Xanadu

Since the U.S. Supreme Court’s 2005 Kelo v. New London decision, significant attention has been paid to the way government interacts in the property development realm. The case centered on a comprehensive redevelopment plan meant to augment pharmaceutical giant Pfizer’s new research and development campus (Pfizer announced construction in 1998 and decided to close the facility in 2009). The city devised a plan, financed in part by $15 million in bonds, which included financing for the Fort Trumbull State Park and a mixed-use development adjacent to the Pfizer campus. City planners estimated that the project would create 1,000 jobs and bring in new tax revenue.

After several homeowners refused to sell, the city of New London, Connecticut, initiated eminent domain condemnations through a public development corporation set up to complete the plan. The private developer of the mixed-use property was to receive a 99-year lease at $1 annually in exchange for developing the property in a manner consistent with the city’s plan.

The U.S. Supreme Court—in an unfortunate 5-4 decision—upheld the Supreme Court of Connecticut’s ruling. The lower court found that projected increased tax revenues and job creation resulting from potential economic development satisfied the requirements of the Fifth Amendment’s Takings Clause, which restricts private property condemnations by government only when the land is taken for “public use” and that the owner is given “just compensation.” This ruling, many scholars fear, has essentially rendered the Takings Clause meaningless in terms of its ability to actually protect individual property owners from unnecessary and unjust seizures. Justice Sandra Day O’Connor went as far to write in her dissent that the U.S. Supreme Court’s decision was “to wash out any distinction between private and public use of property—and thereby to effectively delete the words ‘for public use’ from the Takings Clause.”

Fundamentally, property development is an area where government has very little positive to contribute. Government cannot accurately forecast future economic conditions, as the New London-Pfizer situation demonstrates, and public officials have far less expertise in real estate development than private sector investors. Moreover, land-use restrictions such as zoning distort the real estate markets and are often used to justify public-sector involvement in real estate, as the private sector isn’t capable of fighting city hall—or so the story goes.

A recent study on New York City rezoning found that upzoned areas (those where zoning restrictions were eased to allow more types of development) were predominately populated by lower-income minorities outside of “high growth areas.” While upzoning will have beneficial effects on the neighborhood and the city as a whole, eliminating burdensome land-use restrictions such as zoning altogether should be preferred. Removing these restrictions would also neutralize the red-tape cutting argument for more government involvement in real estate development.

Real estate development policy nationwide has also become more beholden to ideological planners. The so-called “smart growth” and “New Urbanism” movements, which aim to promote “sustainable” and “livable” urban development, have begun to dominate urban development policy discussions across the country. These ideological movements have also received support from government bureaus such as the Environmental Protection Agency. Proponents desire to limit “suburban sprawl” and attempt to create denser developments closer to the urban cores, supported by expensive public “livability” projects and transit systems. A new method of promoting and enforcing this ideology is the form-based code.

Form-based codes, which have become quite popular as zoning alternatives in the southeastern United States, go far beyond the government invasiveness of Euclidian zoning regulation. Unlike traditional zoning, form-based codes specify regulatory compliance and land-use requirements that go beyond broad separation of uses restrictions. While they are touted as an improvement over zoning, form-based codes are in reality considerably worse. Public-sector meddling (and the resulting distortions) is increased across the board, which includes new requirements on green space (e.g., shade trees on private property and public parks), accessibility to public transit, and construction guidelines. In essence, form-based codes further undermine the spontaneous order that largely characterized the real estate market prior to the Euclid v. Ambler Reality decision by greatly enhancing the ability of central planners to dictate the terms of development.

Government in recent years has grown more interested in “aiding” the private sector in real estate development through public-private partnerships. The justifications generally given are that markets alone can’t bring about redevelopment—although, if true, policy makers rarely try to understand why that is the case (perhaps consumers don’t want them in the first place?)—and the existing public institutions are inadequate or counterproductive. Most often, this entails either a comprehensive redevelopment plan as was seen in Kelo or the development of large single-purpose structures such as stadiums and indoor shopping malls.

Unfortunately, these are merely symptoms of the disease: the command-and-control urban planning mindset. Planners presumably get the same rush that the political class feels when it “democratically” exercises its authority over the unwashed masses, and have convinced themselves (and much of the rationally ignorant public) that they produce significant social returns. This is not the case. In reality, they are merely misdirecting taxpayer dollars and private investment into development projects that no one desires enough to privately provide—another example of the road to Hell being paved (a bit more literally in this case) with good intentions.

The retail and entertainment development formerly known as Xanadu Meadowlands—recently renamed The Meadowlands—has been plagued with problems since the planning stage. The East Rutherford megamall is located on the site of the Meadowlands Sports Complex, about seven miles west of Midtown Manhattan in Bergen County, and would be the largest retail and entertainment complex in the United States. In addition to the shopping mall, Xanadu was to include an indoor ski jump, a basketball arena, a ballpark, a luxury hotel, and office towers. When the project was announced, it was hailed as the most innovative and expansive economic development public-private partnership ever to be undertaken in the United States.

The 4.8 million square foot project was expected to cost $1.3 billion when developers Mills Corporation—which had originally proposed the mall in 1998—and Mack-Cali Realty Corporation won the winning bid in February 2003. In March 2003, losing developers Hartz Mountain and Westfield America Trust both sued the New Jersey Sports and Exposition Authority (NJSEA), the state agency that owns the Meadowlands property, in an attempt to halt the deal. These lawsuits were ultimately unsuccessful, but the initial optimism over the project was already waning.

The NJSEA and Mills/Mack-Cali originally estimated an opening two years after groundbreaking, which occurred after the development consortium secured a 175-year lease from NJSEA in 2004. In 2005, the New York Giants, a Meadowlands Sports Complex tenant, filed suit in New Jersey Superior Court in an attempt to halt construction of Xanadu. The Giants claimed the project violated their lease agreement by obstructing views from the stadium, among other reasons. This lawsuit was also unsuccessful, but Mills was already in deep financial trouble. In the spring of 2006, Mills laid-off 15 percent of its staff, shareholders had filed suit, and the company was being investigated by several state attorneys general and the Securities and Exchange Commission. The company soon announced it was looking for buyers.

Mills was eventually sold to Indianapolis’ Simon Property Group, which abandoned the project after major lender Lehman Brothers collapsed and other lenders pulled out of what they viewed was a doomed development. Xanadu was then taken over by a new consortium led by Colony Capital, a California real estate investment firm. The project continued to suffer from financing difficulties, which led to ongoing work stoppages. By this time, the budget had ballooned to $2.3 billion. Dan Fasulo, managing director of real estate analysis firm Real Capital Analytics, described the Xanadu project as “too big to fail,” citing massive sunk costs and public liabilities.

In February 2010, it was announced that billionaire Bob Ross’ Related Companies, a major Manhattan developer, was taking over the project. This followed the release of a report authored by the transition team of Governor Chris Christie (R), which attacked Xanadu for its “failed business model” and which called on the state of New Jersey to tell the developers to “open or surrender the property” back to NJSEA. The report concluded:

There is no leasing plan making material on-site progress. The physical activities of construction are at a standstill, if not abandonment. The construction loan is out of balance. There are no monies readily available to finish construction of public areas or tenant improvements. Most, if not all, of announced major tenants have an ‘escape clause’ solely dependent on leasing—or lack thereof.

Officials were confident that Ross would be able to secure $500 million to $700 million in new financing and that an opening date could be expected as soon as mid-2011. However, in early July 2010, the role of Related Companies was still unclear, and the state was mulling the option of providing $180 million in emergency financing in a last-ditch attempt to save the project. Officials are considering tax increment financing (TIF), a method of public financing in which construction debt is financed by expected future tax revenue increases (the increment) that occur as a result of the property included in the TIF district becoming presumably more productive in the future. This, however, carries significant risk—public services may be over-provided, development investment may never materialize, and the likely possibility of harmful real estate market distortions, such as real property malinvestment, should concern local policy makers. A lot.

Regardless of whether or not Xanadu–sorry, The Meadowlands–is ever completed, New Jersey taxpayers will still be on the hook for the stupid mistakes of their unaccountable and shameless public officials. In the future, when “public-private partnership” and “economic development” are uttered in the same breath by some official or developer, New Jerseyites should run the other way. Fast.