transportation

If a motto summed up the Obama administration, it might be, “Life is short. Eat dessert first.” President Obama’s policies are all about self-indulgence in the present, to be paid for with either long-run economic decline, or painful sacrifices by future generations.

His recent budget proposal, which contains a mix of real spending increases and mostly imaginary “cuts,” is a case in point. It pretends to cut spending and the deficit, but its “cuts” are slated to occur largely in the distant future (and thus may never happen), while its increases kick in almost immediately. It is so dishonest that it has drawn criticism from across the political spectrum.

As former congressional economist Chris Edwards notes, although Obama claims it cuts spending:

His new budget proposes slightly more discretionary and entitlement spending for next year than did his last budget!

  • Last year, Obama planned to spend $1.301 trillion on discretionary programs in FY2012, but now he plans to spend $1.340 trillion.
  • Last year, Obama planned to spend $2,107” billion “on entitlement programs in FY2012, but now he plans to spend $2,140” billion.

Similarly, The Wall Street Journal calls the “White House Budget” proposal “cynical and unrealistic,” since it pretends to cut spending over the long run, but openly “increases deficits above the spending baseline for the next two years.”

(Obama made the same kind of deceptive sales pitch for his $800 billion stimulus package, focusing on immediate gratification and ignoring future costs. In pushing the stimulus, he cited Congressional Budget Office claims that it would save jobs in the short run, while ignoring the CBO’s own finding that the stimulus will actually shrink the economy over the long run, by exploding the national debt and crowding out private investment. Obama also made the apocalyptic claim that the stimulus package was necessary to avert “irreversible decline,” but this claim was so incredible that it was not even peddled by his supporters in the media. The stimulus ended up destroying jobs even in the short run by wiping out jobs in the export sector, and subsidizing foreign green jobs .)

The Atlantic’s Megan McArdle, who voted for Obama in 2008, calls Obama’s budget proposal “disastrous.” She notes that his proposed budget includes phony, “sketchily outlined cuts,” and short-term patches that are “stacked to expire just after Obama (in theory) gets reelected.” Moreover, she points out that the supposedly “‘fiscally responsible’ Democrats have given us the largest peacetime deficit in history, one that keeps growing beyond all expectations.”

Her colleague Andrew Sullivan, who was Obama’s chief cheerleader in the blogosphere until now, finally admits the truth about his idol:

this president is too weak, too cautious, too beholden to politics over policy to lead. In this budget, in his refusal to do anything concrete to tackle the looming entitlement debt, in his failure to address the generational injustice, in his blithe indifference to the increasing danger of default, he has betrayed those of us who took him to be a serious president prepared to put the good of the country before his short term political interests. Like his State of the Union, this budget is good short term politics but such a massive pile of fiscal [male bovine excrement; we like to keep this a family blog if we can--ed.] it makes it perfectly clear that Obama is kicking this vital issue down the road.

To all those under 30 who worked so hard to get this man elected, know this: he just screwed you over. He thinks you’re fools. Either the US will go into default because of Obama’s cowardice, or you will be paying far far more for far far less because this president has no courage when it counts. He let you down. On the critical issue of America’s fiscal crisis, he represents no hope and no change. Just the same old Washington politics he once promised to end.

AOL News notes that  for all the talk of cuts, “President Barack Obama’s 2012 budget proposes to spend $3.48 trillion on everything except interest on the national debt. That’s a 7 percent increase over what the government spent in 2010. And keep in mind that in 2010, there was a lot of stimulus money flying out the door.”

Even The Washington Post, which endorsed Obama in 2008 and has not supported a Republican for president since 1952, said Obama’s budget was full of “gimmickry,” and called Obama the “Punter-in-Chief” for failing to address America’s looming budget problems.

Obama would increase wasteful education and transportation spending by billions more. The Washington Post’s Robert Samuelson gave a thumbs down to the Obama administration’s anachronistic focus on rail boondoggles that few people will use. The Cato Institute’s Neal McCluskey debunked the bogus offsets Obama is using to pretend to pay for his budget-busting and wasteful education proposals. We earlier explained why Obama should have cut rather than increased education spending at this link.

Have a listen here.

Land-use and Transportation Policy Analyst Marc Scribner talks about his new CEI Issue Analysis, “The Limitations of Public-Private Partnerships.” Marc argues that PPPs are an improvement over the status quo in surface transportation because they introduce at least an element of competition into a sector where there is usually none. But PPPs are harmful in real estate developments because they tend to favor politicians’ preferences over those of consumers.

The federal government has managed to create a new regulation that will put even more local governments in the red. Apparently, bureaucrats have determined that this is the perfect time to force all street signs across America to be revamped. It will no longer be legal to have all capital letters in the signs; instead, only the first letter of each word will be permitted to be in CAPS along with other requirements.

In Milwaukee this will cost the cash-strapped city nearly $2 million — double the city’s entire annual for traffic control.” So during this recession, local governments will not only need to cut back on services, but they will need to pay for new street signs. Sadly, this is similar to actual Keynesian economic theory put into practice.

It is amazing that bureaucrats who create these laws couldn’t foresee why anyone who lives on a country road would object to paying an enormous amount of money on a new street sign that nobody needs. In fact, this is a perfect example where federalism works quite well to solve local concerns.

You can see the video of this report below:

Photo credit.

Wendell Cox had an interesting article this week on his new findings on land-use regulation and housing prices. Long a critic of smart-growth planning, Cox’s new study puts a quantitative face on what excessive land-use regulations do to housing prices:

The overwhelming majority of new housing in the United States continues to be detached and is built near or on the urban fringe (Note 2). For new detached homes, the Index is 1.0 in six metropolitan markets (Atlanta, Dallas-Fort Worth, Houston, Indianapolis, Raleigh-Durham and St. Louis). This indicates that land use regulation is less restrictive and does not add more than normal to the price of new homes (Note 3).

In the other five metropolitan markets, the land and regulation cost ratio has risen above 20%, resulting in a higher Index. The Index is 2.4 in Minneapolis-St. Paul, 3.9 in Seattle, 4.5 in Portland, 5.7 in Washington-Baltimore and 13.2 in San Diego. It is estimated that more restrictive land use regulation raises the price of the least expensive detached houses from nearly $30,000 (in Minneapolis-St. Paul) to more than $220,000 (in San Diego) than would be expected if these metropolitan markets had retained less restrictive land use regulation (Figure 2).

Ironically, smart-growth proponents are still peddling the myth that “sprawl” is the main problem, rather than their misguided central planning. Take this new report from left-wing environmentalist and “[un]affordable housing” advocates, which claims that any of the benefits of cheaper housing on Virginia urban peripheries are outweighed by increases in transportation spending.

Of course, their analysis doesn’t consider the fact that the vast majority of Americans prefer to live in detached single-family homes on larger lots, as opposed to apartments in dense urban areas. This is particularly true of families with children. While demonizing cars, the report’s author fails to note that car ownership significantly increases employment opportunities and pay (and that this is particularly significant for lower-income minorities). His solution? Continuing the same aggressive central planning that made housing too expensive in the first place, that disproportionately harms the poor, and that likely helped drive the housing crisis.

Late last month, Washington, D.C. launched its Capital Bikeshare (“CaBi” to its groupies) program to much acclaim from the usual suspects — New Urbanists and bicycle imperialists. For those uninitiated, contemporary bike-sharing programs involve the placement of controlled bicycle racks (usually by government or through large government-financed private operators) around a city so that residents, tourists, and commuters can rent bikes for a fixed period of time and then return them to other racks around the city. All for a nominal, generally subsidized fee.

New Urbanists and Greens love these programs because, for them, any government intervention that puts more people on bikes is a good one. After all, they’ve already spent a lot of political capital zoning out parking and narrowing car lanes to construct special bicycle lanes. They might as well try to get people to use their “livability” boondoggles — or at least provide the illusion thereof.

Oh, the hopes were high on September 20. On a blog run by MetroBike, a pro-bikeshare lobbying/consulting outfit, the owner declared the launch of CaBi to be “a dream come true.” He goes on to cite other programs in Copenhagen, Paris, and Amsterdam as great models for D.C. to emulate. Of course, these fawning portrayals rarely mention the costs. As someone who doesn’t own a car, rarely uses public transit, and who uses a bicycle for the vast majority of excursions in Washington, D.C., let me explain why I’m not thrilled with bike-sharing and why you shouldn’t be either.

First, every one of these systems operates at a loss. Just like transit fares, bike-share user fees do not generate enough revenue to maintain existing capital, let alone provide for expansion (or even cover the initial public investment). For example, Paris’ oft-lauded Vélib program experienced a stock loss rate of nearly 80 percent after launch. That is to say, of the initial 20,600 Vélib bikes  — with an average cost of $3,500 per bike when initial investment and maintenance are included — 16,000 were either stolen or damaged beyond repair. Tourists love ‘em, but they’re not the ones subsidizing most of the cost to the public. Another example is Montreal’s BIXI program, which is currently more than $30 million in debt.

Second, proponents claim externalities from increased bike-share use — less congestion, less pollution — provide benefits not shown by simple fiscal accounting. This appears at first glance to be a valid point. However, when looking at experiences with similar programs in other cities, the positive externalities argument falls flat. Law professor and bike-share skeptic Steve Clowney points to this report on BIXI. Researchers at McGill University released a study with the following key findings:

  • Eighty-six percent of BIXI trips replaced rides on personal bikes (25 percent), walking (28 percent), or public transit (33 percent).
  • Eight percent of BIXI trips replaced cab rides.
  • Two percent of BIXI trips replaced private car rides.
  • Four percent of BIXI trips add trips that otherwise would not have been made.

So, assuming for a moment that transit, walking, and cycling (using your own bike) are all desired “green” forms of urban mobility, only 10 percent of BIXI trips replaced car trips. Even under the most alarmist global warming scenarios, the positive public health and environmental externalities cannot justify this fiscal black hole.

Third, bike-share programs are administrative nightmares. As some starry eyed proponents are starting to discover, land-use regulations, politically entrenched NIMBY interests, and odd government management regimes present big hurdles for new transportation models. D.C. transportation junkies are shocked to learn that the National Park Service, which manages a decent chunk of parkland in D.C., is an inept, opaque government bureaucracy. They’re also flabbergasted that politically connected resident groups might adamantly oppose this little scheme. Color me unsurprised by any of this. Land-use regulations have been twisted to benefit specific entrenched constituencies and the government is generally incompetent when it comes to any issue related to mobility (or virtually everything, for that matter).

Let me make it clear that I’m hardly anti-bicycle (although, I am strongly opposed to subsidized mass transit and highways). What I’m opposed to is misguided utopianism and spending taxpayer dollars on programs where there is significant risk of failure. We’ve already had one failed bike-share program in D.C., and it looks like we’re going to have two.

As one might expect of California, successful transportation public-private partnerships (P3s) face many government hurdles. In the early 1990s, the California Department of Transportation (Caltrans) initiated three pilot P3 projects in Southern California and one in Northern California. Only two of the four went forward: State Route (SR) 91 Express Lanes in Orange County and SR-125 in San Diego County.

The SR-91 toll lanes in Orange County were built in just over a year, with Caltrans estimating that they would have taken at least until 2001 to compete were the private sector not involved. A consortium of private investors secured a 35-year concession to operate the tollway, and the consortium financed the entire $135 million project. However, the agreement between Caltrans and the consortium mandated a three-mile “protection zone” adjacent to the lanes. This protectionist move prohibited Caltrans from adding competing lanes within the zone—public- or private-funded—and specified a bizarre series of restrictions on investment rate of return, maintenance, and infrastructure improvements.

In less than a decade, these contract provisions and the resulting practices had led to a rapidly deteriorating situation, with confusion and panic on all sides. The consortium was facing internal pressure from investors and was involved in several protracted legal battles with Caltrans and other interests. In 2002, the California Assembly passed legislation that authorized the Orange County Transportation Authority (OCTA) to buy out the concessionaire, shut down the protection zone, and eliminate tolls at the end of the 35-year period. The legislation also prohibited OCTA from entering into new P3 agreements with potential SR-91 concessionaires, and required that all future franchise agreements be approved by the legislature.

The story of SR-125 is equally absurd, albeit in entirely different ways. SR-125 concerned building a new 12.5-mile $650 million road between SR-905 and SR-54 in San Diego County. The project was also a 35-year build, operate, and transfer concession, but it took nine years for the project to receive final approval from state and federal environmental authorities. In 2002, the original private investment consortium sold its interest to Macquarie Group, an Australian infrastructure development, financing, and management firm, before construction had even begun. The southern tolled portion, since renamed the South Bay Expressway, eventually opened in 2007, and Macquarie was optimistic about the prospect of turning the project around.

In March of this year, Macquarie’s subsidiary filed for bankruptcy protection (reorganization). Many of the less savvy critics were quick to blame the private sector. Here’s a personal favorite:

San Diego’s South Bay Expressway foreign-owned toll road has become the new poster child for the failed policy of road privatization. Up until now, most “conservative” and libertarian think tanks have promoted PPPs (public private partnerships) as the “free market” solution to road building. I’ve said all along it’s no such thing.

Yikes! But given California’s particularly ailing economy, bloated regulatory state, and business flight to friendlier states–not to mention that private toll operators still compete with traditional government monopolies–is it fair to blame Macquarie? These problems were nearly entirely the result of sloppy, slow, and stupid government actions. They highlight the inherent flaw with P3s: one of the Ps stands for the public sector.

If you believe the “city of northern charm and southern efficiency” is geared solely toward imposing stupid, expensive directives on the rest of the country, think again–local D.C. government makes the feds look reasonable, measured, and intelligent in comparison. I mean, Marion Barry still serves on the city council.

Washington is also a town home to more glassy-eyed rail fanatics per capita than any other. The Washington Metro, the rail transit system that was presumably designed to serve wealthy suburban condo owners, is a notorious fiscal black hole. But the Metro system is controlled by the WMATA, a multi-jurisdictional regional transit authority, and not the city itself. Not wanting to be outdone by a bunch of Virginia and Maryland upstarts, D.C. decided to show WMATA a thing or two about absurdly wasteful transit spending–reintroducing streetcars in the District.

You remember streetcars, right? The antiquated 19th century transit technology that was supposedly murdered by the evil auto industry in the 1960s? Well, it’s been resurrected thanks to the persistent efforts of greensrailfans, and the bow-tie-wearing, criminal-employing Councilman Jim “The people of the District of Columbia want their trolleys back” Graham. To make things worse, officials are now seriously talking about forgoing fare collection on parts of the “$1.5 billion” (if only it would end up being this cheap when all is said and overrun) streetcar system:

“It is certainly possible that in certain areas of the city it would be free,” DDOT Director Gabe Klein tells WTOP.

“And we like that, because the point of this is to stimulate growth and move people between neighborhoods. So we are going to look at a structure where people feel comfortable hopping on and off, maybe many times in an hour.”

D.C. officials have closely studied the streetcar system in Portland, Ore. as a model for what to do in the nation’s capital. In Portland, riders who take trips in the “fareless square” do not have to pay for trips.

“In the downtown area, they make it free,” says Klein. “People literally hop on and hop off, sometimes at every stop. It’s great because it feels more like a people mover, than it does a bus or a streetcar.”

Keeping the cost low would encourage people to use the streetcars. [Emphasis added.]

Mr. Klein is certainly on the right track when he suggests that people might take advantage of a service more if they aren’t charged for use, but he should look up the definition of the word “free.” Something is not costless just because you’re robbing Peter to pay Paul. But Klein really goes off the rails when he proclaims Portland, Oregon’s “silent but deadlyMAX transit system as something the District should be watching and learning from.

Oregonian Randal O’Toole, economist and noted transit scholar, throws cold water on the notion that the Portland model is something to emulate:

Portland’s story of spending $90 million on a streetcar line to get $2.3 billion of development, or $57 million on an aerial tram to get $1 billion of development, sounds attractive to officials from other cities. It might not sound so attractive if Portland admitted that it really had to spend $665 million, in addition to the cost of the streetcar line and tram, not to mention 10-year tax waivers on at least $100 million of development, to get that $2.3 billion worth of development.

Streetcars might sound “fun” or “cool,” but there are two very important reasons why they were scrapped 50 years ago: streetcar lines are much more expensive to operate and maintain compared to buses, and they’re unpopular (not in the “do you like the idea of trolleys?” sense, but in terms of actual ridership). Not to mention the obvious traffic safety problems with nearly-unstoppable, 40-ton fixed-line vehicles sharing the roads with automobiles and cyclists.

One good thing to come out of this flurry of unrestrained public transportation spending is that the District Department of Transportation put online a database where you can see when and how the city is wasting taxpayer dollars on transit boondoggles.

Private sector involvement in surface transportation infrastructure is not new. Public and private turnpikes—roads that require the payment of a toll for passage—have existed for hundreds, if not thousands, of years.  In the United States, turnpikes enjoyed limited success in the 18th century into the 19th century, before being virtually eliminated at the beginning of the 20th century.  Renewed interest in tolls occurred just prior to the Second World War and continued until the passage of the National Interstate and Defense Highways Act in 1956.  Only in the last couple decades have toll roads again become politically palatable, with many taxpayers now preferring tolls to increases in fuel taxes as means to fund road construction and upkeep.  This is important not only in terms of getting road financing right, but also because tolls are the most efficient cost recovery mechanism for private firms.

Private roads serving residential areas have also enjoyed limited historical and contemporary success in the U.S. These are typically financed and managed by local property developers and owners’ associations, many of which allow public traffic. The advantage of these private roads is that investment and use decisions are made in close consult with the affected stakeholders (i.e., adjacent property owners).  Roads controlled by private developers and owners’ associations can accommodate owners’ preferences which may be at odds with one-size-fits-all government regulation, such as preferences for narrower roads and smaller building setbacks.

During the 19th century, private streets were famously constructed in St. Louis. The so-called “private-place model” was successful for several decades, until new city ordinances granted the city the exclusive right to install and maintain “sewers, sewer inlets, water mains, gas mains, underground conduits for electric wires, fire plugs, lamp posts and other conveniences.”  Essentially, owners of private streets lost the ability to control their properties, and many gave up and lobbied the city to take over ownership and management. But with the recent rise of common interest housing developments (often referred to as “gated communities” or “private communities”), private streets have been making a slow comeback as an important component of the overall transportation system.

Private involvement in surface transportation was not limited to roads. Prior to the middle of the 20th century, passenger rail infrastructure in the United States—including track used for intercity service, commuter service, and urban mass transit—had been privately built, owned, and operated. New York City’s subway and commuter rail systems, Chicago’s El, and the nation’s cross-country intercity rail network were all owned and managed by private firms.

The poor state of private mass rail transit following World War II was in part a consequence of the massive economic distortions and dislocations caused by the federal government’s annexation of industry to support its war economy.  However, rail transit had been losing its market share for years following the first auto-driven suburban expansion after World War I. The street car industry, for example, was in a financial death spiral long before the outbreak of World War II.  Unfortunately, these inefficient and unpopular (at least in terms of ridership) transit networks were put on government-funded life support for decades—or worse, continue to limp along to this day.

Around the world and in the United States, private sector involvement in transit infrastructure has increased dramatically in recent years. While not all public-private partnerships are created equal—and those which promote private ownership of infrastructure in the long-run should certainly be preferred over those which merely lease public infrastructure to private managers—they should be seen as a step in the right direction.

A regulation passed in 2005 states that “at least 10 percent of all business at the airport selling consumer products or providing consumer services to the public are small business concerns (as defined by regulations of the Secretary) owned and controlled by a socially and economically disadvantaged individual (as defined in section 47113(a) of this title).

The requirement that the size of a business be taken into account is puzzling; a company’s size has little to do with whether it will do a good job or not.

I would also argue that airports are disadvantaged enough, having already to deal with the TSA, the FAA, the DOT, and others. Snark aside, airports are poorly run, almost without exception. Forcing them to hire vendors and contractors on factors other than price and performance is unlikely to improve matters.

Disadvantaged business quotas bring up a third issue: What happens if a disadvantaged business owner prospers through her hard work, and can no longer be considered disadvantaged? Does she get kicked out of the airport?

That thorny question would have been put to rest on April 21 of this year, when a built-in sunset provision would have made the regulation expire. Wayne Crews and I have written before favoring sunset rules for all new regulations. It’s a painless way to automatically get rid of rules when they become obsolete, or that turn out to be more trouble than they’re worth.

If a rule merits another five years on the books, Congress should be able to vote on it.

In this case, however, the Department of Transportation is getting set to renew the disadvantaged quota program all by itself. Permanently.

According to the DOT, leaving in the sunset provision “would simply cause confusion and disruption, making it more difficult for all parties concerned to carry out their responsibilities under the statute.”

Laws are supposed to be made by legislative branch, not the executive. What we have here is one more case of regulation without representation, out of thousands. You can read all about it in today’s Federal Register.

“Join your fellow pervs for some explicit, twisted fun,” urged a recipient of more than $25,000 from Obama’s $800 billion stimulus package, which received the money through the National Endowment for the Arts. The stimulus is also being spent on “nude simulated-sex dances, Saturday night ‘pervert’ revues,” and “pornographic horror films.” While providing taxpayer funds for “numerous” sexually perverse projects, and lots of money for welfare, the stimulus package has done little for America’s roads and bridges.

Why? Because feminist leaders complained that rebuilding roads and bridges would employ working-class men, who have borne the brunt of the recession, rather than women or the “sexually diverse.” Unemployment is very high among transportation and construction workers, who are overwhelmingly male. The vast majority of people who have lost their jobs in the current recession are male — 82%. But the stimulus package is not aimed at helping them. In response to demands from feminist leaders, the Obama Administration rewrote the stimulus package to largely exclude them, as Christina Hoff Sommers has chronicled at length.

The Obama Administration purged the stimulus package of most of the investments in roads and bridges originally suggested by economists, and filled it instead with welfare and social spending, out of political correctness, after feminist leaders complained that building and repairing roads and bridges would put unemployed blue-collar men to work, rather than women.

As Christina Hoff Sommers points out, “Men are bearing the brunt of the current economic crisis because they predominate in manufacturing and construction, the hardest-hit sectors, which have lost more than 3 million jobs since December 2007. Women, by contrast, are a majority in recession-resistant fields such as education and health care, which gained 588,000 jobs during the same period.”

But when the Administration floated the concept of “an ambitious . . . stimulus program to modernize roads, bridges, schools, electrical grids, public transportation, and dams” as a way of “reinvigorating the hardest-hit sectors of the economy,” “Women’s groups were appalled,” asking “Where are the New Jobs for Women?” and denouncing what they called “The Macho Stimulus Plan.”

The Obama Administration quickly knuckled under to this pressure, replacing its recovery package with an $800 billion stimulus package that instead “skews job creation somewhat towards women” by spending money instead on social services like welfare that are administered mostly by female employees.

“A recent Associated Press story reports: ‘Stimulus Funds Go to Social Programs Over ‘Shovel-ready’ Projects.’ A team of six AP reporters who have been tracking the funds find that the $300 billion sent to the states is being used mainly for health care, education, unemployment benefits, food stamps, and other social services.” Or, as another AP report put it, “Stimulus Aid Favors Welfare, Not Work, Programs.” Less than 6 percent of it ended up going to transportation.

The stimulus package also repealed welfare reform, as Slate’s Mickey Kaus and the Heritage Foundation have noted. Obama ran campaign ads claiming to support welfare reform, even though he had actually fought against meaningful welfare reform as an Illinois legislator. The stimulus package largely repeals the welfare-reform law passed by Congress in 1996.

Obama claimed the stimulus package was needed to prevent the economy from suffering from “irreversible decline,” but the Congressional Budget Office admitted that the stimulus package would shrink the economy “in the long run.” The stimulus package has since destroyed thousands of jobs in America’s export sector, and subsidized countless examples of government waste and corruption.

Recently, Obama fired an inspector general, Gerald Walpin, who uncovered millions of dollars of waste and fraud in the AmeriCorps program, including by a prominent Obama supporter, endangering the Obama supporter’s ability to administer federal stimulus spending in Sacramento.

The stimulus package also imposes on states racial set-aside requirements and prevailing-wage requirements, which increase the cost to taxpayers of government contracts. The prevailing-wage requirements will inflate the cost of state construction and transportation projects by at least $17 billion. Racial set-asides also are very costly to taxpayers.

Racial quotas, set-asides, and affirmative action are also mandated by Obama’s health-care plan, drawing criticism from the U.S. Commission on Civil Rights, reports today’s Washington Times. Earlier, the Commission criticized the Obama Administration for turning a blind eye to racist voter intimidation by black panthers, including an Obama poll watcher and Democratic official who used a nightstick and racial epithets to drive white voters away from a Philadelphia polling place.