Renewable Fuel Standard

The ethanol industry was patiently waiting for the EPA to approve an increase from 10 percent ethanol blends to 15 percent in gasoline. They are still waiting, but no longer patiently.

Numerous groups have voiced their opinion to keep the blend wall at 10 percent, or at least not to approve the increase until further testing is done. Despite the fact that the opposition comes from organizations such as the National Council of Chain Restaurants (this one is admittedly confusing), the Engine Manufacturers Association, and the Motorcycle Industry Association, the domestic ethanol industry is convinced this is an enormous big-oil conspiracy to keep the ethanol industry from succeeding. Did they just finish watching JFK?

From the reading I’ve done, it looks like 15 percent blends of ethanol aren’t going to have any negative effects on newer car engines — and EPA statements have hinted that the industry will get their 5 percent increase this year. But there is evidence that it can cause harm in non-automobile engines — like outboard engines used in boating, which explains why ESPN ran an article covering the issue.

Why is this confusing the ethanol industry? As the ESPN article says:

The lack of general public understanding of the differences between E10 and E15 increases the risk that boaters may misfuel their engines once E15 becomes readily available at gas stations.

The average citizen has no idea what E10 or E15 or E85 are. They might buy E15 rather than E10 and use it, potentially damaging very expensive equipment.

The underlying issue here is that the Renewable Fuel Standard is mandating huge blends of ethanol into our fuel supply, but the EPA isn’t permitting a high enough blend that will allow the mandate to be met. This highlights the absurdity of government energy policy. One government organization mandates a policy and another government organization sets policy making the original initiative impossible to obtain. This is one of the many reasons why consumers, not governments, should decide what they want going into their fuel.

And yes, the oil companies oppose the increase — as they should. They have absolutely nothing to gain from this, and will lose money as each gallon of gasoline sold now contains less refined oil and more ethanol. To some, it is downright shocking that a company would oppose policies that would have the direct effect of making their industry less profitable.

Last week, the House Energy and Commerce Committee unanimously approved H.R. 5626, Chairman Henry Waxman’s Blowout Prevention Act. Here’s the version of the bill as marked up and approved by the Committee. Here’s the earlier discussion draft on which the Energy and Environment Subcommittee held a hearing on June 30.

Like the discussion draft, the marked-up version of the bill is a Trojan Horse for restricting and, ultimately, shutting down deepwater oil production.

The most mischievous language is in the first substantive provision, Sec. (2).

Sec. (2)(a)(3) requires each applicant for a drilling permit to have an oil spill response plan ensuring “the applicant has the capacity to promptly control and stop a blowout in the event the blowout preventer and other well control measures fail” (p. 2). If the ongoing disaster in the Gulf has taught us anything, it is that once the blowout preventer and other well control measures fail, there may be no way “to promptly control and stop a blowout.” H.R. 5626 would establish a test no oil company can pass, a standard none can meet.

Nobody had the capacity to “promptly control and stop” the Macondo well blowout after the preventer and other well control measures failed — not BP, not the oil industry working as a team, not the federal and state governments working with the oil industry.

The sponsors had to know they were demanding the impossible when they drafted the bill. Consider these excerpts from a colloquy between Oversight and Investigation Subcommittee Chairman Bart Stupak (D-Mich.) and ExxonMobil CEO Rex Tillerson at the June 15 Energy and Environment Subcommittee hearing:

Stupak: “So when these things happen, these worst-case scenarios, we can’t handle them, correct?”
Tillerson: “We are not well equipped to handle them. There will be impacts as we are seeing. . . .That’s why the emphasis is always on preventing these things from occurring, because when they happen, we’re not very well equipped to deal with them.”
Stupak: “. . . so no matter which one of the oil companies here before us had the blowout, the resources are not enough to prevent what we’re seeing day after day in the gulf, not only the loss of 11 people, but we’re on, what, day 56 or 57 of oil washing up on shores. There is no other plan. There is no way to stop what’s happening until we finally cap this well, correct?”
Tillerson: “That is correct. . . . There is no response capability that will guarantee you will never have an impact. It does not exist and it will probably never exist.”

The discussion draft’s permitting requirements apply to all “high risk” wells, defined expansively as any offshore well plus any onshore well having the potential to cause serious environmental harm in the event of a blowout. The marked-up version targets “covered wells” rather than “high risk” wells, but this is largely a distinction without a difference. Covered wells include all wells located on the Outer Continental Shelf (OCS), plus any other well that, “based on criteria established by rule … could, in the event of a blowout, lead to extensive and widespread harm to public health, safety, and the environment” (pp. 41-42).

The OCS is defined (by reference to Sec. 1301 of the Submerged Lands Act) as waters lying seaward of three geographic miles from the coastline (p. 43). So H.R. 5626 would cover any deepwater well plus any shallow-water and onshore well where a blowout could lead to widespread environmental harm. Very few large wells would be exempt.

Presumably, operators could “promptly control and stop” a blowout at any onshore well and most shallow-water wells. Nonetheless, H.R. 5626 could effectively ban new wells in deep water, and deep water is the future of offshore oil and gas production. As the Department of Interior notes in its May 27 report, Increased Safety Measures for Energy Development on the Outer Continental Shelf, U.S. deepwater offshore oil production surpassed shallow water oil production in 2001, and in 2009, 80% of offshore oil production and 45% of offshore gas production “occurred in water depths in excess of 1,000 feet.” 

The bill does not clearly state how its requirements would apply to existing wells. Would an operator’s permit be revoked if he cannot demonstrate the capacity to “promptly control and stop” a blowout after the preventer and other well-control measures fail? If so, then the bill would not only block new deepwater drilling, it would also create a vehicle for shutting down existing wells. 

Sec. (2)(c) requires the operator to obtain a revised permit if he makes a “material modification” in well design, the blowout preventer, his plan to promptly stop a blowout, or his capability to begin or compete drilling of a relief well for a covered well. Apparently, then, an existing well would be subject to the new permitting requirements if it undertakes a “material modification.” In that case, however, the bill could discourage operators from making material improvements in well safety. Some might avoid or delay making safety improvements in order to avoid or delay becoming subject to an impossible standard. If I am reading these provisions correctly, H.R. 5626 could actually make offshore drilling less safe!  

Federal officials may not be able to finesse Sec. (2)(a)(3), even if they want to, because H.R. 5626 would empower “citizens” to enforce its provisions and associated regulations via litigation:

Any person having a valid legal interest which is or may be adversely affected may commence a civil action in Federal district court of appropriate jurisdiction on such person’s own behalf to compel compliance with this Act, or any regulation or order issued under this Act, or any regulation or order issued under this Act, against any person, including the United States, and any other government instrumentality or agency (to the extent permitted by the eleventh amendment to the Constitution) for any alleged violation of any provision of this Act or any regulation or order issued under this Act. [p. 28]

The discussion draft did not include the qualifier “valid legal interest.” But how difficult is it for an environmental group to demonstrate a “valid legal interest” in enforcing environmental laws and regulations? Enact the Blowout Prevention Act, and environmental groups will be able to sue any agency that fails to hold an oil company to an unattainable standard.

A few concluding thoughts. The security risks of dependence on petroleum imports are often hugely exaggerated, as the Cato Institute’s Jerry Taylor and Peter van Doren explain. Nonetheless, the sponsors of H.R. 5626 view petroleum imports with alarm. If the bill kills the future of U.S. offshore production, our dependence on Saudi Arabia and OPEC will increase. Is that what the sponsors want?

Perhaps their core premise is that oil is so evil that any restriction on oil production is good, because it will hasten the arrival of a “beyond petroleum” future. Such thinking is dangerous folly.

Although oil spills are bad, oil is good. Without oil, there would be no modern commerce and no mechanized agriculture. Life for most of humanity, including most Americans, would be poor, nasty, and short. Indeed, many of us would not even be alive.

Killing the future of offshore production would increase consumers’ pain at the pump, destroy tens of thousands of high-paying jobs, and undermine the economy of the Gulf Coast region. A “beyond petroleum” future would likely be just as distant — or even more so, because a poorer America would have fewer resources to invest in technological innovation.

Petrophobes overestimate their ability to predict and control the future. Consider these examples. 

  • In 1990, the California Air Resources Board (CARB) adopted a zero emission vehicle (ZEV) mandate requiring 10% of all new cars sold in California be electric vehicles by 2003. Ten percent of the California new-car market is about 150,000 vehicles. CARB had to backpeddle several times as it became apparent that consumers were not buying these costly, limited-range vehicles. In 2008, CARB reduced the mandate to 2,500 all-electric vehicles – a rollback of about 98%.
  • Congress in 2007 enacted a Renewable Fuel Standard (RFS) requiring refiners to sell 250 million gallons of cellulosic ethanol in 2011. Earlier this week, EPA announced it would reduce the 2011 target to 5 – 17 million gallons per year –  a 94-98% rollback.

It is not surprising that veteran petrophobes like Reps. Waxman and Markey (D-Mass.) drafted H.R. 5626. It is surprising that every Republican member voted for it too. Do any of them have buyer’s remorse? If not now, when?

In today’s ClimateWire (subscription required), reporter Jessica Leber describes a biofuel industry still totally dependent on government handouts and still pleading for more special favors.

First a bit of background.

In December 2007, Congress passed and President Bush signed the Energy Independence and Security Act (EISA). Among other things, EISA boosted the existing (2005 Energy Policy Act) Renewable Fuel Standard (RFS) from 7.5 billion gallons a year by 2012 to 36 billion gallons a year by 2022. Of those 36 billion gallons, 21 billion gallons must come from “advanced biofuels.”

The RFS is essentially a Soviet-style production quota. Congress, prodded by campaign contributions from the corn lobby, and by presidential candidates jockeying for support in the Iowa Caucuses, decided that central planning of the nation’s motor fuel markets was an idea whose time had come.

To qualify as “advanced” under EISA, a biofuel must (1) be made from plant matter other than corn kernels and (2) achieve a 50% reduction in greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions compared to gasoline, based on a “life-cycle” (wells-to-wheels) analysis. EISA also allows 15 billion gallons a year by 2022 to come from plain old corn ethanol, although to qualify as a “renewable fuel,” corn ethanol from newer plants must achieve a 20% reduction in GHG emissions relative to gasoline — again, based on life-cycle analysis.

EISA mandates the sale of 100 million gallons of advanced biofuel in 2009 and 200 million gallons in 2010 (see p. 6 of this presentation). For years, biofuel lobbyists have been telling us that advanced biofuels are “just around the corner.” But, Matt Carr of the Biotechnology Industry Organization estimated last month that in 2010 volumes will, optimistically, reach only 12 million gallons, Leber reports.

In a sop to the corn lobby, the Waxman-Markey cap-and-trade bill would suspend for five years the EISA requirement for life-cycle analysis to determine whether biofuels qualify as “advanced” or even as “renewable.” Several life-cycle analyses indicate that corn ethanol produces more greenhouse gases than the gasoline it replaces, once emissions from land use changes are taken into account (for a summary, see pp. 4-6 of this report).

The Kerry-Boxer cap-and-trade bill does not contain the five-year hold on life-cycle analysis, and the uncertainty as to which biofuels will qualify under future EPA implementing rules ”chills the investment community,” Carr complains. I’d put the point differently: Strong evidence that corn ethanol is not “climate friendly” jeopardizes the political rents that corn growers and ethanol distillers hoped to extract from climate hysteria.

Leber also notes that, “the industry is also concerned about ambiguous language in both the Senate and House versions of the bill that does not clearly exempt the biofuels component of blended petroleum fuels, such as E10 and E85, from an economy-wide carbon cap.”

Did you get that? The corn-ethanol lobby invoked climate doom to sell biofuel mandates to Congress and the public. But now they say the centerpiece of regulatory climate policy — the cap in “cap and trade” — should not apply to biofuels, even though biofuels emit CO2, and even though several life-cycle analyses indicate that corn-ethanol is more carbon-intensive than gasoline. One law for me, another for thee!

Producers of “advanced” ethanol also complain that they must compete for climate-tech loan guarantees against companies developing solar, wind, and compressed natural gas technologies. The outrage! Why should ethanol producers have to share the greenhouse gravy train with anybody else?

This just in: Sens. Barbara Boxer (D-CA) and Susan Collins (R-ME) today released Biofuels: Potential Effects and Challenges of Required Increases in Production and Use, an August 2009 study by the Government Accountability Office (GAO). One of GAO’s conclusions is that the 45-cent/gallon tax credit that refiners receive for blending ethanol into motor gasoline “may no longer be needed to stimulate conventional corn-ethanol production because the domestic industry has matured, its processing is well understood, and its use capacity is already near the effective RFS limit of 15 billion gallons a year of conventional ethanol.”

The Renewable Fuels Association “panned” the GAO study, Leber reports. Well, what else did you expect? Without the blenders’ credit, a national market for ethanol would not exist. In their PR (if not in their own minds), corn ethanol will always be an infant industry in need of special tax breaks to compete with the big bad oil companies.

What happens if, as seems likely, the industry falls farther and farther behind the EISA ”advanced” biofuel requirements? Here’s my prediction: The Renewable Fuels Association will not lobby to scale back the overall 36-billion RFS; rather, they’ll lobby to raise up the 15 billion gallon ceiling on corn ethanol.

That may seem counter-intuitive, because burning ethanol merely puts back into the air the carbon dioxide (CO2) that corn crops recently pulled out of it, whereas burning gasoline liberates carbon that had been stored in geologic deposits for millions of years.

But other factors come into play, such as the fossil energy inputs required to produce the corn, turn it into ethanol, and deliver the ethanol to market. 

In addition, as EPA argues in its proposed rule to implement the renewable fuel standard program established by the 2007 Energy Independence and Security Act (EISA), expanding corn production into forest and grass lands can release substantial amounts of carbon stored in soils and trees.

Similarly, when U.S. farmers grow corn in areas previously used to produce soy beans, for example, farmers in Brazil have an incentive to convert forest land into soy plantations.

As you might expect, EPA’s use of life-cycle analysis, although required by EISA, drives the ethanol lobby and its congressional allies up the wall. They claim it is ridiculous to link increased corn production here to increased CO2 emissions in developing countries.

But, as my colleague, agricultural commodity analyst Dave Juday, demonstrates, the numbers paint a very clear picture. With Dave’s permission, I reproduce below an email he sent around earlier today.

*  *  *

With regard to GHG and the EPA’s RFS [renewable fuel standard] 2 rule, … the concept of “indirect land use changes” (ILUC) get criticized for being faulty, but it actually is pretty sound.  

Consider, if ethanol drives up US corn  plantings (which it did) and drives down US soybean plantings and production (which it did, because the US – the largest producer and exporter – has only so much farm land and not much tillable acreage to expand) and thereby raises the world price of soybeans, it raises the incentives to grow soybeans elsewhere in the world.  It just so happens Brazil – which is the world’s second largest producer and exporter – is the most likely place where additional soybeans will be grown on virgin land because that is where the virgin land is. 

The real weak link in this GHG lifecycle emissions concept is the ability to measure and value the carbon emissions and sequestration and the process by which “value” gets assigned to practices and manufacturing processes.  Yet, as might be expected from ethanol advocates, it is the simple, fundamental, and rational economic concept that is argued against.    Consider the perspectives shared by a lobbyist and a US Senator on the issue of “indirect land use changes” driven by US biofuel policy:

  •  Basically, the EPA has determined that the production of ethanol in America is forcing land use changes in Brazil and other foreign countries to destroy their valuable rain forests to produce farm commodities to make up for reduced exports of these commodities from the United States. Mr. Chairman, I have been in Washington for a long time, but I have never heard of a more bizarre concept. – Tom Buis, CEO, Growth Energy
  •  Every chance I get, I’m going to bring this issue up. It’s so obvious that the EPA’s rationale doesn’t meet the common sense test.  It’s ridiculous to think that Brazilian farmers are looking to see what Iowa farmers are doing to determine how they run their own business, and quite frankly it’s plain unfair to farmers. –  Honorable Charles Grassley, US Senator (R-IA)

Addressing these comments above is one of those cases where a picture is indeed worth 1,000 words:

corn-and-soy-us-and-brazil

SOURCE: USDA, Foreign Agricultural Service: Production, Supply, and Distribution Online

Added: May 29, 2009

Lisa Lerer delves into the ”life cycle analysis” controversy in the May 26 issue of Politico.  Farm state Democrats are threatening to oppose the Waxman-Markey bill if, as required by EISA, EPA considers the indirect impacts on land-use changes abroad when determining the life-cycle CO2 emissions of domestic ethanol production. 

The same lawmakers enthusiastically supported the EISA renewable fuel program as a global warming policy when they thought it would rig the market in favor of corn farmers. Now they’re threatening to derail Obama’s cap-and-trade initiative if EPA follows the law they helped enact. 

Obama campaigned on a platform of CHANGE, but he may find that in Washington still, Pork Rules and Corn Is King.

Doug Koplow of Earth Track, assisted by researchers with Friends of the Earth, has produced a new study, A Boon to Bad Biofuels, on the taxpayer cost of federal biofuel tax credits and mandates. The numbers are staggering.

In 2008, federal support for ethanol and biodiesel totalled more than $9.5 billion. The subsidy system has two main components:

  1. The Renewable Fuels Standard (RFS), which mandates increased blending of biofuels into the national motor fuel supply, ramping up from 9 billion gallons in 2008 to 36 billion in 2022.
  2. Tax credits including the Volumetric Ethanol Excise Tax Credit (VEETC), which pays out $0.45 for each gallon of corn ethanol; a parallel program for biodiesel worth $1.00 per gallon; and a production tax credit that pays $1.01 for each gallon of cellulosic ethanol produced.

“In their current form, these tax credits scale linearly with production, without limit,” notes Koplow. This means that the $9.5 billion in subsidies in 2008 increases six-fold to $60 billion in 2022, “due both to more production and to a shift to more heavily subsidized cellulosic fuels.” The cumulative cost from 2008 to 2022: $420 billion, nearly 40% of which will go to the corn industry.

But wait, there may be more. As a candidate, Obama proposed to up the RFS to 60 billion gallons by 2030. If this proposal is adopted, “subsidies would top $120 billion per year by the end of the period, for a cumulative subsidy during the 2008-2030 period of more than $1 trillion.”

Kudos to Koplow and his colleagues at Friends of the Earth for this important contribution.