public good

In our half-political, half-private world, there are a growing number of public-private partnerships.  Almost nothing in the current world can be done without implicit or explicit permission by local, state, federal or (increasingly) global regulators.  But the term, public-private is normally used to denote the joint funding and, sometimes, joint management of some “public” facility — streets, water systems, and so forth.

The rationale for “public” investments is that they are “public” goods, whose benefits are not adequately captured by the provider.  There are many problems with this concept – in practice, it means that someone wants something and nobody seems to be providing it.  Note, from a Coasian/Schumpeterian free market perspective, these are exactly the “lures” that lead mankind to pursue the unexplored entrepreneurial paths to the future.  Rushing in with government assistance distorts and preempts those creative forces.

Sometimes, public-private partnerships can be a transitional step toward privatization.  The concept of “corporatization” that is, reorganizing an activity now performed by some political agency so that its inherent economic realities become more understandable and transparent, may be a useful step in privatizing the activity.

In most cases, however, public-private partnerships are simply a means of using tax breaks, regulatory easing, taxpayer support and so forth to subsidize some private activity: stadia, light and heavy rail — mass transit generally, sometimes (for God’s sake) hotels and malls, downtown development districts.  Where I live in Washington, D.C., businesses are allowed to add a “special tax” to pay for services the city supposedly pays for with normal tax revenues.  Such public-private partnerships suffer from the full array of government failures:

  • Log-rolling and pork-barrel politics: I’ll vote for your PPP if you vote for my PPP.
  • Weakened market tests: resources are devoted to a project not because it benefits the citizenry but rather because it benefits a powerful interest group and/or because a creative referendum entices a majority of voters to support their special interests.
  • Weaker Management: Absent market tests, managers are less motivated to find that mix of services and creative array of financing tools to ensure that it proves “profitable” (that is, a rational allocation of capital). Roads, even charter schools, etc all have suffered here immensely.
  • Lack of innovation: No institution in the private world can allow itself to stagnate – the creative forces of destruction will soon make it obsolete. PPP managers face much weaker innovative forces – if things go wrong, they can always appeal to their “public” nature for taxpayer bailouts.
  • Corruption: Crony capitalism abounds in the PPP world.
  • Faddism: Markets sometimes go on kicks – the tech boom, for example – but these soon collapse. Governments go on kicks for many decades – “renewable energy” and “mass transit” being perhaps the best examples but “magnet” investments in downtown malls, stadia and convention centers are perhaps even more persistent ones. Before Walmart became a PPP, it did more for consumers than all the PPP malls in the world.
  • Crowding Out: Capitalism plays a critical role in allocating capital – planting the seeds for our future. That is a very difficult task, one made much more difficult by the existence of PPPs. Government already seizes a disproportionate amount of our wealth and the PPP concept allows it to further distort the allocation by market forces. I’ve argued that the genius of the Progressives in the late 19th century was to preempt or push large sectors of the emerging future (the environment, schools, electromagnetic spectrum, infrastructure, welfare, the medical world) into the political world. The PPP concept simply exacerbates this tendency.

Our challenge is to find ways to expand the private sector and only very rarely does the PPP concept do that.  It allows people to be sloppy — “That would never pay for itself but it obviously has value, thus, we need some government help.  Let’s not make it an honest government function, let’s make it a Public-Private partnership and get the best of all possible outcomes!!”

This Mixed Economy model is less honest than true socialism (government acting directly) for many reasons.  If as is often the case, things go wrong, it will be capitalism — not government — that will be blamed.  PPP activities are less subject to consumer sovereignty (look at airports or schools).  The true costs of the activity don’t appear on government budgets — making it appear that PPP arrangements are “bargains.”

Bruce Schneier, eminent cryptographer, has declared market failure. He points to what he calls a meta-problem:

Those entrusted with our privacy often don’t have much incentive to respect it . . . What this all means is that protecting individual privacy remains an externality for many companies, and that basic market dynamics won’t work to solve the problem. Because the efficient market solution won’t work, we’re left with inefficient regulatory solutions.

Privacy is indeed an externality, but customer satisfaction is an externality, too. The whole point of markets is that they help us work these things out. What Mr. Schneier has described is not a market failure but in fact the original sin of the regulator: the assumption that, though the market chose publicity, it should have chosen privacy. We can’t make that claim without evidence.

Before we go making assumptions about what homo economicus might or mightn’t choose, we should remind ourselves of some of the benefits of publicity. Search engines like Google can give me tailored results, and targeted advertising funds many of their nifty services. When TransUnion vouches for me, I can reliably get a loan from a banker I’ve never met. If I’m married with kids, insurers who know that can offer me cheaper policies. These benefits are substantial, and we should be quicker to assume that the market values them than that it has ignored the associated costs.

There are plenty of good reasons for choosing privacy, and for the most part that choice is open to us. It’s still legal to pay with cash, walk around without ID, and forgo health insurance. It can be monstrously inconvenient, but that’s the price we pay when we make unusual choices. Of course, these options may not be legal for much longer, and there are already many legally required disclosures that should include privacy requirements–car insurance and airplane tickets, for example. There’s plenty of work to be done to make sure privacy stays legal, but that’s a long way from making it mandatory.

Mr. Schneier acknowledges several of the inefficiencies of regulation, to his credit, but he misses the single largest. None of us have exactly the same priorities when it comes to privacy, but when the choice is made for us by legislation, we’re stuck with a one-size-fits-all regime. As Mr. Schneier points out himself, there are also limits to how much regulation can accomplish. A privacy violation is the act of revealing information–not using it–and without any “IRS misplaces laptop” headlines, it’s usually impossible to tell whodunnit.

And of course, that’s the real problem here. If we don’t act like private people, we won’t be private people. I don’t share Mr. Schneier’s willingness to regulate, but he is absolutely right that the reality of privacy has changed too quickly for our norms to keep up. Posting drunken photos on Facebook is one of the stupidest things we can do with a computer, yet we do it all the time, because we don’t appreciate the consequences. It’s not just a lack of judgment, either. Everyone knows not to send cash through the postal service, but most of us still don’t have the slightest clue how email works. This too shall pass.

When man discovered fire, he learned not to burn himself. When we brought electricity into the home, we learned not to shock ourselves. If and when our online indiscretions come back to haunt us, we’re going to learn the value of privacy, and how to get it. Once we do, the market will bend over backwards to sell it to us. But insulating us from the consequences of our decisions can only make things worse.  If we try to save ourselves the trouble of adjusting, if we put our chips on government to simply make the problem disappear, we won’t be ready when the stakes are a lot higher.