediately upon gaining regulatory approval, to be effective and cheap enough to get the support of bureaucratic bean counters, research on the next generation of treatments for cancer, heart disease, and countless other serious conditions would slow to a snail’s pace.
Get used to the innovative medical treatments that we already have today. If these programs become part of our health care system, we’ll be seeing a lot fewer treatment innovations tomorrow.