pigou

The idea that government can “perfect” an imperfect market (an artifact of economists’ “perfect competition” theory) has again become an item of faith among intellectuals. In a recent FT column, Samuel Brittan, a former market advocate, discusses three fallacies of U.S. style capitalism or what he not so endearingly calls “market fundamentalism”:

• He rejects the “efficient market” hypothesis. Based on the axioms of theorists such as A. C. Pigou, he characterizes this theory of the market as one of static equilibrium where if one sees a hundred dollar bill on the street, one wouldn’t pick it up because somebody already has. Why Brittan believes this constitutes a criticism of the dynamic entrepreneurial views of economic liberals is unclear.

• He then critiques the view that “Government is not the answer, it is the problem.” And Brittan is certainly correct that this view is central to many market advocates. Brittan, however, presents a choice: either accept the entire welfare, regulatory state or anarchy. He seemingly rejects as politically impossible the constitutionally constrained state. Hayek and most classical liberals were well aware that culture and a rule of law (limited government focused on preventing force and fraud and maintaining a stable legal environment) was essential but they did not wish society to walk the Road to Serfdom.

• And finally he rejects Samuel Johnson’s statement: “There are few ways in which a man can be more innocently employed than in getting money.” Brittan sees self-interest as problematic because of the role of “private” parties in the current fiscal bubble. That such private error was encouraged by the moral hazards created by excessive government intervention is a point he neglects to discuss.

Brittan’s arguments are shallow. He attacks a straw man caricature of capitalism. His objections should be focused on the current “mixed economy” in which crony capitalists benefit from various Pigouvian interventionist rationales (wealth redistribution, correcting externalities, ensuring adequate production of “public goods” and so forth). As Larry Summers noted in his essay in the recent compilation, Creative Capitalism, he’s really criticizing market socialism, not capitalism. Fannie and Freddie are examples of the risks of the GSE-centric mixed economy. That – not “market fundamentalism” – should have been Brittan’s target.

Classical liberals and even some Chicago school economists such as Ronald Coase exposed the foolishness of equating a “market” to the “perfect competitive market” needed to “solve” mathematical equations. Stripping away the critical features of the market to allow this may have some pedagological value but is akin to relating the fall of a feather in a vacuum as having much to say about the same event in the real world. Brittan does, to his credit, recognize that intellectuals emphasize “market failures,” while giving little attention to the far more pervasive “government failures.”

He mentions but one- the tendency of political institutions to reward concentrated interests at the expense of the less well organized citizenry. Yet there are many others- for example, the tendency for government to “avoid risk” by slowing innovation (refusing to allow the creative destruction that another early free market economist, Joseph Schumpeter, saw as the keystone of capitalism). That the risks of stagnation are generally much greater than the risks of innovation is a massive government failure. (This issue, of course, does not arise in Pigou’s static economy – no possibility of innovation means no gains from innovation.) Brittan does caution us that the failure of “private” actors to be responsible owes much to the unholy alliance between regulators and market participants (the regulatory capture problem) but here he seems to echo Pigou, who was confident that “in the English speaking world, a new man was emerging trained in economics and imbued with civic responsibility that would avoid this trap”.

Yet, some 80 years later the U.S. still faces rampant rent-seeking and corruption under the guise of necessary bailouts, protectionism, and trust-busting. Ironically – and a credit to the FT editorial page oversight – the same page carries an article by David Rothkopf, a visiting scholar at the Carnegie Endowment and head of his eponymous international investment firm. Rothkopf repeats the concerns of Schumpeter and Robert Higgs (Crisis and Leviathan). Schumpeter’s famous phrase: “Rational as distinguished from vindictive regulation by public authority turns out to be an extremely delicate problem which not every government agency, particularly when in full cry against big business, can be trusted to solve.” This warning is particularly relevant when politicians face populist outcries about Wall Street and more recently BP over the oil spill.

Higgs noted that market crises become an impetus for governments to further their grip over industry, blurring the distinction between capitalism and crony capitalism. History has proved Pigou very wrong. His view of politics as a virtuous occupation somehow immune from the self-interest problems that are disciplined in a true capitalist system by competition and the profit and loss realities is the dominant intellectual religion. (Note today, Pigou’s chief acolyte seems to be Greg Mankiw.)

Jerry Taylor of Cato has an excellent summary of what the scientific literature tells us about the social cost of carbon emissions, drawing on the comprehensive but sometimes opaque work of Richard Tol. His conclusion:

So what does Tol 2008 tell us about the social cost of carbon emissions (assuming that the underlying science from the IPCC is correct)? Given our skepticism about the underlying logic of discount rates of 1% or less, any number between $3 per ton and $24 per ton seems defensible. The lower end of that distribution would seem to be more reasonable, however, keeping in mind that the better and more recent studies produce lower cost estimates than do others.

What would this mean for the average US household? A couple of years ago I did some calculations of what taxes (or carbon permits trading at the price) would mean for the average electricity and gasoline bill if set according to a social cost of carbon at $14/ton of CO2 and $5 per ton. For what they’re worth, here they are.

At $14/ton, the tax on 1 KWh of coal-fired electricity would be 1.5c, at $5/ton, 0.5c.
At $14/ton the tax on a gallon of gasoline would be 12c, at $5/ton, 4c.

The average household uses 10,660 KWh of electricity (not all of it coal-fired) and 1,143 gallons of gasoline each year.

So at $14/ton, household bills would increase by at most $297 annually.
At $5/ton, household bills would increase by at most $98 annually.

In other words, the actual increase would be pretty small. Certainly enough to be noticeable at higher levels ($510 if we used the $24 figure, for instance), but probably not enough to change behavior. If you believe, unlike Pigou, that a Pigovian tax should aim at changing behavior, then a mere tax that reflects the social cost of CO2 will not be enough for you. You’ll have to get into the realm of punitive taxation. In any event, a drive to reduce CO2 will probably cost more than the damages inflicted by CO2, and that is pretty silly public policy.