Sarbox

The Supreme Court doomed Chicago’s handgun ban Monday by ruling 5-to-4 that the Second Amendment applies to state and local governments like Chicago, not merely the federal government.  (Most guarantees in the Bill of Rights are deemed so fundamental that they apply to both state and federal governments, but a few rights deemed trivial, like the right to a jury trial in lawsuits seeking over $20, only are applied by the Courts to the federal government, not the states.)  In 2008, the Supreme Court ruled that the Second Amendment protects the individual right to possess a handgun in a federal enclave, in striking down a handgun ban in Washington, D.C., in District of Columbia v. Heller.  Chicago’s ban is quite similar to the one found unconstitutional in Washington, D.C., so the Supreme Court’s ruling Monday in McDonald v. City of Chicago dooms Chicago’s gun ban.

In 2009, President Obama’s first Supreme Court nominee, Sonia Sotomayor, claimed before her confirmation to accept the Supreme Court’s ruling in Heller as binding precedent.  But on Monday, she joined a dissent by the Supreme Court’s four liberal justices calling for the Heller decision to be overruled.  Second Amendment scholar David Kopel says that Sotomayor was not candid, noting that her opinion “contradicted” what she told the Senate before the Senate confirmed her to the Supreme Court.  It is likely that future liberal Supreme Court nominees will pretend to support gun rights until they are confirmed, then vote against such rights once on the Court.

Obama’s current Supreme Court nominee, Elena Kagan, lumped the NRA together with the KKK as “bad guy orgs” while serving in the Clinton administration, suggesting that she will consistently rule against gun owners if her nomination is approved by the Senate.  Kagan failed to defend federal laws protecting crime victims while serving as Solicitor General.

As a Harvard dean, Kagan blocked the military from recruiting, in defiance of a federal law requiring access for military recruiters.  Kagan claimed her opposition was based on the military’s exclusion of openly-gay soldiers, not hostility to the military in general, but this is hard to square with the fact that she had no problem letting the Saudis sponsor an Islamic studies program at Harvard Law School, even though the Saudis flog and execute gay people, and she had no problem serving in the Clinton administration, even though Clinton signed into law both the restrictions on gays in the military she claimed to object to (the Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell policy), and the ban on federal recognition of gay marriages contained in DOMA.

The Supreme Court Monday also ruled that religious clubs can be forced by colleges to admit atheists and others who disagree with the club’s religious perspective as members, as long as the college requires this as part of a general policy of banning clubs from discriminating based on any characteristic.  The Supreme Court’s four “conservative” justices dissented against this ruling limiting the First Amendment’s freedom of association, while moderate Anthony Kennedy joined the Supreme Court’s liberal bloc in ruling against the religious clubs in Christian Legal Society v. Martinez.

In Free Enterprise Fund v. PCAOB, the Supreme Court, in a 5-to-4 ruling, cut back on restrictions on the ability to remove high-ranking bureaucrats, ruling that provisions of the Sarbanes-Oxley law that kept anyone from removing members of the Public Company Accounting Oversight Board except for willful misconduct unconstitutionally infringed on the constitutional separation of powers, which requires that important government employees be subject to some degree of accountability to higher-ups in the executive branch.  However, the Supreme Court left intact the bulk of the Sarbanes-Oxley law.  The red tape adopted by bureaucrats under Sarbanes-Oxley has driven many IPOs and American jobs overseas.  The red tape costs the economy $35 billion a year, according to the American Electronics Association, and it did nothing to prevent the mortgage meltdown, Bernard Madoff’s $50 billion fraud, or the faulty valuation of sub-prime mortgage-backed securities that helped spawn the financial crisis.

The Supreme Court overturned a ruling that allowed business methods to be treated as exclusive property under the patent laws, but did not definitively rule out the patenting of business methods, in Bilski v. Kappos.

The members of the Public Company Accounting Oversight Board (PCAOB), an agency being challenged in the Supreme Court on December 7, aren’t appointed by the president, nor can he remove them. The General Accounting Office describes the PCAOB as “an independent board with sweeping powers and authority;” its rules and red tape cost the economy billions of dollars every year (with an long-term cost of perhaps $1 trillion).

Yet the government suggests in its brief that the president has “fully effective control” over the PCAOB (see pg. 46 of that brief). That’s not the only peculiar claim made in the PCAOB’s defense.

The case raises the issue of whether members of an agency — the PCAOB — picked by the members of yet another independent agency — the five Commissioners of the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) acting as a group — are, in light of their broad policy making role, actually “principal officers” who thus should have been picked instead by the president under the Constitution’s Appointments Clause. Alternatively, assuming that PCAOB members are mere “inferior” officers, the case raises the issue of whether they should have been picked, as the Appointments Clause requires for inferior officers, by the “Head” of a “Department,” rather than the SEC Commissioners acting collectively (the SEC has a Chairman who manages it and supervises its staff).

Government lawyers argue that the PCAOB is so controlled by the SEC that its members are mere inferior officers, and claim that the SEC is headed by all its Commissioners, not its Chairman. But as Jonathan Moore has noted, a long-time SEC commissioner debunked these claims on December 3. Former SEC Commissioner Paul Atkins took the exact opposite view, in a panel discussion at the American Enterprise Institute, which one can view and listen to here (Atkins was the fifth speaker; I also spoke at the event, and Jonathan Moore, who was in the audience, questioned the panel).

Atkins spoke at length about the PCAOB and how difficult it was for the SEC to influence the PCAOB. He noted that the PCAOB had enough autonomy to frustrate the SEC’s attempts at oversight. When the SEC sought a business plan from the PCAOB, the PCAOB Chairman said that “the statute was his business plan” and more or less failed to comply. It took five years to get something akin to a business plan from the PCAOB. Atkins said that PCAOB’s “Audit Standard 2” “has a very checkered history” and illustrated the “limits” of SEC oversight. The 400 pages of requirements from Auditing Standard No. 2 made compliance with Sarbanes-Oxley “very difficult” and “very costly.”

Atkins noted that “All five commissioners” were in favor of “radical” changes to it, yet it took years for them to obtain merely “some” changes to that audit standard, owing to the need for consensus and PCAOB foot dragging. He recounted how the PCAOB adopts “staff-driven” rules through “informal rulemaking” that apply without being approved by the SEC, regardless of Sarbanes-Oxley’s formal approval process for rules. Atkins says, for example, that its guidance regarding “stock options” was “not subject to any rule at all,” despite functioning in practice as a rule. While the SEC has to approve formal rules, the PCAOB functions heavily through informal rules never approved by the SEC. He said that “Peekaboo does have real power,” “investigative power,” and “prosecutorial power.” Although the SEC theoretically reviews the PCAOB’s budget, Atkins noted that “staff at Peekaboo were not telling the truth” about the PCAOB’s budget system to the SEC, making evaluation of its budget and spending difficult. He noted that on the SEC’s website, there is video footage of his concerns over this at the last budget meeting. He noted that because of the PCAOB’s separate status and the SEC’s lack of control over PCAOB staff, the “SEC found it didn’t really have the authority” to control the PCAOB’s budget that it supposedly did.

Atkins noted that the SEC’s “power is not plenary” over the PCAOB, that it was difficult to get a group consensus focused on oversight over the PCAOB, and that oversight of the PCAOB was “like pushing on a string.” He said that the current set-up under Sarbanes-Oxley is a “very difficult way for the SEC to oversee a separate board.” He cited “flawed implementation of [SOX Section] 404” from 2002 to 2006 as an example, and noted the “incredible amount of attention diverted” to accounting issues that were not important as a result of the PCAOB’s internal-controls rules.

He addressed the question of whether the SEC’s chairman is its head for appointments clause purposes. He said that the Founders realized the “committee structure” or the “committee system was not a very effective decision making type of body” for things like appointments, and cited the 1950 Reorganization Plan 10 that vested “authority over the budget” and “HR decisions” in the SEC’s chairman. Although he noted that “consensus” is desired for key posts like the General Counsel, when push comes to shove, “in reality, he [the Chairman] can still appoint who he wants.” He said that the idea that PCAOB members – or even SEC members – were really accountable to the president was silly, and that the SEC’s own history “illustrates how difficult it is for the President to assert authority” over the SEC, much less the PCAOB.

Atkins’ observations debunk the government’s suggestion that the president has “fully effective control” over the SEC – and the lower court ruling upholding the PCAOB, which claimed that the SEC was not headed by its Chairman, but by SEC Commissioners as a group – a claim based on that court’s inconsistent reasoning. Law professor Donna Nagy similarly debunks claims that the PCAOB is “heavily controlled” by the SEC in a forthcoming article in the Pittsburgh Law Review, noting that PCAOB members are “principal officers” “acting with significant discretion and autonomy outside the SEC’s control” who constitutionally must be appointed by the president — not, as is currently the case, by the SEC Commissioners as a group.

Also available online is the text of SEC Commissioner Paul Atkins’s earlier 2006 speech noting the SEC’s limited ability to control the PCAOB (such as the PCAOB’s unapproved guidance on subjects like “options grants” and the PCAOB chair’s view that the PCAOB is more like the SEC’s “cousin” than its subordinate).

Courts sometimes take judicial notice of such statements. See Nebraska v. EPA, 331 F.3d 995, 998 n.3 (D.C. Cir. 2003) (taking judicial notice of statements on web site); Cf. Parents Involved in Community Schools v. Seattle School District No. 1, 551 U.S. 701, 780 n. 30 (2006) (Thomas, J., concurring) (quoting from web site); id. at 730, n.14 (plurality) (citing news articles about website’s earlier content).

Tomorrow, the Supreme Court will weigh whether to decide what a federal judge called the “the most important separation-of-powers case regarding the President’s appointment and removal powers to reach the courts in the last 20 years.” Law professors Kenneth Starr and Viet Dinh, who worked on the case, have an editorial in today’s Wall Street Journal urging the Supreme Court to hear the case, which challenges a powerful, and largely unaccountable, federal agency called the Public Company Accounting Oversight Board (PCAOB). As they point out, in creating the PCAOB, “Congress created a striking Constitutional anomaly – a powerful executive branch agency with a structure that gives the President almost no say over its policies.”

Last year, a divided D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals voted 2-to-1 to uphold a provision of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act, over a strong dissent by Judge Kavanaugh, in the case of Free Enterprise Fund v. Public Company Accounting Oversight Board. That ruling deserves Supreme Court review both because the case is exceedingly important, and because the ruling rests on reasoning that is disturbingly inconsistent.

The case challenges the PCAOB, the regulatory board set up by the 2002 Sarbanes-Oxley Act, as a violation of the Constitution’s Appointments Clause and separation of powers. The PCAOB is enormously important: As Starr and Dinh note, “A Brookings-American Enterprise Institute study found that all of Sarbanes-Oxley’s provisions – mostly enforced by the PCAOB – have cost the U.S. economy more than $1 trillion in direct and indirect costs.” Moreover, the PCAOB’s red tape imposes annual compliance costs of over $35 billion, while providing only illusory benefits for investors, and driving businesses overseas. The PCAOB enjoys “massive power,” “unchecked power by design,” according to a Senator who voted to create it.

But rather than being picked by the President with Senate approval, the way important government officials are supposed to be, PCAOB members are picked by SEC Commissioners as a group (which led to a disorganized selection process for the first PCAOB members). As Starr and Dinh note, “The PCAOB’s lack of an accountable structure has likely contributed to what members of both parties see as its policy failures, such as its failure to stem inadequate disclosures by “firms reporting subprime securities.”

The lawsuit says that violates the Appointments Clause of the Constitution, which requires that government officials be picked by the President or (for minor officials) by the “Head of a Department.” The lawsuit also argued that the PCAOB members are so unaccountable to the president, who can’t remove them (the SEC Commissioners collectively can, but only for “willful” misconduct), that it violates separation of powers.

In order to reject the constitutional challenges, the court’s majority had to rely on inconsistent reasoning. First, it claimed that the SEC’s Chairman is NOT the SEC’s head, but rather “simply one” of “several commissioners,” making the SEC Commissioners collectively the head of the SEC. See Opinion, at pg. 20 (“The [SEC's] Chairman . . . is simply one Commissioner”); Opinion, pg. 21 (“The commission is a body whose ‘Head’ consists of the several commissioners”). Only by doing that could it rule that the SEC Commissioners collectively are the “Head” of a department and thus are permitted by the Appointments Clause to make appointments. (Never mind that the Chairman has been described by the SEC itself as its “chief executive” and “head”).

Then, just a few pages later, it suddenly suggested just the opposite: that the SEC’s chairman was, after all, the SEC’s head. Confronted with the argument that the PCAOB is not accountable to the President through his appointees, such as the SEC’s chairman (who, unlike other SEC commissioners, serves at the president’s pleasure), the court stated that the President does have indirect influence over the PCAOB through the SEC, because the president picks the SEC Chairman, who “dominates commission policymaking.” See Opinion, Pg. 24. (It said that “by appointment of the Commission chairman, who serves at the pleasure of the President and often ‘dominate[s] commission policymaking,’ the President can influence Commission policy and control who directs ‘the administrative side of commission business, select[s] most staff, set[s] budgetary policy, and as a consequence command[s] staff loyalties.’” See Opinion, pg. 24). But if the Chairman so “dominates commission policymaking,” that is because he is the SEC’s actual “head” (its “top executive,” as the SEC concedes), not a mere figurehead.

Is it too much to ask that courts not rely on inconsistent reasoning? Especially in a case like this, which Judge Kavanaugh noted is “the most important separation-of-powers case regarding the President’s appointment and removal powers to reach the courts in the last 20 years.”